I'll Give You Something to Lose Sleep Over

As reported in the Financial Times last Sunday, the Iranians may have acquired a new state-of-the-art speed boat, much to the concern of the Obama Administration and those US Navy personnel stationed in the Persian Gulf. The Bradstone Challenger, developed by the British company ICE Marine and partially financed by the US-based defense contractor Navatek, is a pretty kick*** ride; it can comfortably reach 71 mph in open waters. In 2005, it circumvented the island of Britain in some 27 hours and 10 minutes, averaging 61.5 mph. Since then, the Iranians have been trying to get their hands on it. The UK Department of Trade and Industry blocked an initial attempt by the Iranians to purchase the vessel. Then in January 2009, through mishap and circumstance, the vessel ended up in South Africa, headed for shipment to Iran on an Iranian cargo ship. The US Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security requested that South Africa block the transfer, but, as the story goes, the South Africans missed the memo, and the Bladerunner 51 was loaded on to the Iranian ship, named ironically, The Diplomat. US Special Forces were on hand ready to stop the cargo ship, but the order was never given.

Why such a big deal, you ask? The Iranians like fast boats just like any other sea-faring man's man, right? Well, sure, but when you're also developing a super-fast torpedo capable of sinking submarines and warships, the pieces start to come together and folks start to get worried. Iranian speed boats equipped with Russian designed Shkval (Squall) torpedoes could possibly be deployed against the US 5th Fleet thus reeking havoc in the Persian Gulf. Or they could be deployed to sink oil tankers passing through the Straight of Hormuz, a critical transit point for approximately 40% of the world's oil. Even without the torpedoes, these fast-moving boats skippered by the Iranian navy pose a serious threat that must be addressed. Indeed, if these type scenarios became reality, it would be a very big deal.

However, before we go getting all up and arms about this, it's worth knowing that this isn't the first time this issue has come up. Actually, the idea has been around for quite a while, at least since 1987. And the Iranians are no strangers to provoking US warships with small speed boats, as shown in this 2008 video aired on ABC News. So the history is there. And Craig Hooper, a San Francisco-based naval strategist familiar with the saga of the Bradstone Challenger, asserts that the US Navy isn't too worried about the threat, saying, "Every time small, fast boats run into helicopters, the helicopters win." And yes folks, helicopters are deployable from ships within the 5th Fleet (see second comment after article). My question would then be, "Hey Craig, what if the Iranians got some of these and put them on the boats?" Just a thought.

So this is definitely something to keep your eye on. But I wouldn't lose much sleep over it; I will, however, be losing sleep over this.

The RRW is dead, long live the RRW!

Congress cut funding for the Reliable Replacement Warhead program in 2008 and the Obama Administration called the program “dead” in 2009. Yet Obama’s recently-revealed Nuclear Posture Review opens a loophole to a warhead replacement option, although it likely wouldn’t gain the scope or name of the RRW program.

Here’s the replacement language in the NPR, courtesy of Clark Murdock of CSIS:

While stating that U.S. would use only “previously tested designs” in their Life Extension Programs for each nuclear weapons (the cancelled RRW program used “new design” warheads for maintaining the stockpile), the 2010 NPR retained the “replacement option,” in addition to refurbishment and re-use, for maintain the reliability of a particular warhead, but said it was the least preferable option and exercising it would require both Presidential authorization and Congressional approval.

Again, this would appear to keep RRW effectively in its grave while still allowing for some sort of replacement option as an augmentation to the Life Extension Programs. The replacement option will be reviewed on a weapon-by-weapon basis, and it will fall below reuse and refurbishment as modernization option.

Ha! RRW is dead!

Not so fast. Murdock fails to mention something: NPR clearly states “no new warheads,” but then immediately follows that sentence by stating that the replacement option will use only warheads “based on previously tested designs.”

Boom. It’s a key loophole, and one foreseen by the Federation of American Scientists. What exactly does “new” mean, if a new design could be simply viewed as a variant of an existing, well-tested design?

Says The Atlantic’s Marc Ambinder:

In fact, Obama's NPR makes it possible for the one design that was approved under the now-dead "RRW" program to be utilized in the future, provided that they don't enhance the productivity of a weapon.

The design to which Ambinder refers is likely the SKUA-9, the base model for the LLNL’s RRW winning WR-1 warhead design. The SKUA-9 was thoroughly tested prior to the 1992 testing moratorium, but was never actually deployed in the nuclear force. It is possible to argue that this warhead design is not new, and doesn’t need additional testing. That makes it a newly-respectable candidate for the replacement option.

Republican reaction to the NPR is decidedly negative, with most commentators on the right decrying Obama’s decision as a failure to properly modernize the nuclear force. Such statements might be politically effective but the overlook the “previously tested designs” loophole.

With the influx of additional funding for the weapons laboratories, now would be a good time for the Republicans to game plan how they can use the hole in the NPR to accomplish what they want.

The way is open. Now it will be interesting to see if Defense Secretary Robert Gates – an old RRW supporter – and the Republicans in Congress can take advantage of those pathways to piece together an RRW-like program, perhaps as quid pro quo for ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

RRW is dead. Long live RRW.

Kyrgyzstan's Potential Impact on Afghanistan

How do the recent events in Kyrgyzstan relate to defense statecraft? The U.S. has an airbase in Manas, near the capital, that has become an important transit point for cargo and personnel headed to Afghanistan. Last month alone about 50,000 troops passed through the base. Brigadier General Mike Holmes discussed the importance of Manas to the war effort last week in his remarks at the University of Kentucky. Although the majority of cargo going to Afghanistan travels overland through Pakistan or Central Asia, the majority of personnel go through Manas.

Last year Russia announced over 2 billion in aid for Kyrgyzstan, in a deal where Kyrgyz President Bakiyev promised to close the U.S. air base. But Bakiyev used that deal as an opportunity to renegotiate the lease, allowing the U.S. to stay by calling it a “transit center” and tripling the lease. The Kremlin may see his overthrow as an opportunity to force the U.S. out. A senior Russian official has said that Moscow will urge the new leadership to shut the U.S. air base at Manas, commenting that there should only be one base in Kyrgyzstan-the Russian one.

The acting Kyrgyz leader, Roza Otunbayeva, stated that the new leadership would make a decision in the best interest of Kyrgyzstan but that the treaty would be upheld. However, another opposition leader has said that due to Russia’s support of the coup the U.S. presence in Kyrgyzstan will be shortened. (Michael McFaul, Obama’s advisor on Russia, has denied that opposition’s seizure of power was a Russian-backed coup.)

The ongoing unrest, and especially a closure, could possibly delay the additional troops headed to Afghanistan as part of President Obama’s announced surge there. Manas has provided a valuable alternative to overland transit across Pakistan. Air Force Chief of Staff Norton Schwartz has said that "If we had to fall back to other locations, we could do that. We have a plan, we have a back-up. It's harder. It's more expensive, it's more ... intensive." The situation definitely complicates the logistics of carrying out a war in Afghanistan and gives the U.S. yet another thing to worry about in Central Asia.

Phasing out DADT: it’s easy, right?

Wrong. The gradual phasing out of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell is opening up a whole new can of worms. Aside from the (at times opportunistic) conservative ballyhooing about the possible impact on unit cohesion and efficiency, the bureaucratic wrangling to ensure that there is no intra-service turmoil is creating its own issues.

For the first time, the military is asking, and gays in the military are left to decide whether to tell or not. Defense Secretary Gibbs has ordered there to be a survey of troops to be concluded by December to gauge the rank and file’s support of repeal of DADT. Part of this survey requires soldiers to share their sexual orientation.

Assuming this is actually necessary for what is essentially an opinion poll, it would seem a solution to privacy issues should be rather simple: keep all responses confidential. After all, the purpose of the study is to find out the opinion of servicemen and women regarding working alongside openly gay counterparts, not how each individual feels.

But confidentiality has not proven easy to come by, nor is there an assurance of security from discharge for coming out of the closet. The DoD has employed a third party to carry out the survey, but if the results were to fall into the hands of officials at the Pentagon, some of the old guard may seek to root out gay service members. As Gen Carter F. Ham, Commander of the US Army Europe and one of two men charged with carrying out the survey (along with Jeh C. Johnson, the Pentagon’s Chief Legal Counsel) said in an excerpt from the Washington Post, “if a gay soldier ‘were to disclose to me their sexuality, then I'd almost certainly be required to pursue that,’ by opening a formal investigation that could lead to discharge.” Such opinion from the man in charge of the DADT study might give many soldiers pause before divulging private information.

Many higher level officials do not seem to be on board with the effort, and have made little effort to conceal their disdain. Via Gawker: “In a March 8 letter to Stars & Stripes, Army Gen. Benjamin Mixon wrote:

‘It is often stated that most service members are in favor of repealing the policy. I do not believe that is accurate. I suspect many service members, their families, veterans and citizens are wondering what to do to stop this ill-advised repeal of a policy that has achieved a balance between a citizen's desire to serve and acceptable conduct.’”

In this letter, he advised servicemen and women to write to Members of Congress to request for legislation to prevent the repeal of DADT. He was later asked to retract this statement, presumably because it was in opposition to the official DoD line.

This sort of internal opposition cannot offer much hope to the estimated 2% of all military personnel, or 66,000 people, who are gay. In order to bolster the poll numbers in support of erasing DADT, they will have to trust the military at its word that if asked, they are allowed to tell.

In the meantime, there are other oddities. Tom Ricks highlights the fact that if one seeks a discharge by using DADT, there is a sort of catch-22. A lesbian in the Air Force who outed herself hoping for a discharge was denied. Stars & Stripes explained “if you admit to being homosexual you can be discharged from the military, but if you admit it for the purposes of being discharged you won't be."

All of this makes it seem that even along the road to getting rid of DADT, despite the fact that other militaries that have allowed gays to enter the ranks have suffered no loss in efficiency, that the military is going to make it uncomfortable for gays to enter or stay in the military. Persecution need not be official to be present. The military’s message to gays who wish to serve their country seems to be one of “we’ll allow you to fight and perhaps die for the United States, when it’s convenient for us.” If you want a discharge you will not be granted one; if you’re outed you cannot join under current rules; and if you’re currently in, we’re asking—and we’ll leave it up to you to determine what the hell we mean.

All of this at a time when our current number of personnel is stretched to the limits begs the question: why not let them fight? I’m not going to fight. Most American citizens have no interest in laying their lives out on the line in the service of the country, and most of us are apparently not even healthy enough to do so. Why do the Armed Forces seem so eager to turn away valuable manpower? The military institutions seem more eager to do things their way rather than to improve the chances of victory. Perceived this way, DADT is merely a symptom of the organizational issues of the entire US military apparatus.

Sparks in the tinder box

Over the past several weeks I have written several times about the situation in Iraq. Specifically, I recently wrote that the elections in Iraq were not necessarily a bad thing--- and were nothing to fear (no need for Prozac—says I!). I have also written that Nuri al-Maliki, while chameleon-like, is a politician (and that his politician-ness is a good thing). In these posts, I explicitly and implicitly suggested that Tom Ricks was being overly pessimistic about Iraq’s future, and that things may be a little rosier than he thinks.

My writing about these topics has revealed one irrefutable truth: I know nothing about Iraq—Tom Ricks does.

In the time since I wrote with a horribly naïve (bordering on stupidity) optimism, we’ve seen an election come and go (and produce no winner!), a Prime Minister act like a wannabe dictator (also see this), bombings rip apart embassies (not to mention humans), bombings rip apart apartments (not to mention—humans-- again), a nut job cleric hold his own election, and this morning--- two U.S. soldiers were killed in combat related violence (haven’t seen that in a while).

So what do we make of all of this?

I have to admit, I’m having a hard time getting my head around the current unrest in Iraq (it might be more useful to say I'm having a hard time getting my head around the magnitude of my own wrongness). Of course, I had a sense that instability was likely on the way, but, sheesh, -- nothing like this.

Not Ricks. He suggested that the election was going to bring profound instability, and that US policy should be to do everything we can to hold the country together--- lest we see the country implode (saying “explode” is too obvious). He also suggested that the current administration would not be keen on keeping combat troops in Iraq no matter how bad things got.
Yeah, he knows what he’s talking about.

Pass the Prozac--- and the anti anxiety meds.

They don't make them like they used to

Not a real post, but this anecdote by an SR-71 pilot was too good to pass up [via Gizmodo].

Update on the Iraqi/Blackwater Nisour Square Incident

A recently released video shows a 2007 incident in which an American Apache helicopter fired upon and killed 12 people in Baghdad, among them two Reuters photographers. The video has sparked significant backlash as Wikileaks, the website that hosted the video has framed the footage as “collateral murder” and commentators have argued this is another example of the American military run amuck. Meanwhile, this week’s reading concerned the Revolution in Military Affairs including the use of private military contractors, which frequently receive a similar level of press and public scrutiny. Given this week’s reading on Blackwater head Erik Prince, it seems relevant to take a look at the current status of an incident in which Blackwater guards killed 17 Iraqi civilians, also in Baghdad in 2007.

On September 16, 2007, six Blackwater guards opened fire in broad daylight, killing 17 and wounding 20 Iraqi civilians in an area known as Nisour Square. Based on the incident, the U.S. Justice Department eventually brought criminal charges, families of some of the victims brought civil charges, and the Justice Department investigated bribery charges against Blackwater itself for trying to silence Iraqi officials. Voluntary manslaughter charges were brought against 5 ex-employees, while a 6th ex-employee struck a deal with prosecutors and provided evidence against his former Blackwater associates while pleading guilty to lesser charges.

The most recent status of the three types of charges:
Criminal case – The case against the 5 employees was dismissed by a Washington D.C. federal judge on December 24, 2009 on the grounds that the prosecution’s case was dependent upon statements given by the accused to State Department investigators while under an agreement that such statements would not be used in a criminal case. However, recent evidence has emerged that the State Department did not make a serious probe into the incident and critically mishandled evidence, speaking nothing of the statements obtained from the Blackwater guards. A security official at the U.S. Embassy in Iraq further alleges that Blackwater intentionally destroyed evidence and acted to deceive State Department investigators. While such allegations may increase the likelihood that the Justice Department’s appeal is heard by another court, Yale Law lecturer Eugene Fidell does not expect the courts to ultimately hear the appeal. He feels the incident will serve as a continued source of grievance by the Iraqis and their government towards the United States. Finally, he expects the 6th ex-employee to withdraw his plea and face no penalty.

Civil case – “Blackwater has reached a settlement in 7 civil lawsuits filed against it by families of Iraqis killed” in the Nisour Square incident. While the details of the settlement were not officially revealed, one of the wounded told AP that Blackwater offered $100,000 for each person who died and $30,000 to those wounded. An additional group of 10 plaintiffs has not yet settled.

Bribery charges – 4 former Blackwater executives allege Blackwater sent approximately $1 million to its Iraq office for use in paying off Iraqi officals who were angry and vocal about the shootings. The plan was to have a prominent Iraqi lawyer persuade Iraqi officials to allow Blackwater to remain in Iraq to continue its multi-million dollar contracts, but shortly after the shooting Blackwater was kicked out of the country. While precise details concerning who authorized and knew about the proposal are still emerging, the plan presumably caused a rift in the company. Meanwhile, Blackwater officially denies all such allegations. The practice of bribing foreign officials is illegal under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. It is believed securing a conviction will be difficult because of the lack of a paper trail to prove the statutory requirement of “corrupt intent.”

The Battle Rages?

Military rivalry, and no not just the legendary football game nor the Hollywood favorite of military members throwing punches at each other in bars. It goes much deeper than that and gives rise to the question of whether or not we should be concerned. Does this rivalry create a security issue, does it cost the collective US military lives? In our recent discussion on military identity and brief history of origins, the fact that infighting has a basis is obvious in the conflict of overlap of responsibilities and blurred lines of branch command. What was not as clear was if this comes across just in mere bickering at the political level or if it transfers to ground combat, following orders, cutting corners and losing lives.

The most prevalent form of this rivalry is in play when branches compete for funding, for the biggest and brightest new tech toys and equipment. That sounds reasonable, there is always good to come from healthy competition, and that is what many decree this as, mostly harmless competitive spirit building. However, once you look back in history at the conflicts that raged within the military in WWII, before the development of the Joint Chiefs of staff and then jump forward to now, to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan not all of which was harmful has been settled.

In WWII, to keep it simple, the main conflict arose between the Navy (then encompassing the Marines) and the Army as the two split and fought as they saw fit, the Navy basically island hoping and using the Marines as a land fighting force. This split lead to a Navy/Marine combination that lost more lives because the branches refused to coordinate strategy with the Army. Today that deterioration of distinction of the Marines as a security force for the Navy and as a deployable land force has obviously been blurred if not erased completely. The Navy has its own MA program and the Marines, though still tied to the Navy, are ideologically their own branch and seeking official recognition as so. Conflicts like this gave rise to the creation of the Joint Chiefs ans unified combatant commands, both of which were supposed to solve the problem but in some opinions, they have not.

The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are said to be in need of a whole new level of branch cooperation from all, Navy, Army, Marines, and Air Force. Even today though, the different strategies used by the branches to accomplish the same task differ greatly and their drive to be the first and the fastest seem to sacrifice security. Be it the differences in testing for chemical weapons where the Army uses special vehicles and testing, the Marines carry pigeons and criticize the Army for spending too much or in the way each faction secures a building. As one description goes:

"when the Navy orders sailors to secure a building, it means to turn out the lights, lock the doors, and post a quarterdeck watch. When the Army orders a building secured it means to post an MP and make sure no one gets in without a special pass. When the Marines secure a building, they set up machine guns and bring in artillery support. When the Air Force is told to secure a building, it makes darn sure to get a two-year lease with an option to buy."

So who's being costly here? Most of these differences are chalked up to healthy competition, that keeps the military sharp but there are instances that one can use to question whether this competition leads to cutting corners and losing lives just to appear to be the first, the ones that make the difference. In one case a venture to secure Baghdad early on in Iraq lead to the hot pursuit of Marines through unsecured terrain by the urge of higher-ups for them to be the first into the city while the Army took a more tactical approach from the opposite direction. In the end, a decision by the field commander leading the Marines, to take a longer route in order to preserve lives that would have been, and some that had already been, unduly lost lead to him losing his job, one of the underlying reasons being perhaps that he just didn't make sure the Marines were the first. Now, facts are always up for interpretation, and usually we don't have the precise facts when it comes to maneuvers during war, but the possibility remains.

In a more direct approach, commanders from different branches openly criticize the tactics used, for example General Conway's critique of the Army and Air Force using air strikes against insurgents, saying that his Marines were not going to pursue such actions. Bidding for public support sure, but to what extent does this also show lack of a shared strategy within the military itself? Many aspects of this "dysfunctional" family, as said before, are chalked up to healthy competition. Still, some argue that by merging some aspects of the branches, much like the proposal to merge commands in 1946, the US would save money and end rivalry. Though this doesn't seem to be something that will happen in this lifetime, nor do I particularly advocate the merge, the question of infighting should be addressed, healthy competition is fine, losing lives because of it is not.

The Cheonan Crisis

Saturday marked 8 days following the mysterious sinking of the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan. It also marked the first day that rescuers discovered one of the 46 missing servicemen was recovered. After the body of Senior Chief Petty Officer Nam Ki-hoon was found yesterday, families of the remaining 45 missing sailors urged the rescue effort to be stopped in order to prevent risks to divers and rescuers - particularly after the deaths of a South Korean navy diver and 2 sailors whose private fishing boat collided with a freighter in their rescue efforts (while seven remain missing).

The South Koreans, along with help from the US Navy, will now work to recover the 1,200 ton Cheonan in order to investigate the cause of its demise. However, despite the clearest weather above the water in days, the murky underwater conditions are likely to delay the investigative work even more.

As we wait for the ship's recovery (likely to take weeks) and Pyongyang remains silent, speculations will continue to fly. The South Korean government quickly dismissed the cause of the explosion as internal; a human torpedo seems highly unlikely as the ship was in motion; and if a North Korean mine indeed caused the explosion, it must have a mind its in order to have found the Cheonan (no mines from the Korean War have been found since 1984). With an explosion powerful enough to halve the 1200-ton vessel, the source must have been substantial considering the strength of the relatively modern ship.

South Korea has drawn criticism on various fronts: preventing the Choenan survivors from speaking to the press, implying that North Korea's culpability without firm evidence, and taking 8 days to reach the sailors who sunk with the ship. Meanwhile, North Korea has accused South Korean troops of firing toward its border on the eastern part of the demilitarized zone. Though this is most likely an attempt to take notice away from the Cheonan, South Korean officials (along with the rest of the world) should be careful in prematurely placing the blame on North Korea. Though the two countries are still technically "at war," the United States military would be extremely strained to be heavily involved in a third major conflict. Whatever the outcome, the two Koreas would both benefit in settling the decades-long disputed boundary, particularly in the Yellow Sea.

Removing the Mask of Depression?

The strict standards and extreme demands placed on Air Force pilots facilitate their reputation as being among the sharpest in the United States military. Yet this group, while at times set apart, is subject to the same pressures as the general population that can manifest in depression. Additionally, the rigid demands of flight accompanied by the pressure of mission execution impose strain on pilots that may result in adverse effects if left otherwise untreated. While some may jest about the limited role of the Air Force in COIN strategy or potential re-incorporation into the Army, potential depression among pilots raises concern about their well-being and of their effectiveness in the cockpit.

A recent report indicates that the Air Force is changing its stance on use of anti-depressants among pilots. This policy shift is largely the result of two factors: 1) the improvement in drugs that treat depression, and 2) the recognition of a “disincentive to report depression” among pilots.

Facing a continued desire or pressure to fly, pilots can feel compelled to hide conditions they are experiencing. This example of policy change reveals a desire to address the overall well-being of those serving in the military, and hopefully is a step toward reforming a culture of that fosters medical mis-information among soldiers.

While questions of “flying under the influence” may arise, regulations build in security measures to ensure pilot safety. Specifically, pilots taking approved medication can fly after one year of successful treatment without experiencing side effects that lead to safety concerns during flight. This lengthy window for evaluation will accommodate pilots who need treatment. However, this policy does raise questions about military personnel in other potentially stressful environments other than a cockpit. For example, how do depression and subsequent treatment affect sailors aboard submarines that may not surface for long periods of time? What factors should be taken into account when evaluating soldiers for advanced training in urban warfare? As the nature and environment of conflict change, so should the approach to evaluating those equipped to serve.

As stated before, this policy change seems to be a positive step in advancing the well-being of those in the military. But it should not signal a loosening of regulations that prevent certain individuals or behaviors from being admitted in the military – a service which requires impeccable focus whether in the cockpit of a fighter or in the streets of Kabul.

Generation 4.5? Thanks, but no. -USAF

U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz announced today that the USAF has begun stress tests on the F-16 fleet in hopes of prolonging their life until the delivery of the (still delayed) shiny new F-35s. Promised in 2008, the Joint Strike Fighter has been delayed for two years so far, and it will be another two years before the Marines get their first batch. Faced with tough decisions from all angles as to what to do while they wait, the Air Force has been squeezed especially tight. Though far from losing its preeminence as the world’s foremost air power, the service prides itself on having the best technology in the best condition. Thus, many lawmakers (with a significant stake in the issue) have seized on this delay to demand that the USAF fund a 4.5-generation fighter series, one that will prevent a “fighter gap.”
The Air Force has resisted this pressure, however, for months now and today’s statement from Schwartz seems to make it clear that the service does not intend to get pushed around.
“I think it’s pretty clear that our strategy is to pursue service-life extensions [SLEPs] to the extent that is affordable rather than purchase new generation four-and-a-half aircraft while we’re working hard to bring on F-35. I do not think it is wise to dissipate the limited pool of resources available for F-35.” In short: the USAF will stretch the lives of the existing fleet as far as they will go (some with expiration dates as early as 2020).
Though the focus has been on the Air Force to call for the controversial production of planes to fill the gap, the F-35 is one of the rare pieces of machinery that is to operate for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. Therefore, it stands to reason that the Air Force’s decision to hold out for the F-35 and rely on their older F-15 and F-16s could markedly impact the fleets of the other two services as well. It is highly unlikely that one or both of these traditionally maritime services would override the decision of the USAF to call for new planes while they wait for one that functions for them all. I find it interesting then, (though not altogether surprising) that this decision was left to the Air Force alone, and the Air Force alone was pushed to fund new designs for an intermediate generation of fighters.
This displays an insightful point about the interactions of those services and about the plane they eagerly anticipate; though there have been recent rumblings about the necessity of the Air Force as an independent military branch and/or their future in terms of manned fighters, it is clear that those within the military establishment (including those in the Navy and Marine Corps) and those in Congress see the USAF as the unquestioned head of air power decision-making in this country, even when it comes to issues that span branches (and make no mistake, these new planes are just as important to the missions of the Navy and Marine Corps as they are to the Air Force). So, is the Air Force on its way out? Based on this, I seem to doubt it.

A false START?

This past week saw President Obama making good on a campaign promise and years of advocacy for nuclear weapons reductions (dating back to his time at Columbia) with the signing of a new START treaty with Russia. The first major arms control treaty in twenty years between the former Cold War foes, the treaty reduces active strategic weapons to 1,550 (down 30% from the previous START) and limits delivery vehicles from ICBMs to long-range bombers to 800.

This sounds great, even if the reductions aren’t as great as one might have hoped. The greatest significance of this treaty is not the actual numbers, but the fact it was signed at all. It suggests that not all of Obama’s efforts to “reset” our relationship with Russia have failed. Apparently, negotiations on the treaty became extremely tense several times, with Russian president Medvedev threatening to walk away on numerous occasions. That Obama managed to hold his feet to the fire and achieve a viable treaty that has been welcomed by the international community is just another of the major political successes he has scored in the past couple of weeks.

Unfortunately, the new START may be valueless. As with healthcare, the Republicans—likely whipped up in partisan fury—are promising to defeat ratification of the treaty unless there is some sign Obama is willing to modernize the US ICBM force and stand by missile defense. Ratification of treaties requires a two-thirds majority, so even if the Democrats are capable of standing together (for once), they will need seven members of the GOP to come across the aisle to achieve the needed 67 votes. The way things are going in Washington this treaty will never see the light of day.

Worse still is the fact that the treaty in no way addresses the countries’ immense stockpiles. By dealing with only active and deployed weapons and delivery vehicles, there is no requirement for an actual reduction in weapons. The number of nuclear weapons in the world will still be over 20,000, to no purpose. The White House also admits that the treaty in no way addresses testing of either weapons or delivery vehicles, and because the US has maintained its position supporting missile defense, there is likely to be a continuing offensive and defensive arms race well into the future.

The gloss of US-Russia cooperation and mutual monitoring is nice, but beneath the surface this new START is toothless and likely DOA. One can only hope it may be a START for something better.

The Third Option

As sanctions and talks continue, viable military options against Iran’s nuclear program in case of diplomatic failure have been scarce. Not only that, but the language coming from the US and Israel seems to signal that both are waiting for the other to make a first move. The other option has been some variant on the deterrence theory, proponents advocating either confidence in missile defense or rationality in Iranian leadership. Both alternatives have substantial drawbacks as most likely any choice at this point will have.

In a Center for Strategic and International Studies roundtable dialogue (transcript or download audio), New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman played Nostradamus and put forth a third option, a fire at Iran’s Natanz nuclear reactor, or some sort of similar “accident”. Friedman thinks airstrikes are too risky for Israel because Iran can do substantial damage in a retaliatory stirke. “The beauty of an internal explosion,” Friedman says,"is that it makes the regime look weak and it’s impossible to retaliate.” Airstrikes can also strengthen the Iranian regime by rallying people against Israel. With opposition protests lingering, one would think individuals on the inside may be having second thoughts about the Revolutionary Guard and would be willing to listen to an offer from Mossad or the CIA. After all, you just need to install some bad wiring…

Problems with the idea aren't hard to find. Many believe Iran’s programs are spread out and that they possess duplicate facilities rendering an isolated case of arson meaningless. Plus while it might buy time, it doesn’t solve the problem. One wonders how many accidents there could be. But more time and a weaker Tehran might still be helpful. It might be all the US and its allies at the diplomatic table need to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.

Smart phone, smart sanctions...Smart Power?

We know what smart sanctions are, but what about “smart power”? Don’t google it because all you will find are web sites devoted to green energy. However, the Wall Street Journal explained the phrase relative to defense in this article last week (although Ted Galen Carpenter probably coined the phrase in his book Smart Power).

Adm. Mullen said. "Should we choose to exert American influence solely through our troops, we should expect to see that influence diminish in time." State and DoD’s cure for this is moving funding from projects like the F-22 to those which exert more “soft power” in order to align target states with US strategic interests. To do this, Secretaries Gates and Clinton are calling on the biggie defense contractors to step in. For 2011 President Obama has requested $39.4 billion for civilian contracts abroad. We are not talking the “civilian” contracts of the Bush era which Blackwater made infamous. Think more along the lines of Peace Corps, legal aid, peacekeeper training—projects where, in the past, NGOs have dominated the field.

Aerospace companies like Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin have long been expanding their business development initiatives beyond the exemplars of force which made them DoD sweethearts. To date, NGC builds bomb dismantling robots for police in Europe and satellites for NASA communications. Still, these contracts do not radically deviate from what one traditionally associates with security. But only recently has there been something of a 180.

Continuing to produce things with lasers and missiles (it will long be lucrative to produce mechanisms to annihilate the enemy), top defense contractors are also bidding on (and are being encouraged to bid on more) contracts completely contrary to their combat roots. Instead of making their money developing technologies to win conflict, now they are charged with finding ways to avoid conflict altogether. This concept has permeated the foundations of these companies to the extent that NGC’s new motto is “a leader in global security” which still applies to the old stuff but is also inclusive of the radically new contracts it is pursuing.

This has all come to light due to the recent awarding of a contract to Lockheed Martin to train prosecutors in Liberia's Justice Ministry. This is not the first though; Northrop Grumman previously won a contract to train Senegalese peacekeeping troops in human-rights law. BAE Systems provided anthropologists to accompany U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan to aid understanding of local cultures. DyneCorp recently bought a company which specializes in building up public-health and legal systems in the developing world.

Naturally, businesses as successful as the above mentioned have well learned to follow the money by now, continuously adapting their business model an innovating their technologies to remain attractive to the customer. Still, redefining the idea of security in a global context (rather than national) of organically avoiding conflict (rather than threat and force) seems revolutionary. And making development an honest-to-god for-profit business venture—this isn’t your grandpa’s Marshal Plan.

But don’t expect the State and DoD budgets to level out anytime soon.

Census Attacks!

Are chemical/biological weapons making a comeback? The Baltimore Sun reports a recent scare (via Armchair Generalist):

Census officials say a suspicious envelope received at a huge data processing center outside Baltimore turned out not to be dangerous.

Census bureau spokesman Stephen Buckner says the white powder inside the envelope turned out to be coffee creamer. The completed Census form in the envelope also had a coffee stain on it.

But is such an attack - by Al Qaeda, or any other terrorist group domestic or foreign - plausible now? From the lecture and readings, particularly the Price piece, the chances of terrorist groups successfully carrying out a full scale biological or chemical (or nuclear, for that matter) attack are seemingly smaller and smaller.

Instead, we've witnessed different tactics, especially since the early 2000s, on behalf of Al Qaeda. With at least 2 different instances of underwear terrorism in the past 6 months, Al Qaeda appears to be on a path of transition. As posters of this blog have pointed out, Pakistani officials have been more cooperative in detaining Al Qaeda members. And the Saudi government recently broke up 3 Al Qaeda cells, 51 of the 113 total militants being Yemeni. Though separate from each other, two the terrorist cells "were in the initial stages of preparation for attacks on oil and security installations in the eastern region."

Clearly, change in Al Qaeda's tactics and operations are afoot, though the group certainly retains the same goal to "establish an Islamic caliphate." With more international cooperation to fight Al Qaeda, especially in the Arabian peninsula, is it possible that the group will indeed resort to "chemical" weapons? I would contend the answer remains no; even with the potential to acquire the means, due to the uncertainty of their impact, Al Qaeda will likely continue using conventional weapons despite the group's possible weakened state. And there is always the added "what if" bonus upon which they rely, thereby forcing intelligence communities and defense ministries worldwide to fund CW/BW preparedness.

In the meantime, don't drink your coffee too close to your census form.

US Military Body Armor: A Worthwhile Debate

The 1991 Persian Gulf War was the first major conflict in which all US troops were provided body armor. Soldiers were issued torso-covering Kevlar vests capable of stopping shell and grenade fragments and, when fitted with ceramic plates, bullets. However, the fully loaded vests weighed close to 25 pounds making them undesirable to your average soldier.

Since the beginning of 2001, body armor with ceramic plates has been standard issue for every US soldier in both Afghanistan and Iraq, mainly due to advancements which have brought average body armor weight down to an effectively distributed 16 pounds. You can see from the picture (right) the newest additions include a layer of neck protection and two protective flaps, one for the backside and one for the goods (frontside). Heavy-duty shoulder and neck flaps are also available for soldiers guarding Entry Control Points (ECPs) and driving combat vehicles. And, appropriately, the heaviest protection goes to those soldiers who play with bombs, the initial testing of which left some non-Muslim livestock wondering what happened to their cousins.

US military issue body armor, like everything in life, is not without its debates, one of the more interesting ones being whether the use of body armor by US soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq hurts the COIN effort. It is rather perspective changing to stop and think about what goes through a civilian Iraqi and Afghani's mind when an armored US Humvee with a mounted .50 Cal stops at the end of their street and four or five US soldiers step out wearing head-to-toe blast and bullet resistance armor carrying big guns. I venture to say I'd probably be wary of these armored foreigners myself.

The future of US military issue body armor is very exciting, with some pretty cool new stuff in the works. However, the current image of the future soldier doesn't really solve this issue; actually, he/she complicates it.

There is a very cool alternative route, straight out of Columbia, which probably will have more applicability in the other sectors, not the military necessarily. With that said, it would be interesting if the US military could apply some of the concepts of this alternative to its future personal protective equipment (PPE) to make a more receivable future soldier.

This is a important debate with merits on both sides and implications for the future of the entire US military. It is in our best interest to take the time and devote the resources to get it right.

Eide Speaks Out

Last fall, Pakistan launched an offensive against the Taliban in South Waziristan which was welcomed by the U.S. as a critical step in cracking down on the Taliban on the Pakistani side of the border. When Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban’s number 2 commander, was arrested in Pakistan in February it seemed to be a sign of even more cooperation in the fight against the Taliban. The Pakistanis have arrested at least four other senior Taliban figures since then, including two shadow governors. It appeared that Pakistan was finally going to get serious helping the U.S. go after the Taliban inside Pakistan.

Yet Pakistan has not mounted a serious offensive in North Waziristan, where the “Afghan Taliban” is believed to be headquartered. And now the Pakistanis’ motivation in arresting Baradar and other Taliban leaders is being questioned. This week, Kai Eide, the former UN envoy to Afghanistan said that Pakistan arrested the Taliban leaders not to cooperate, but to undermine negotiations between the UN and the Taliban. According to Eide, the UN had been engaged in negotiations with senior Taliban leadership and those negotiations abruptly ended with the recent arrests. In an interview with the BBC Eide said that: “[The Pakistanis] must have known who they were, what kind of role they were playing, and you see the result today.” Eide suggested that Pakistan’s motivation was to ensure its own control over any future settlement.

U.S. officials have been downplaying Eide’s comments, saying that talks were preliminary and the arrests have not scuttled peace plans. This is undoubtedly correct; it is doubtful that the UN and the Taliban were close to any kind of deal. However, Eide’s comments underscore just how difficult it is to decipher intentions in the region. Pakistan has been playing all sides for years. Most experts agree that elements within Pakistan are still pro-Taliban and think that Pakistan’s best chance of controlling Afghanistan in the long run is to maintain covert ties with the Taliban. Perhaps Pakistan has arrested some leaders to shield them from drone strikes or to use them as pawns in a diplomatic game. They can relieve U.S. pressure through timely arrests. And as Eide suggested, perhaps they used arrests to undermine a peace deal that they couldn’t control. Whatever the case may be, Pakistani intentions remain opaque which is troubling since they are undoubtedly the key to any kind of lasting peace in Afghanistan.

Who is this guy?

By all accounts (except this one!), incumbent Iraqi premier Nouri al-Maliki is heading for a second term as Prime Minister (PM). Al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition is running strong in early vote counts and seems likely to edge out former Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s al-Iraqiyya party.


In a span of 3-4 years, al-Maliki has gone from an obscure party spokesman and deputy of then PM Ibrahim al-Jaafari to one of the, if not the, most powerful figures in Iraq. Clearly Al-Maliki’s position in Iraqi politics means that US success in the country is closely tied to his success leading his embattled nation. If al-Maliki fails, any gains made by the US over the last 7 years (OK, maybe 3 years, or 2…) will wither on the vine.

Given Al Maliki’s importance, one might suspect that US (or at least western) analysts have a strong sense of the man. Not so.

Several years and a (likely) reelection later, Nouri al-Maliki remains a mystery. His actions as PM are well documented, but the essence of the man---- how and what he thinks--- is as shrouded as ever (interestingly, President Bush never got a good look into his soul!).

This blog post will briefly examine just who al-Maliki is.

In 2006, when al-Maliki first emerged as a compromise PM, he was so little known in both the region and the world that there was some confusion about what exactly his name was (Jawad? Nouri?). His out of the blue candidacy sent western journalists scrambling. As a result, initial profiles on al-Maliki were conflicting, to say the least. The New York Times indicated that al-Maliki was direct, outspoken, and inflexible. Similarly, Salon reported that he was a sectarian who supported policies that would target Sunnis.

On the other hand, USA Today fired off a piece in which a prominent Sunni politician indicated that al-Maliki was more practical and flexible than his predecessor. Along these lines, the Washington Post and the BBC both published reports indicating that al-Maliki was a fairly reasonable person and an Arab nationalist.

Clearly, when al-Maliki was first introduced to the world, he was an unknown commodity. The picture of al-Maliki has not become much more clear during his first term as PM.

Some suspected that concerns about al-Maliki's supposed sectarian streak were laid to rest when he ordered Iraqi forces (with American backup) to attack Shiite militias in the southern Iraqi port city of Basra. Yet, he also failed to integrate the Sunni "Sons of Iraq" into the police and military forces with any haste. To further muddy the waters, al-Maliki recently supported an election ban on some supposed Baath party members----- while almost simultaneously reinstating 20,000 army officers who served under Saddam Hussein.

Seriously--- who is this guy?

A recent Time Magazine article likely offers the best perspective on al-Maliki's nature. Time suggests that al-Maliki is a "chameleon." The report quotes one western official suggesting that "...every six months we have a new Maliki... And as a political strategy, it's genius: in a country as divided as Iraq, it's the only was to appeal to all the people." 

Who is al-Maliki? In western parlance, it seems reasonable to describe him as a classic "politician."

In Iraq, after decades under Saddam Hussein, that may not be such a bad thing.

These are the Days of Our Lives

Now that spring break is upon us, I can take a bit more time to elaborate on the KC-X situation. As it is apparent by now, Northrop Grumman has elected not to submit a bid in response to the new tanker RFP. NGC will not file a protest either. CEO Wes Bush, while citing fiduciary responsibility to shareholders, has not been shy about NGC’s reasons: the new RFP is unfairly weighted towards Boeing.

Boeing Executive VP of Commercial Airplanes responded with "It's the longest-running soap opera since 'Days of Our Lives'. I'm not sure that we've seen the last episode." Days has been running since 1965…clearly someone has a flair for the dramatic. At least the media coverage on the matter is finally spicing up.

EADS has also released a statement to the effect that EADS North America will not make a go at the new RFP without NGC. EADS will be pursuing other contracts with the Pentagon and Homeland Security which are much smaller (1 billion-ish each). However, despite the plans to pursue more contracts stateside, none can compare to the growth the tanker contract would have provided for the consortium. The implication here is that the various platforms of EADS, heavily subsidizes by European governments, together would have experienced such organic growth from the KC-X contract that it would have significantly reduced its dependence on those contentious subsidies (or eliminated them altogether).

EADS North America CEO O’Keefe was careful to deny that this debacle was due to a movement of protectionism in the U.S. government. He instead cited the poor economic climate. Remember though, this drama far predates the bursting of any economic bubble.

The European side of EADS is not being so diplomatic about the issue. Retaliation is the impulse of the moment. Members of the European parliament are crying “protectionism” and both Prime Minister Brown and President Sarkozy have spoken out against the apparent outcome. “If they want to be spearheading the fight against protectionism, they shouldn't be setting the wrong example of protectionism…In life there is what you say and then there is what you do." Sarkozy said at a press conference held today with Brown.

There has been talk of retaliation by restricting the access of American firms to the defense industry of Europe. Coincidentally, this would seriously affect the bottom line of EADS ally and would be partner Northrop Grumman. NGC has sizeable contracts for Air Traffic Management, unmanned ground vehicles (and things with lasers that are beyond my tech capacity) in Europe. Meanwhile, NGC is moving its headquarters from LA to DC to get a better handle on Congress and the Pentagon.

Some are suggesting that the real motivator for the domestic preference is the USAF’s unwillingness to deal with WTO litigation against Airbus. Although not cited as a reason for the GAO ruling in favor of the unfairness claims of Boeing, the inclusion of the subsidized Airbus A330 in the NGC-EADS bid is in violation of federal acquisition laws. As long as we are going for the dramatic, this could be a grand production to avoid the legislative changes to make federal acquisitions law match trade policy discourse.

Bringing this blog full circle—if Boeing wants to make a Days of Our Lives reference, they should realize that they are Victor Kiriakis, a glorified drug dealer, and NGC is Stefano DiMira, the real boss in Salem who fakes his death, only to return more powerful than ever. Watch out Boeing, Alabama has your number (and they are bringing those dang Europeans as backup).

Tanker update: Pentagon vulnerable to highway robbery

For those of you who found my last post riveting: http://www.irconnect.com/noc/press/pages/news_releases.html?d=186116

NGC pulled out of the KC-X competition. Boeing will be the sole bidder...and the Pentagon is desperate for a new tanker as the old ones are falling apart. Now Boeing can rebid, charging the Pentagon whatever it wants. So much for competition: Market Fail!

Obama to Drop Nukes...the Number in Stockpile, That Is

President Obama is preparing the Nuclear Posture Review and Defense Secretary Gates is presenting the President with information regarding questions of US nuclear armament and US strategy pertaining to the circumstances in which it will use nuclear weapons.

Following class discussions about declaratory policy, a recent New York Times article identifies some of the pressing questions regarding the nature of US nuclear policy. In addition to considering the language, if the President establishes or changes the policy at all, whether or not to formally declare US policy is another question to consider.

In speeches that have earned him a Nobel Peace Prize, President Obama indicated his commitment to work toward a world without nuclear weapons. While this global transformation won't happen during his tenure, he is taking steps to work toward a reduction of the US nuclear arsenal. The anticipated policy set forth in the Nuclear Posture Review indicates steps toward arsenal reduction, and is in line with his rhetoric. However, the language of the Nuclear Posture Review with regard to declaratory policy may undermine his previous statements. Some critics, both within the Democratic party and elsewhere, cite that if President Obama retains ambiguous language about when the United States will use nuclear weapons, he will be retaining Bush-era policy and weakening his commitment to a non-nuclear world.

The primary debate centers around whether nuclear weapons are to be used only as a deterrent against nuclear attack, or whether they may be used in response to chemical or biological weapons as well. In answering this question, the President must assess the costs, both political and in lives lost, if the US is to use a nuclear weapon. Since he has cut funding for development of new nuclear weapons, specifically low-yield versions, the US retains a powerful although somewhat variable nuclear arsenal. The article references the idea of a Prompt Global Strike system introduced in the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which may offer a non-nuclear alternative should President Obama decide to declare that nuclear weapons are only to be used as a nuclear deterrent.

Even with the challenge of determining what US policy should be, there is debate as to whether this policy should be formally declared. Does a lack of declaration reduce or enhance deterrent effect? If potential enemies know exactly where the US stands, then there is no question as to what US response will be given certain situations. Yet if policy is not strictly defined, the US retains options and flexibility in light of unforeseen threats or attacks.

While deterrence theory is debatable, the reduction in the number of nuclear weapons is a positive step toward the peace that President Obama seeks. Let's just hope that the only nuclear dropping he declares is in the number of weapons in the US arsenal.