How do the Russian Armed Forces express jointness?

We've seen a resurgent Russian military in Syria in the last few years, and they seem to be notably more effective than the team we saw in Georgia and Chechnya. They have new weapons for sure, but there is also performance that reflects a new training structure that leverages effective joint operations. Did they have a Goldwater-Nichols moment? Well, sorta.

General Staff

The Army's Foreign Military Service Office (FMSO) produced an e-book in 2017 called The Russian Way of War (PDF) which is one of the only documents I've found that explores Russian inter-service cooperation thoroughly. According to the authors Dr. Lester Grau and Charles Bartles, Russian command and control has jointness baked-in. They write:

Unlike the U.S. military, officers do not rotate through “joint” assignments. In the Russian system, “joint” matters, such as operational-strategic level planning and capabilities and doctrine development, are handled exclusively by General Staff personnel...Since matters of military doctrine and procurement are decided by the General Staff, it is considered essential that officers break their fixation with their branch of service (Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force, etc.) and branch of arms (infantry, armor, artillery, etc.) in order to avoid the 'trade union mentality' that hinders military doctrine and procurement matters in Western armies.

The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency's 2017 report on Russian military power confirms the FMSO report, adding that this design is intended to speed up decision-making and enable joint operations. It invites the question if jointness exists in the upper command hierarchy, why didn't the Soviet Armed Forces have joint operations commands below them?

Reform

Russian Armed Forces began to truly recognize a need for restructuring almost immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but efforts to modernize have taken decades. Informed by painful experiences in Chechnya and Georgia, real discussion of reform doesn't really take off until 2008 when unpopular Russian Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdukov announces "New Look." The irony of this name should not be lost on this blog's readership.  Some of Serdukov's proposals came into place in 2010; such as the conversion of military districts into operational-strategic commands (OSKs). Momentum for the reform would take-off when Sergei Shoigu became Defense Minister in 2012.
Serdyukov worked closely with Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov on a wide body of reforms focused on "greater mobility, eliminating mass mobilization in exchange for higher levels of constant readiness, and improving inter-service coordination." Much like the US, Russia realized in battle situations that cooperation between services was weak and was hampering their effectiveness on the battlefield. A number of sources that have studied Russian operations in Syria say that the jointness is much improved over 2008. Russian military reform is still underway, and the fight in Syria is being observed by some as a sandbox for playing out how this "new look" is, um, looking.

OSKs

In 2010 as part of the overall reform package, they converted their six "military districts" into four OSKs based on geographical regions. These are similar in nature to U.S. Combatant Commands. The name for the western region "Zapad" ought to look familiar as well. The military exercises that US media was obsessed with last year are one of the four that happened as part of ongoing readiness training. A fifth joint strategic command was added in 2015 in recognition of the Arctic as an emerging battlespace.  The new structure means that units assigned to these regions train for joint-defense of that particular battlespace.

Russian OSKs. (Grau and Bartles, p28)

Syria

Operations in Syria provide evidence of Russian operational jointness. The SU-25 Frogfoot lost in Maasran is the Russian aircraft designed for close air support. Other attack aircraft were likely used to clear the way: bombing fixed targets, weapons caches, and command/control points of the opposition. There are numerous videos showing Russian helicopters attacking targets, likely in a close-air-support role for Iranian-backed militias. The Black Sea Fleet provided sea-lift for base-protection troops and the missile cruiser Moskva as a platform for the fearsome S-300 air defense system to back the CAS mission.
It appears that the broad reforms started 15 years ago are beginning to show fruit. While some of the more futuristic and surprising capabilities of a reformed army make the news (UAVs and cyber), it should come as no surprise that the grandchildren of "Deep Battle" understand how to modernize and institutionalize inter-service integration.

Russia, UBL, and the Crusades??

The cover of Moscow News reported the day after the death of Usama Bin Laden how proud they were that President Obama informed The Russian leadership (I would say President Medvedev, but let's get real...he probably called Putin) of the death of the terrorist before his speech to the American People.  The article referenced the famous called made by the then-President Putin to President Bush to express condolonces on 9/11.  While these chat lines between world leaders make for feel-good stories, and good line-fillers for poor graduate students writing about international relations and diplomacy, some associated themes including the Eagle and the Bear.
Included in the Moscow Times article and further discussed here was some comparison between UBL's death and the deaths of key terrorist leaders associated with the Caucasus situation.  One was Shamil Basaev.  Basaev made a name for himself after the First Chechen War seemed to be calming down.  After the Chechen rebels lost the region's capital, Grozny, the resistence faded into the mountains with the Russian forces believing that the war was coming to an end.  In 1996, however, Basaev led a band of rebels back into the city after collected signifant intelligence on Russian psitions and overwhelmed the Interior Ministry forces.  This resulted in a stalemate, with Chechnya maintaining an autonomous status within the Russian borders.  He also took credit for the deadly and heartbreaking Beslan School massacre.  The Russians hunted Basaev with similar zeal as the US did UBL, finally killing him in Ingushetia.  The Russian's similarly targeted de facto President of Chechnya Dzhokar Dudayev using SIGINT and capitalizing with a guided missile.
The Russians have made clear that they believe that, like these Chechen characters, that retribution and justice against UBL was well deserved and well served.  They further caution that their problems in the Caucasus did not disspate after these individuals were killed.  Though our EComCon colleague points out, expertly, that this may provide an opportunity to use this as an excuse to get out of Afghanistan, our rhetoric should not affect how we focus on the strategic threat posed by Al Qaeda and similar terrorist organizations.
In stark contract to the support quietly put forward by the Russians regarding this fantastic execution of a special raid, former President Putin has been very vocal on his distaste for the ongoing NATO operation in Libya.  This is not a surprising siezure by the "future President" as he will take any opportunity he can to stick it to NATO.  Some of these tensions come from the ongoing process to induct Georgia into the alliance and the previous efforts to do the same with Ukraine.  Early in the implementation of the NATO operation in Libya, Putin controversially likened the military efforts against Qadaffi to another Western Crusade.
If the Obama administration delays for too long before finally releasing the photos of UBL's corpse, I would not be surprised if Putin is the first to make snide remarks about a possible conspiracy by the US.  Not to say that their handling of the Basayev operation was all that great.  "Basayev's body has been identified through some of the fragments, including his head."
As the Russians have alluded, the US should continue to focus on the Al Qaeda threat, but can consider options that this victory has affored.  As for Russia...hopefully we will stop enabling their fantasy that they are a strong state and adjust our policies accordingly.  See my previously posting colleague.