Many observers
have been nonplused by the blasé attitude that the United States has seemed to
exhibit over whether India will increasingly ally itself with the United States
in the face of the rise of China in its global neighborhood. Indeed, at times, the United States has seemed
to believe that simply its wishing it to be so would make it true. President Obama has referred to India as a “natural
ally,” but this was only after he left them out of important speeches
concerning cooperation in Asia and a list of rising Asian powers, early in
his administration, for example. More recently,
the
discourse between the two countries has been very favorable, but concrete
action on military cooperation has lagged behind.
Nevertheless, the
prevailing thought has been that if India does indeed emerge to provide a regional
balance of power to China, this will occur via naval power. To be certain, India’s central position in
the Indian Ocean is near to extremely vital Sea Lines Of Communication (SLOC’s)
and could lend itself to that endeavor.
However, in a
recent article in The Diplomat,
Evan B. Montgomery suggests that the better pathway for India to balance China,
is on land. Montgomery argues that India’s biggest
challenges to their security are still land-based, and that in spite of recent
naval advancements, the Indian Army is still the most important branch of their
overall military. Assuming those
continental challenges do not significantly diminish, India will have to continue
its commitment to land-based forces. If India
creates an all-out naval competition with China as an additional priority, this
might overstress the Indian defense budgets and endanger Indian military
success. Chinese
analysts already view Indian naval modernization as the first step toward India
wanting to not just be able to control major choke points in the Indian Ocean,
but also to project power far beyond the Indian Ocean even to China’s own
littoral. If India develops a much more far-reaching “blue-water”
Navy, China might feel compelled to expand its naval presence outside of East
Asia, possibly even establishing permanent foreign naval bases to protect its
SLOC’s.
From the United States perspective, this
outcome would be very undesirable. With
China having to invest less and less of its defense budget toward traditional
land forces, it would be able to focus more and more (as it has been doing) on
naval, air and missile capabilities—the things most threatening to the United
States’ interests. If India were to focus more resources toward
its land forces near its disputed borders, China would have to direct some of
its focus toward responding in kind.
This continental distraction for China could work well for the United
States’ Pacific Pivot, and potentially be the better option for a regional
balance of power.
Therefore, Montgomery
argues that it may be best for the United States strategy to support what India
has already been doing to bolster its land forces and land-based air
forces. The United States should further
aid India with such things as intelligence sharing concerning Chinese troop
movements, aerial surveillance systems, and even eventually stealth
aircraft. This approach could serve to
truly balance Chinese power rather than give China reason to even more
aggressively escalate its naval power.
No comments:
Post a Comment