How do the Russian Armed Forces express jointness?

We've seen a resurgent Russian military in Syria in the last few years, and they seem to be notably more effective than the team we saw in Georgia and Chechnya. They have new weapons for sure, but there is also performance that reflects a new training structure that leverages effective joint operations. Did they have a Goldwater-Nichols moment? Well, sorta.

General Staff

The Army's Foreign Military Service Office (FMSO) produced an e-book in 2017 called The Russian Way of War (PDF) which is one of the only documents I've found that explores Russian inter-service cooperation thoroughly. According to the authors Dr. Lester Grau and Charles Bartles, Russian command and control has jointness baked-in. They write:

Unlike the U.S. military, officers do not rotate through “joint” assignments. In the Russian system, “joint” matters, such as operational-strategic level planning and capabilities and doctrine development, are handled exclusively by General Staff personnel...Since matters of military doctrine and procurement are decided by the General Staff, it is considered essential that officers break their fixation with their branch of service (Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force, etc.) and branch of arms (infantry, armor, artillery, etc.) in order to avoid the 'trade union mentality' that hinders military doctrine and procurement matters in Western armies.

The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency's 2017 report on Russian military power confirms the FMSO report, adding that this design is intended to speed up decision-making and enable joint operations. It invites the question if jointness exists in the upper command hierarchy, why didn't the Soviet Armed Forces have joint operations commands below them?

Reform

Russian Armed Forces began to truly recognize a need for restructuring almost immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but efforts to modernize have taken decades. Informed by painful experiences in Chechnya and Georgia, real discussion of reform doesn't really take off until 2008 when unpopular Russian Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdukov announces "New Look." The irony of this name should not be lost on this blog's readership.  Some of Serdukov's proposals came into place in 2010; such as the conversion of military districts into operational-strategic commands (OSKs). Momentum for the reform would take-off when Sergei Shoigu became Defense Minister in 2012.
Serdyukov worked closely with Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov on a wide body of reforms focused on "greater mobility, eliminating mass mobilization in exchange for higher levels of constant readiness, and improving inter-service coordination." Much like the US, Russia realized in battle situations that cooperation between services was weak and was hampering their effectiveness on the battlefield. A number of sources that have studied Russian operations in Syria say that the jointness is much improved over 2008. Russian military reform is still underway, and the fight in Syria is being observed by some as a sandbox for playing out how this "new look" is, um, looking.

OSKs

In 2010 as part of the overall reform package, they converted their six "military districts" into four OSKs based on geographical regions. These are similar in nature to U.S. Combatant Commands. The name for the western region "Zapad" ought to look familiar as well. The military exercises that US media was obsessed with last year are one of the four that happened as part of ongoing readiness training. A fifth joint strategic command was added in 2015 in recognition of the Arctic as an emerging battlespace.  The new structure means that units assigned to these regions train for joint-defense of that particular battlespace.

Russian OSKs. (Grau and Bartles, p28)

Syria

Operations in Syria provide evidence of Russian operational jointness. The SU-25 Frogfoot lost in Maasran is the Russian aircraft designed for close air support. Other attack aircraft were likely used to clear the way: bombing fixed targets, weapons caches, and command/control points of the opposition. There are numerous videos showing Russian helicopters attacking targets, likely in a close-air-support role for Iranian-backed militias. The Black Sea Fleet provided sea-lift for base-protection troops and the missile cruiser Moskva as a platform for the fearsome S-300 air defense system to back the CAS mission.
It appears that the broad reforms started 15 years ago are beginning to show fruit. While some of the more futuristic and surprising capabilities of a reformed army make the news (UAVs and cyber), it should come as no surprise that the grandchildren of "Deep Battle" understand how to modernize and institutionalize inter-service integration.

Justified Intervention?

As the world’s most influential super power, the United States has a lot to offer the world in terms of aid both militarily and financially. The nation sees these as humanitarian efforts. We are intervening to help solve an issue in other country…  We are intervening to help others and spread democracy.. Helping  to create a more politically stable world order. 

But aren’t there legal ramifications to this? A country’s sovereignty is challenged when others intervene, especially when not called upon to do so. Under international law, using any formal military forces in a country that the United States is not already at war with, in fact, constitutes as an ACT of war. The lines become blurred when distinguishing between national and international. A consistent motto of the US, some would say is “Whatever it takes!”. Whatever it takes to protect our nation or help struggling ones, we will deal with the consequences later. Now it is true, that the majority of the time there is a larger forum of domestic and foreign support which constitutes the bending of rules sometimes.

What does this mean for national credibility? It depends each time.  And do the means outweigh the costs? Remember, whatever it takes right…
After the fallout of Operation Gothic Serpent in Somalia (estimated 300-500 killed), the US decided not to intervene in the Rwandan genocide (estimated 500,000-1,000,000 killed).  Was the ‘you live and you learn’ approach justified? Interventionism will always bare this inevitable question and the matter of civil liberties and accountability will remain disputed. If operations do not succeed is it worth defending others, when it is our troops on the ground? Well, one way to minimize casualties and resources is through the use of small, elite SOF units. 
The use of special operations forces will always remain on blurred lines.
Thomas Aquinas’ Just-war theory inspired a set of three criteria: 

1.       The action must be last resort 

2.       There must be a great chance of success

3.       The damage the act causes must be proportionate to the injury or injustice that caused it

                                          Do we use SOF or not? That depends...

“The world is flat, except when it is round” – Fredric Manget

Photo Credit: Reform

A European Union Military?

There have recently been calls for a more robust EU joint defense, to go so far as to have an EU military. The EU does not have a joint military- a military that is staffed and run on a supranational level.

Currently the EU member states cooperate between themselves and with outside alliances. Cooperation within the EU takes places under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) which entered into force with the Treaty of Lisbon.In addition, 22 of 28 EU member states are part of NATO.

This creates a difficult security environment, one that does not have many successes (ex: the Balkans, many African cases, almost anywhere the EU has wanted to interfere).   Many states are against the idea of an supranational EU military, but others are for it. With the problems of Germany's military to the lack of 2% of GDP to their military that many NATO states don't contribute, an EU military is an alternative.

On March 8, 2015 the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker called for an EU military to help the world take the EU seriously. Further he advocated that “A common army among the Europeans would convey to Russia that we are serious about defending the values of the European Union.” His arguments also included that it would be more efficient to have a common military than each state paying to maintain it separately.

There was immediate backlash from the UK. Both the opposition and ruling party voiced their immediate displeasure with David Cameron (British Prime Minister) going so far as to say “it isn’t right for the European Union to have capabilities, armies, air forces and all the rest of it”. The next day Finland said that an EU army is "unrealistic," however the Foreign Minister said that an army composed of joint military units would be more possible. In addition, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia insist upon utilizing NATO rather than an EU military.

This is compared to Germany, whose defense minister stated that  “our future as Europeans will one day be a European army." France has also expressed support for the idea.

Javier Solana (former NATO secretary general) and Steven Blockmans (professor at University of Amsterdam) have pointed out that the EU's treaties allow for a common military. They argue that there are political, military, and economic benefits to creating a single EU military: "Member states could achieve much more value for money than the €190 billion that they spend to keep up 28 national armies."

Where John Schindler (former National Security Agency official), argues against creating an EU army because Europe already mismanages it military forces, so pooling them is a really bad idea. Further, he argues, many defense projects are already coordinated and European-wide projects so duplicating these things is not needed.

The Bigger Picture

However, this debate is not just about having an EU military or not having one. Rather it is on the future of the EU as a Union of European States or a Union of European States. If the 28 member states of the European Union want to create a full supranational union that has political, economic, and military power they will need to move forward on creating a single European military rather than simply coordinating their military.  If they want to stay as they are, with some cooperation in all areas but no real full integration, then an EU military is not needed.

As Solana and Blockmans pointed out, the EU has always been forged in crisis and the EU is facing a crisis now (think of them essentially being surrounded by conflict).

Whatever decision the EU makes on creating a military, and it is looking increasingly less and less likely, it will be a step down a road that precludes the other option (at least until another crisis or a widespread change of national governments).