Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons and the Undermining of Deterrence Theory

The Trump administration announced its new nuclear strategy earlier in the month of February. The plan aims to match any and all movement made by Russia to modernize their forces--as long as it stays within the boundaries of treaties. In the beginning of March, Russian President Vladmir Putin announced that Russia had new nuclear-capable weapons which make nuclear defense systems “useless.”  

The escalating rhetoric and planned nuclear build-up by the United States might lead one to question the necessity of some of the planned expenditures. The Nuclear Posture Review had called for the fitting of Trident II missiles with low-yield nuclear warheads. Many believe that this is the best and most humane way to counter the escalation of Russian deployment of low-yield nuclear warheads. However, in accordance with nuclear deterrence theory, the possession or use of low yield nuclear undermines security. If a state possesses low yield nuclear weapons this indicates that they intend to be used, as nuclear weapons serve the singular purpose of preventing the use of nuclear weapons. And there can only be two results coming from the use of low-yield nuclear weapons. 

 

First, the use of a single low-yield nuclear weapon utilized against a nuclear power would trigger a second-strike. According to the theory, a second-strike will likely be the entirety of the targeted state's nuclear arsenal, as they must make it impossible for there to be a third strike. Thus, it is imperative that the targeting nation inflict so much damage that a second strike is no longer possible. For this reason, low-yield nuclear weapons are ineffective against nuclear powers beyond deterring the use of nuclear weapons. 

Second, the use of a low-yield nuclear weapon would trigger new nuclear arms race if used against a non-nuclear power. An attack on a non-nuclear state by a nuclear state signals to all non-nuclear powers that, to counter the same fate, they will need to procure their own nuclear stockpile. The other non-nuclear nations will push forward with their own nuclear programs. Because, within nuclear deterrence theory, the only way in which a nation can prevent being the target of a nuclear attack is through mutually assured destruction.
 

The escalating rhetoric of President Trump and President Putin has worked to undermine deterrence theory, but if they continue on their current path of escalation through increasing their nuclear arsenals they might just get to test it.  

The Real Reason North Korea Wants Nuclear Weapons

            Although the North Korean regime depicts the image of the United States and the West completely destroyed, the main reason behind their push for proliferation is because they are scared. They’re scared of an invasion or US intervention. They’re scared because the US doesn’t have a great track record with keeping its word on agreements regarding disarmament. In recent history, Iraq and Libya serve as perfect examples. The US signed an agreement with Saddam Hussein in which he gave up his WMDs¹. In the end we still said he had WMDs, invaded Iraq, and toppled his government. With Libya the US signed a disarmament agreement with Muammar Gaddafi. Eventually we toppled his government too¹. Kim Jong Un simply fears ending up like Hussein or Gaddafi. He fears that any agreement the US signs won’t stop the US from overthrowing the North Korean government if it so chooses. He has decided that nuclear weapons are the best way to avert that option.

            It all goes back to the theory of nuclear deterrence. If North Korea has deliverable nuclear weapons, it should, in theory, deter the United States’ desire to invade or attack North Korea because they fear nuclear retaliation. In general, nuclear weapons aren’t used for first strikes or warfighting. They’re used to deter the enemy from using them in the first place. A lot of the theory depends on second strike capability. It’s the idea that if we are attacked first will we still have the ability to strike back with such destruction that the enemy will not want to attack in the first place. It can be argued that North Korea definitely doesn’t have a proper second strike capability, but what really determines what is too much destruction for the US? 50% of the country’s major cities, or just one major city on the west coast? Who can say what would be too much for the American people? It is safe to assume that the American people will react negatively to any kind of attack. In the end, it isn’t about North Korea’s ability to completely destroy the US. Kim Jong Un wants nukes out of fear. After all, if North Korea initiated a first strike against the US, that country would cease to exist. They want that even less.

¹ Mosher, D. (2018). North Korea is not building nuclear weapons to destroy the US — the real reasons are much more surprising. Business Insider.