Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons and the Undermining of Deterrence Theory

The Trump administration announced its new nuclear strategy earlier in the month of February. The plan aims to match any and all movement made by Russia to modernize their forces--as long as it stays within the boundaries of treaties. In the beginning of March, Russian President Vladmir Putin announced that Russia had new nuclear-capable weapons which make nuclear defense systems “useless.”  

The escalating rhetoric and planned nuclear build-up by the United States might lead one to question the necessity of some of the planned expenditures. The Nuclear Posture Review had called for the fitting of Trident II missiles with low-yield nuclear warheads. Many believe that this is the best and most humane way to counter the escalation of Russian deployment of low-yield nuclear warheads. However, in accordance with nuclear deterrence theory, the possession or use of low yield nuclear undermines security. If a state possesses low yield nuclear weapons this indicates that they intend to be used, as nuclear weapons serve the singular purpose of preventing the use of nuclear weapons. And there can only be two results coming from the use of low-yield nuclear weapons. 

 

First, the use of a single low-yield nuclear weapon utilized against a nuclear power would trigger a second-strike. According to the theory, a second-strike will likely be the entirety of the targeted state's nuclear arsenal, as they must make it impossible for there to be a third strike. Thus, it is imperative that the targeting nation inflict so much damage that a second strike is no longer possible. For this reason, low-yield nuclear weapons are ineffective against nuclear powers beyond deterring the use of nuclear weapons. 

Second, the use of a low-yield nuclear weapon would trigger new nuclear arms race if used against a non-nuclear power. An attack on a non-nuclear state by a nuclear state signals to all non-nuclear powers that, to counter the same fate, they will need to procure their own nuclear stockpile. The other non-nuclear nations will push forward with their own nuclear programs. Because, within nuclear deterrence theory, the only way in which a nation can prevent being the target of a nuclear attack is through mutually assured destruction.
 

The escalating rhetoric of President Trump and President Putin has worked to undermine deterrence theory, but if they continue on their current path of escalation through increasing their nuclear arsenals they might just get to test it.  

Disarmament: Are We The Problem Or Are They?

This week, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov condemned the United States for perceived infringement on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He cited the nation's participation in "joint nuclear missions" and the deployment of and training in strategic arms in Europe, both of which he says are violations of the NPT. With such "destabilizing factors," Lavrov concludes that real disarmament is impossible.

Does he have a point? Perhaps. However, his point is lost in a fog of paranoia as he claims that the U.S. military is attempting to prepare European countries to use nuclear weapons against Russia. The U.S. and NATO have both denied this and other allegations that their build up of defense in Eastern Europe against Iran is really meant towards Russia. Lavrov also makes claims that Russia is not deploying or testing weapons and has reduced its nuclear arsenal 85% since the Cold War, but we all know better. Russia can wage a strategic war of words all it wants but it does not detract from their role in providing plans, support, and/or materials to the U.S.'s enemies for the development of nuclear weapons. 

In fact, as a recent article suggests, Washington is concerned that Russia's military strategy is "evolving" and increasingly focused on active use of nuclear weapons. It cites knowledge of illicit Russian military exercises in which nuclear weapons use was simulated, the caliber of which has not been seen since the height of the Cold War.

This too, however, should be taken with a bit of skepticism, as it is possible that the White House may be, let's say 'overestimating' Russia's activity in hopes of forwarding its own plans for expanding nuclear power. This approach of increasing power may be, as the Pentagon puts it, "grounded in a realistic assessment of today's strategic environment." Just earlier this month, both Russia and the U.S. claimed that the other was in compliance with reductions outlined in New START, despite the fact that an assessment on February 5th showed that Russia is deploying more nuclear might than the U.S. Trump has made clear that, while he does not want any nation to possess nuclear power, as long as they do, he wants to ensure that the U.S. has the most; Putin has expressed similar sentiments. This coupled with Jonathan Granoff's critical comments on our NPT compliance during his visit to the Patterson School leave us with a lot to ponder. 

What might we learn from all this? The Russians are paranoid. We're a little trigger happy. And we both have a lot of nuclear weapons we're not planning to reduce any time soon. So nothing new.

The Real Reason North Korea Wants Nuclear Weapons

            Although the North Korean regime depicts the image of the United States and the West completely destroyed, the main reason behind their push for proliferation is because they are scared. They’re scared of an invasion or US intervention. They’re scared because the US doesn’t have a great track record with keeping its word on agreements regarding disarmament. In recent history, Iraq and Libya serve as perfect examples. The US signed an agreement with Saddam Hussein in which he gave up his WMDs¹. In the end we still said he had WMDs, invaded Iraq, and toppled his government. With Libya the US signed a disarmament agreement with Muammar Gaddafi. Eventually we toppled his government too¹. Kim Jong Un simply fears ending up like Hussein or Gaddafi. He fears that any agreement the US signs won’t stop the US from overthrowing the North Korean government if it so chooses. He has decided that nuclear weapons are the best way to avert that option.

            It all goes back to the theory of nuclear deterrence. If North Korea has deliverable nuclear weapons, it should, in theory, deter the United States’ desire to invade or attack North Korea because they fear nuclear retaliation. In general, nuclear weapons aren’t used for first strikes or warfighting. They’re used to deter the enemy from using them in the first place. A lot of the theory depends on second strike capability. It’s the idea that if we are attacked first will we still have the ability to strike back with such destruction that the enemy will not want to attack in the first place. It can be argued that North Korea definitely doesn’t have a proper second strike capability, but what really determines what is too much destruction for the US? 50% of the country’s major cities, or just one major city on the west coast? Who can say what would be too much for the American people? It is safe to assume that the American people will react negatively to any kind of attack. In the end, it isn’t about North Korea’s ability to completely destroy the US. Kim Jong Un wants nukes out of fear. After all, if North Korea initiated a first strike against the US, that country would cease to exist. They want that even less.

¹ Mosher, D. (2018). North Korea is not building nuclear weapons to destroy the US — the real reasons are much more surprising. Business Insider.

Nukes, Round 3

Starting today (and through Tuesday), leaders of 47 nations - including those from China, India and Pakistan but excluding those from Israel and Iran - descend on Washington, which marks the first such occasion in the capital since the late 1940s. The expressed goal of the Nuclear Security Summit is to seek "ways to better secure existing supplies of bomb-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium." Of course this event will follow the release of the 2010 NPR and last Thursday's START treaty with Russia, all part of the Obama administration's long-term goal of a nuclear-free world. The BBC also suggests,

all three events are aimed strengthening Mr Obama's hand as heads into step four: the review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treat (NPT) scheduled for next month in New York.

As with the NPR and START treaty, this event won't occur without criticism. Though I don't think certain criticism has anything to offer for discussions on US defense posture (see Palin's schoolyard analogy), some significant shortcomings of the summit are worth notice and consideration. First is the "wicked" problem that both non-NPT members Pakistan and India are either in the process of or planning on increasing production of weapons-grade fuel. This arms race is enabled partially by a Bush-era agreement with India that implements necessary technology for nuclear power plants, thereby freeing up older nuclear facilities for creating next generation nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Pakistan is poised to expand its weapons-grade fuel as a deterrent; yet at the same time the Taliban and Al Qaeda inhabit near-lawless swaths of Pakistani territory - an obvious increased risk to the stated goal of the summit.

Second, Israeli PM Netanyahu has backed out of the summit only a few days before it is to begin (sending instead deputy PM Meridor). Following US-Israeli tensions regarding Israeli behavior prior to the Israel-Palestine peace process, this move is representative of Isreal's focus on protecting its weapons program in the face of a possible nuclear Iran. Neither confirming nor denying possessing nuclear weapons, Netanyahu decided not to attend after learning that Egypt and Turkey would question Israel's nuclear program. Planning on attending a nuclear summit, Netanyahu must have expected questions about its own program. In any case, Netanyahu's absence could further strain relations with the US, as well as diminish the possibility of encouraging sanctions on Iran at the summit.

Iran, on the other hand, won't be in attendance because it wasn't invited. Instead, as it announced on April 4th, Iran will hold a nuclear disarmament conference on April 17th with 60 countries expected in attendance. Fitting nicely into the Iranian narrative that its nuclear ambitions are for civilian use only, this conference will undoubtedly provide another platform for anti-Israeli remarks (while Israel will miss its chance in Washington) and to try to dissuade further sanctions.

Although Obama cannot possibly tackle these and other pressing issues at the nuclear summit over the next two days - and doesn't intend to - they signal that we have definitely not heard the last of international nuclear woes. Even if the world is successful in preventing "loose" nuclear material from falling in the hands of non-state actors, it is far from becoming nuclear free. As a final note, as Dr. Farley mentioned, perhaps the only way for the US (and thus the world) to take concrete steps toward this goal is to look for changes inward first rather than outward.

A false START?

This past week saw President Obama making good on a campaign promise and years of advocacy for nuclear weapons reductions (dating back to his time at Columbia) with the signing of a new START treaty with Russia. The first major arms control treaty in twenty years between the former Cold War foes, the treaty reduces active strategic weapons to 1,550 (down 30% from the previous START) and limits delivery vehicles from ICBMs to long-range bombers to 800.

This sounds great, even if the reductions aren’t as great as one might have hoped. The greatest significance of this treaty is not the actual numbers, but the fact it was signed at all. It suggests that not all of Obama’s efforts to “reset” our relationship with Russia have failed. Apparently, negotiations on the treaty became extremely tense several times, with Russian president Medvedev threatening to walk away on numerous occasions. That Obama managed to hold his feet to the fire and achieve a viable treaty that has been welcomed by the international community is just another of the major political successes he has scored in the past couple of weeks.

Unfortunately, the new START may be valueless. As with healthcare, the Republicans—likely whipped up in partisan fury—are promising to defeat ratification of the treaty unless there is some sign Obama is willing to modernize the US ICBM force and stand by missile defense. Ratification of treaties requires a two-thirds majority, so even if the Democrats are capable of standing together (for once), they will need seven members of the GOP to come across the aisle to achieve the needed 67 votes. The way things are going in Washington this treaty will never see the light of day.

Worse still is the fact that the treaty in no way addresses the countries’ immense stockpiles. By dealing with only active and deployed weapons and delivery vehicles, there is no requirement for an actual reduction in weapons. The number of nuclear weapons in the world will still be over 20,000, to no purpose. The White House also admits that the treaty in no way addresses testing of either weapons or delivery vehicles, and because the US has maintained its position supporting missile defense, there is likely to be a continuing offensive and defensive arms race well into the future.

The gloss of US-Russia cooperation and mutual monitoring is nice, but beneath the surface this new START is toothless and likely DOA. One can only hope it may be a START for something better.

Unicorns, Fairies and a World Without Nuclear Weapons

OK, I’ll say it. This whole “world without nuclear weapons” thing is ludicrous.

To be fair, Obama is not the first American president to call for this, nor will he be the last. But the idea is a bad one.

First of all, I’ll reveal my cynicism by saying it’s not possible. It’s like uninventing electricity. Or maybe there’s a better analogy. Has anyone heard of that gossip parable, with the woman and the bag of feathers? Well, now imagine that the feathers can reproduce asexually and take on the form of non-feathery things. That’s how difficult it would be to eliminate nuclear weapons from the world.

Here’s why. The scientific know-how exists, and it can’t unexist. Building on this fact, I’ll approach this thing logically.

What do nuclear weapons provide? Well, they’re cheaper than building and maintaining a massive conventional army able to compete with the United States. They’re also extremely effective deterrents. A country can increase its standing in the world, and force greater powers to listen to it, by possessing nuclear weapons. And some countries that possess nuclear weapons or possess the capabilities of creating nuclear weapons are not moved by President Obama’s idealistic rhetoric.

The way they see it, no one would like to see a nuke-free world more than the United States. That’s because the United States has, by far, the largest and most capable conventional military force in the world. What would be an incentive for countries like, say, Russia or North Korea, to give up their nuclear weapons? Or for that matter, how about Israel, which has a very capable military but is surrounded by adversaries? Not only would it require the elimination of enmity, hate, and all those things that we’d like to get rid of in the world. It would also require the elimination of the concept of self-interest, or the self-protection of the state.

In the highly unlikely case that the United States and Russia got rid of all of their nuclear weapons, would smaller countries get rid of their nukes? No. They would see them as just as valuable as a deterrent against the huge military forces—a means of fighting asymmetrical warfare, if necessary. This also also means that terrorist groups, whose budgets are growing and who certainly don’t have qualms about looking bad in the eyes of the international community, would continue to seek nuclear weapons. Sure, that’s not going to happen anytime soon given the difficulty of creating nuclear weapons and using them effectively, but it could happen in the time it would take for the great powers to rid themselves of their entire nuclear arsenals.

Not to go all right-wing gun-nut on you, but there’s also the old 2nd amendment adage—if you outlaw all the nukes, only the outlaws will have nukes.

On a related note, Obama said that the recent satellite launch by North Korea only illustrates “the need for action … to prevent the spread of these weapons.” I like the way E. Thomas McClanahan from the Kansas City Star puts it:
Wrong: Instead, the launch showed the fecklessness of pretending that international agreements and displays of good intentions can change the behavior of countries bent on going nuclear in defiance of world opinion.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was hardly effective in constraining North Korea, which signed it and then simply violated its terms and withdrew. Both Iran and North Korea have been subjected to sanctions and years of diplomatic pressure. Little has worked.


As long as there are states, and even powerful, militant non-state actors, there will be a desire for nuclear weapons. And where there’s a will, eventually, there’s probably a way. It’s one thing to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in military strategy, to reduce the outrageous amount of nuclear weapons we now possess, and to try as hard as we can to prevent nuclear proliferation. It’s entirely another to propose that the world disarm themselves of nuclear weapons entirely. The former are concepts I can get behind. The latter is not.