COIN: Don't Stop While We're Winning

     My esteemed colleague, Alice Reichert, recently argued that the United States Military is focusing far too much on COIN and not nearly enough on the fundamental skills of conventional war. Ms. Reichert is concerned that the United States is losing its ability to wage a major war against belligerents such as North Korea. Of course, no commander in their right mind would completely eschew the training of conventional skills, especially when these skills form the foundation for fighting Big War and for conducting COIN. We must however remember that the impetus behind FM3-24, the Surge and the wide adoption of COIN was the failure of pure conventional tactics in a changing battlefield.

     First and foremost, COIN has been successful, both in older historical contexts and in recent wars. The British of course are famous for their successes in Malaysia against the Malayan National Liberation Army and in Northern Ireland against the Irish Republican Army (their day did not come). The United States has been successful in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War, during the Reconstruction after the Civil War, and yes, most recently in Iraq. Indeed, careful use of COIN tactics should prevent insurgencies in the Western Sahel from becoming as strong as examples in the Middle East. Finally, the U.S. Military should not abandon just as it is on the cusp of victory, as they did after the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War. In that example, the U.S. Military, in conjunction with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) largely crushed the Viet Cong (VC), but withdrew from the country (a political move) before total victory could be achieved.

ARVN forces repel the VC during the Tet Offensive

     It is said that armies always prepare for the last war that they fought. In the interwar period, several countries developed heavy line breaking tanks for extensive trench warfare which never materialized again. After World War II and the Korean War, U.S. military leaders attempted to fight the same war in Vietnam. Some military scholars, such as Gian P. Gentile, are concerned that the U.S. is placing too much emphasis on COIN in the face of future threats of conventional war; however, asymmetric warfare is not behind the U.S. yet. The U.S. must prepare for the wars which it is now faced rather than the prospect of a Big War with China, Russia or North Korea. Of course, completely focusing on COIN at the expense of conventional warfighting capability would be a mistake: the military must continue to train soldiers in the fundamental skills necessary for conventional war. Nevertheless, we must continue to engage in COIN for the foreseeable future: for as long as there are insurgencies, militaries must be able to crush them and provide security for the state. We are winning, but we haven’t won yet.

Hearts and Minds ≠ Free S#!T

http://darylcagle.com/2014/08/19/gotta-love-those-policemen/

When Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations entered full-swing in Iraq (and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan) the catch phrase of “winning the hearts and minds” re-entered the lexicon of military leaders and this strategy was heralded as being the key to success in Iraq and Afghanistan.  However, within a decade the term “hearts and minds” was met with derision and cast aside as overly naïve and unrealistic.  Unfortunately, this strategy has received undue criticism in its oversimplification and the lack of understanding by those that attempted to implement it.

The simplified idea that “if I just give them stuff they will like me” has plagued military units since the start of the wars.  Schools go unused, clinics unstaffed and bags of food resold in the market and the population remains distant.  Why is this?  Looking back to the Malay Emergency, we find a different idea of how to win the “hearts and minds”.

True, the Malay Emergency is different than Iraq and Afghanistan, but so is every war; they are all different.  And yes, there are many factors that contributed to the success of the tea-drinking Brits such as physically separating the ‘base’ and controlling every aspect of the at-risk population such food control programs and the daily deluge of propaganda. However, the British recognized that ‘winning’ the population was a necessary part of its success criteria.

To win their ‘hearts’ you have to convince the population that your success is linked to their interests.  To win their ‘minds’ you have to convince the population that you are actually capable of winning.  Unfortunately for the predominantly ethnic Chinese communist movement in Malaysia, the British utilized a host of social and political reforms coupled with tactical victories to limit the success of the Malayan Communist Party and its armed wing, the Malayan National Liberation Army.

In the ‘hearts’ category, the British implemented a series of social and political reforms aimed at undermining the communist position.  The British took control of the political narrative and pushed the idea of nationalism to separate the anti-colonialists from the communists.  The British government also carried out massive civic and information (propaganda) programs targeted at the rebel’s ‘base’.  In the ‘minds’ category, a series of British tactical victories pushed the communists further and further into the jungles, physically separating them from the people and convincing the population the insurgent movement was too inept and incapable of winning.

There is truly more to winning the “hearts and minds” of a population than simple giving money and things away.  I can only hope that America’s recent experiment with “hearts and minds” hasn’t left a bad taste in the mouths of military personnel, policy makers and the population.  

What the Hell are We Doing!?

The other day, the Obama Administration decided that the pressure from the international community, namely the UN and the Arab League, was too much for him not to pursue military action in the Libya situation. With this "no fly zone," the administration has fallen into the trap of believing that detached operations from aerial platforms can effect lasting strategic change. The administration struggles to answer what the endstate in Libya looks like. I thought we should expand on this for them.

First, we should understand (as best as we can) what we are committed to.
- We want Qadaffi gone, but AFRICOM, at least on the low side, is not allowed to kill him.
- Some have admitted that a Libya with Qadaffi is still a possibility.
- We are supporting an unknown "rebel" entity that has no clear leader or political organization that is prepared to take control of the country once "regime change" happens.
- We got into this now instead of before, because........
- The Arab League originally supported a "no fly zone" but not they are wobbling
- Russia is laughing at us. But Putin is an idiot.
- We are going to "hand this over" ASAP

Someone studying strategy would consider what the end of this thing looks like. So lets...

Those thinking about this in the administration are likely praying for an Egypt-type scenario where the Libyan military, with overwhelming support by the Libyan people, turns against Qaddafi and he is run out of town. Somehow there is a smooth transition to an interim government, followed by steps toward elections. Since this same military was just shelling its people, I don't see it happening, but you never know... Though the Eqypt solution still isn't even clear in Egypt, we will call that the absolute best case scenario.

More likely to happen in this case is that if Qaddafi is killed or run out of town and retaliatory acts ignite in a lawless land. This will result in complete state failure, a la Somalia. What then? The international community will be hard-pressed to stand idly by while the country implodes, since military action contributed to this state. Someone, therefore will have to commit Stability and Support personnel into the country that will help stand up a new Libya. The uncertain security situation will likely demand some sort of military personnel and "they" will look to the US for money and/or troops. Regime change was our mission in Iraq, and that is what this outcome resembles.

Considering the process before Qaddafi falls...our "humanitarian effort" right now is designed to establish a no fly zone to prevent Qaddafi from massacring somebody. If the rebel forces restart their offensive and start getting whacked by the Libyan Army again, what will we do? An idea...lets identify a leader in the resistence that has a reasonable amount of political clout and may be able to run the country. We can embed special forces with this guy and have them call in Close Air Support until the regime falls. Oh wait....we did this....that guy's name was Karzai.

Now...if Qaddafi doesn't fall. He can rightly declare victory against basically the entire world. Does this matter? Maybe, maybe not. I believe that it will place in doubt other country's belief in America's resolve. President Obama will almost certainly not be reelected.

Reality check:
- This "got real" to many when our first casualty, an F-15 (thankfully no humans were seriously wounded) crashed into "friendly" territory because of mechanical problems. Let's imagine for a second if this plane crashed where Qaddafi's goons got a hold of him.

Our recent lesson on the mythical RMA addresses this situation very well. Despite the Army Operational Concept - the product of a lengthy project that considered the fundamental fallacy of the RMA - some among our higher brass are still convinced that the technology advances in recent decades have lifted the fog of war and allowed us to execute decisive action using PGMs (precision guided munitions) and no BOGs (boots on the ground). BG McMaster discussed in a teleconference with the COIN class this week how Iraq and Afghanistan have proven this.

To be clear - I want the US / Obama to "win" this thing. I just don't know what that means. Unfortunatly, the only good solution I see is someone (hopefully not the US) conducting Iraq-like Stability and Support Operations in Libya. Hopefully they will quell the insurgency (because there will be one) early with the lessons that we've learned over the last 11 years.