Special Operations in NATO

Starting with a Letter of Intent (LOI) in February 2019, then moving forward with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on October 25, five European states established the Regional Special Operations Component Command (R-SOCC).

Hungary launched the initiative, and thus will be responsible for “overall coordination of the regional command” as well as supplying the R-SOCC's commanding officer. Joined by fellow NATO members Croatia, Slovakia, and Slovenia, and NATO partner Austria, the five signees expect R-SOCC to “reach Initial Operational Capability” by January 2021 and “Final Operational Capability” by the end of 2024.

The command aims to improve the nations’ ability to “effectively employ their special forces,” as well as increase “cooperation and interoperability within” NATO at large. Alongside the Composite Special Operations Component Command (C-SOCC)—another regional command created in June 2018 by Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands—and NATO’s Special Operations Headquarters in Belgium, R-SOCC will specifically strengthen NATO Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the region as part of NATO’s quick-reaction Response Force.

The annual Trojan Footprint exercise provided NATO commanders with the opportunity to “evaluate the progress and future” of R-SOCC, with special attention paid to the command’s deployment viability in case of an increasingly likely crisis with Russia. Given the divide between several NATO allies that has bubbled up in the wake of the organization’s 70th anniversary, NATO needs the improved cooperation and coordination that R-SOCC and other special operations commands intend to provide.

Justified Intervention?

As the world’s most influential super power, the United States has a lot to offer the world in terms of aid both militarily and financially. The nation sees these as humanitarian efforts. We are intervening to help solve an issue in other country…  We are intervening to help others and spread democracy.. Helping  to create a more politically stable world order. 

But aren’t there legal ramifications to this? A country’s sovereignty is challenged when others intervene, especially when not called upon to do so. Under international law, using any formal military forces in a country that the United States is not already at war with, in fact, constitutes as an ACT of war. The lines become blurred when distinguishing between national and international. A consistent motto of the US, some would say is “Whatever it takes!”. Whatever it takes to protect our nation or help struggling ones, we will deal with the consequences later. Now it is true, that the majority of the time there is a larger forum of domestic and foreign support which constitutes the bending of rules sometimes.

What does this mean for national credibility? It depends each time.  And do the means outweigh the costs? Remember, whatever it takes right…
After the fallout of Operation Gothic Serpent in Somalia (estimated 300-500 killed), the US decided not to intervene in the Rwandan genocide (estimated 500,000-1,000,000 killed).  Was the ‘you live and you learn’ approach justified? Interventionism will always bare this inevitable question and the matter of civil liberties and accountability will remain disputed. If operations do not succeed is it worth defending others, when it is our troops on the ground? Well, one way to minimize casualties and resources is through the use of small, elite SOF units. 
The use of special operations forces will always remain on blurred lines.
Thomas Aquinas’ Just-war theory inspired a set of three criteria: 

1.       The action must be last resort 

2.       There must be a great chance of success

3.       The damage the act causes must be proportionate to the injury or injustice that caused it

                                          Do we use SOF or not? That depends...

“The world is flat, except when it is round” – Fredric Manget

Photo Credit: Reform

Unconventional Warfare as a Strategic Option

Unconventional warfare is not a new concept.  States such as Iran, Russia, France, and the United States have utilized unconventional warfare to achieve national interests.  However, the effectiveness of unconventional warfare has been questioned by some.  Unconventional warfare is a valid strategic option; but, to be effective it must be with a whole-of-government approach and preparations must be made well in advance.

              

           Unconventional warfare (UW) is not waged solely by Special Operations Forces (SOF).  To truly be successful, it must incorporate all aspects of national power to include diplomatic pressure, economic coercion, information dominance and military engagement.  Russia’s recent use of what their support for Houthis (although they still deny arming them). 
some have termed ‘Hybrid Warfare’ is an example of how an unconventional warfare campaign can secure national interests.  Iran is currently locked in an unconventional warfare campaign in Yemen as well.  Iran has supported Houthi rebels with drones, ballistic missiles, and small arms.  Iranian officials have even made public

              
          Indeed the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) address the issue of unconventional warfare.  In the 2017 NSS, the DoD is specifically tasked with sustaining its competencies in irregular warfare (IW)−UW is a subtask of IW – and acknowledges the need for long term planning.  The NSS further highlights the need to combine the tools of economic, information, and diplomatic statecraft as an important part in a “broader strategy to deter, coerce, and constrain adversaries.”  To meet the intent of the NSS, preparations must be made well in advance.

              
          To mount a successful UW campaign, SOF soldiers must invest significant time and effort in the potentially denied area.  This requires SOF to conduct operations in countries prior to hostilities, during steady state operations.  It is during this time when SOF troops make significant contributions in developing the human and infrastructure capital that is needed to execute a UW campaign.  Trying to establish a network once a conflict has started greatly increases the chance of failure and limits the use of UW as a strategic option.

           Unconventional warfare is not the panacea for international challenges.  However, it is an effective option when confrontation between the U.S. and another state is deemed unfeasible or politically imprudent due to the potentially catastrophic consequences.  Indeed, the use of UW to coerce or disrupt an adversary may likely prove the best option when it looks like a military confrontation is inevitable, such as preventing an attack on a U.S. ally.

Hearts and Minds ≠ Free S#!T

http://darylcagle.com/2014/08/19/gotta-love-those-policemen/

When Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations entered full-swing in Iraq (and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan) the catch phrase of “winning the hearts and minds” re-entered the lexicon of military leaders and this strategy was heralded as being the key to success in Iraq and Afghanistan.  However, within a decade the term “hearts and minds” was met with derision and cast aside as overly naïve and unrealistic.  Unfortunately, this strategy has received undue criticism in its oversimplification and the lack of understanding by those that attempted to implement it.

The simplified idea that “if I just give them stuff they will like me” has plagued military units since the start of the wars.  Schools go unused, clinics unstaffed and bags of food resold in the market and the population remains distant.  Why is this?  Looking back to the Malay Emergency, we find a different idea of how to win the “hearts and minds”.

True, the Malay Emergency is different than Iraq and Afghanistan, but so is every war; they are all different.  And yes, there are many factors that contributed to the success of the tea-drinking Brits such as physically separating the ‘base’ and controlling every aspect of the at-risk population such food control programs and the daily deluge of propaganda. However, the British recognized that ‘winning’ the population was a necessary part of its success criteria.

To win their ‘hearts’ you have to convince the population that your success is linked to their interests.  To win their ‘minds’ you have to convince the population that you are actually capable of winning.  Unfortunately for the predominantly ethnic Chinese communist movement in Malaysia, the British utilized a host of social and political reforms coupled with tactical victories to limit the success of the Malayan Communist Party and its armed wing, the Malayan National Liberation Army.

In the ‘hearts’ category, the British implemented a series of social and political reforms aimed at undermining the communist position.  The British took control of the political narrative and pushed the idea of nationalism to separate the anti-colonialists from the communists.  The British government also carried out massive civic and information (propaganda) programs targeted at the rebel’s ‘base’.  In the ‘minds’ category, a series of British tactical victories pushed the communists further and further into the jungles, physically separating them from the people and convincing the population the insurgent movement was too inept and incapable of winning.

There is truly more to winning the “hearts and minds” of a population than simple giving money and things away.  I can only hope that America’s recent experiment with “hearts and minds” hasn’t left a bad taste in the mouths of military personnel, policy makers and the population.