A 2005 report on US naval doctrine stated that protecting US shipping and the transit of international
trade is a vital national security interest of Washington. It also recognized the necessity of US naval
strategists better preparing for the defense of allied merchant marine in future
conflicts. While recognizing the
importance of maintaining parity with Chinese and Russian rivals, a recent plan proposed by the admiralty also urged
for greater consideration of the changing strategic environment of the world’s
oceans, as limited budgets, burgeoning technologies, and new sea-lanes present novel
challenges for the next generation’s leaders.
Nevertheless, the overarching objectives ultimately remain the
same. In peace or future conflict, US naval operations must ensure the unimpeded movement of the goods, supplies, and troops
of itself and its allies while destroying or containing those of its
adversaries. Given the predominant role
played by the US navy in maintaining global access to maritime trade and
sea-lanes, however, the US stands poised to capture a commanding position over
the world’s maritime sea-lanes in the event of a future large-scale,
conventional conflict.
The United States, in conjunction with its allies, has
enjoyed naval supremacy since the end of the Cold War, with fleets larger than even
a combination of competitors. Overall,
in addition to supplying and transporting troops and material to bases or
conflicts around the world, it has maintained a policy of maintaining free
maritime access of the sea-lanes for international trade as a global public
good for which it receives limited recognition.
This gives it a global predominance over the corridors of international
trade. Yet, to date Washington has so
far not integrated this policy with the broader benefits it provides to its own
naval strategy. This is surprising, for
at present the US protection of the ocean’s major sea-lanes allows for the easy
transition from maintaining access, to dominating, the key corridors of naval
traffic. Given its preponderant position,
US naval doctrine should better direct its naval focus to rapidly transitioning
towards controlling these strategic locations in the conflicts of the future
Based upon Mahanian theories of
naval operations, US strategy recognizes the value of seizing or protecting the
narrow places of the world like the Straits of Malacca, the Dardanelles, or the
Suez and Panama Canals. These choke points serve as funnels that channel the
world’s traffic from one ocean to another, and which are far easier to block or
control than traversing the open sea. It
is for this reason that pirates often haunt these locations, hoping to prey
upon the numerous vessels forced to pass by their shores. By a similar token, the US boasting the
largest fleet afloat and deployed naval vessels constantly protecting the seas,
Washington inadvertently holds the key to dominating these waters in the face
of sudden conflict. At present, no other
state stands ready to assume or share in this role of protecting the global
commons sea-lanes. Moreover, with a
world reliant on US maintenance of the sea-lanes, few nations stand ready to
contest this maneuver as hostilities commence. Thus, no other nation is in such a position to
seize control of these areas in the event of open conflict.
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