COIN: Don't Stop While We're Winning

     My esteemed colleague, Alice Reichert, recently argued that the United States Military is focusing far too much on COIN and not nearly enough on the fundamental skills of conventional war. Ms. Reichert is concerned that the United States is losing its ability to wage a major war against belligerents such as North Korea. Of course, no commander in their right mind would completely eschew the training of conventional skills, especially when these skills form the foundation for fighting Big War and for conducting COIN. We must however remember that the impetus behind FM3-24, the Surge and the wide adoption of COIN was the failure of pure conventional tactics in a changing battlefield.

     First and foremost, COIN has been successful, both in older historical contexts and in recent wars. The British of course are famous for their successes in Malaysia against the Malayan National Liberation Army and in Northern Ireland against the Irish Republican Army (their day did not come). The United States has been successful in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War, during the Reconstruction after the Civil War, and yes, most recently in Iraq. Indeed, careful use of COIN tactics should prevent insurgencies in the Western Sahel from becoming as strong as examples in the Middle East. Finally, the U.S. Military should not abandon just as it is on the cusp of victory, as they did after the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War. In that example, the U.S. Military, in conjunction with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) largely crushed the Viet Cong (VC), but withdrew from the country (a political move) before total victory could be achieved.

ARVN forces repel the VC during the Tet Offensive

     It is said that armies always prepare for the last war that they fought. In the interwar period, several countries developed heavy line breaking tanks for extensive trench warfare which never materialized again. After World War II and the Korean War, U.S. military leaders attempted to fight the same war in Vietnam. Some military scholars, such as Gian P. Gentile, are concerned that the U.S. is placing too much emphasis on COIN in the face of future threats of conventional war; however, asymmetric warfare is not behind the U.S. yet. The U.S. must prepare for the wars which it is now faced rather than the prospect of a Big War with China, Russia or North Korea. Of course, completely focusing on COIN at the expense of conventional warfighting capability would be a mistake: the military must continue to train soldiers in the fundamental skills necessary for conventional war. Nevertheless, we must continue to engage in COIN for the foreseeable future: for as long as there are insurgencies, militaries must be able to crush them and provide security for the state. We are winning, but we haven’t won yet.

Hearts and Minds ≠ Free S#!T

http://darylcagle.com/2014/08/19/gotta-love-those-policemen/

When Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations entered full-swing in Iraq (and to a lesser extent in Afghanistan) the catch phrase of “winning the hearts and minds” re-entered the lexicon of military leaders and this strategy was heralded as being the key to success in Iraq and Afghanistan.  However, within a decade the term “hearts and minds” was met with derision and cast aside as overly naïve and unrealistic.  Unfortunately, this strategy has received undue criticism in its oversimplification and the lack of understanding by those that attempted to implement it.

The simplified idea that “if I just give them stuff they will like me” has plagued military units since the start of the wars.  Schools go unused, clinics unstaffed and bags of food resold in the market and the population remains distant.  Why is this?  Looking back to the Malay Emergency, we find a different idea of how to win the “hearts and minds”.

True, the Malay Emergency is different than Iraq and Afghanistan, but so is every war; they are all different.  And yes, there are many factors that contributed to the success of the tea-drinking Brits such as physically separating the ‘base’ and controlling every aspect of the at-risk population such food control programs and the daily deluge of propaganda. However, the British recognized that ‘winning’ the population was a necessary part of its success criteria.

To win their ‘hearts’ you have to convince the population that your success is linked to their interests.  To win their ‘minds’ you have to convince the population that you are actually capable of winning.  Unfortunately for the predominantly ethnic Chinese communist movement in Malaysia, the British utilized a host of social and political reforms coupled with tactical victories to limit the success of the Malayan Communist Party and its armed wing, the Malayan National Liberation Army.

In the ‘hearts’ category, the British implemented a series of social and political reforms aimed at undermining the communist position.  The British took control of the political narrative and pushed the idea of nationalism to separate the anti-colonialists from the communists.  The British government also carried out massive civic and information (propaganda) programs targeted at the rebel’s ‘base’.  In the ‘minds’ category, a series of British tactical victories pushed the communists further and further into the jungles, physically separating them from the people and convincing the population the insurgent movement was too inept and incapable of winning.

There is truly more to winning the “hearts and minds” of a population than simple giving money and things away.  I can only hope that America’s recent experiment with “hearts and minds” hasn’t left a bad taste in the mouths of military personnel, policy makers and the population.  

The Muppets Take Multan

The Marines, Army, Air Force and Navy have all played integral roles in U.S. counterinsurgency operations. Now, the U.S. is unleashing its latest COIN force: the Muppets.

According to TIME Magazine, the U.S. Agency for International Development (U.S. AID) has allocated $20 million for the production of a Pakistani version of Sesame Street, intended to air on Pakistan national TV and regional Urdu language channels. While Elmo will make an appearance, the show will focus on a six-year-old puppet named Rami, who will explore the streets of a traditional Pakistani village.

As on the American Sesame Street, the Pakistani version will teach children lessons on literacy, numeracy and healthy eating. However, the show also plans to address local political issues in what the show’s writers call “a gradual journey.” In addition to touching on “what little girls have to go through in [Pakistan’s] gender-biased society,” the program will eventually deal with militancy in Pakistan, possibly including “a gentle treatment” of how children are affected by terrorism and how they can cope with their fear.

The Muppets are used to doing heavy lifting abroad. Between 1983 and 2007, Israel aired five incarnations of Rechov Sumsum, a Sesame Street adaptation featuring an Arab-Israeli Muslim Muppet that discusses religious divisions. South Africa’s Takalani Sesame has tackled post-apartheid issues using Bert and Ernie, who respectively speak with black and white South African accents but maintain a strong friendship. More recently, the HIV-positive Muppet Kami was added to teach kids and their families about the importance of accepting people with AIDS and seeking treatment if needed. Even schools in Afghanistan tested a series of videos that included an Islamic version of Grover in 2004.

As furry and funny educational warriors, the Muppets might be the best troops available for the job. According to World Bank data, approximately 7.3 million Pakistani children between 5 and 9 years old aren’t currently enrolled in school – the third-lowest attendance rate in the world. Through televised Sesame Street episodes and a series of related live shows planned for areas with lower TV ownership, children can learn basic reading and math skills that they might otherwise not encounter in a state where roughly half of the population is illiterate. Since girls in particular are frequently denied the benefits of education, seeing a Muppet girl from their own culture who loves reading and learning may encourage kids to believe that girls really can belong in a classroom.

There are benefits that transcend education, of course. Many of the U.S. TV shows currently aired abroad, from Tom & Jerry cartoons to WWE matches, contain elements of violence that can affect impressionable kids and perpetuate stereotypes of American cultural depravity. An alternative like Sesame Street teaches children to value communication and cooperation over violence, and shows both kids and parents a much more positive set of American values.

While the impact on kids is more of a long-term investment, the effect on parents is intended to be more immediate. The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual notes that, “When women support COIN efforts, families support COIN efforts.” If women watching Sesame Street along with their kids approve of the show’s educational and cultural content, they’ll not only let them continue watching, but may learn right along with them, and might even view U.S. culture with slightly less suspicion.

However, Miss Piggy and friends inevitably bring some baggage along when they travel. Although Pakistan’s Sesame Street will be filled mainly with new “regionally appropriate” puppets, visits from the original cast can cause some interesting cultural dilemmas. In preparing an Afghani version of the show, creators struggled with whether female Muppets should wear headscarves or burqas, whether Bert and Ernie needed beards, and whether the audience would accept women in positions of authority over men, like shopkeeper Maria in the U.S. version. Some of these issues may be relevant for the Pakistani version, too.

There’s also concern that parents might not let their kids tune in at all. The show’s development is currently funded by donors from states like Sweden and the Netherlands in addition to U.S. groups, and local educators and writers will ultimately determine the content. Since Sesame Street is a U.S. concept, though, suspicious parents may classify it more as U.S. propaganda and another example of Western imperialism rather than an educational show. If Pakistanis are upset by inclusion of Western values and views on subjects like militancy, they may be more likely to distrust efforts by other actors like Greg Mortenson, whose school-building and education programs are more strictly academic.

Still, a Muppet with a book is a more desirable teacher than a cat with a mallet or an insurgent with a weapon. At the very least, it’s far more huggable.