The world is in the midst of a
slow-moving, yet systemically important, transition to cities. In 1950, 30
percent of the world population lived in urban areas. Today, slightly more than
half of all people reside in urban areas and by 2050 two-thirds of the world
population is expected to live in cities. As people become more concentrated in
population centers, rather than dispersed more equitably across rural areas,
the way we think about society is likely to change. Rather than defining
ourselves by the broad characteristic of nationality, people may begin to
identify with city before country. As the internet has connected the world,
people are likely to narrow their geographic identity to their immediate
“meeting area” and broaden their ideological identity in accordance to the vast
communities of cyberspace; this can already be witnessed in the growing
significance of non-state actors around the world. Furthermore, bilateral and
multilateral relations between cities may begin to take precedence in global
relations. Put another way, rising urbanization may mean the decline of the
state, as we know it.
Nationalism is still a thriving
phenomenon, and it certainly won’t dissipate swiftly. In fact, Europe is
experiencing a resurgence of nationalism in light of the 2008 financial crisis
and ongoing sovereign debt crisis (it appears shared prosperity is an easier
sell than shared suffering). However, this impulse involved contraction, from
the larger European identity to the smaller national identity. During crisis,
this otherwise cooperative covenant became suspicious of the motives of other member-states.
Does Greece have the same economic interests as Germany? Does Spain have the
same defense interests as Latvia? The last few years have certainly made the
affirmative a more difficult case.
Paradoxically, I believe the same
concept that is powering nationalism today may lead to its demise in a more
urbanized world. Just as EU states are not feel fully aligned with one another,
cities of geographically large countries are likely to feel growingly distinct.
Nationalism would have you believe Seattle is more aligned with Miami than it
is with Vancouver, but this is obviously only so true as national identity
dictates it to be. The two pacific coast, seaport cities, separated by 140
miles of road, certainly share more geographic, economic, and culture
similarities with one another than they do with an Atlantic population more
than 3000 miles away. Again, nationalism is a deeply ingrained value,
particularly in the developed world, and will not recede quickly or without a
fight. However, as populations concentrate, each of these concentrations are
likely to desire more autonomy to pursue their unique interests.
In addition to the concentration of
populations, the introduction of the internet over the last three decades has
made the world a more connected place than it has ever been in history. People
are no longer confined to interaction with others in their immediate location.
Information isn’t garnered from a local newspaper, but instead from online
sources that can be tailored to individual interests and ideological
preferences. As populations concentrate and coming generations become more and
more globally connected, two venues will increase in importance: “meeting area”
and the cyber community. The ability to meet in-person conveniently allows for
a level of intimacy in relationships that cannot be replicated by technology
and, thus, will remain an important aspect of our identity. On the other end of
the spectrum, the vast connectedness made possible by the internet has allowed
people around the world to find others with similar beliefs and values, meaning
people aren’t limited by the political options offered in their domestic
community. For example, the Arab Spring is largely credited to social media
enabling a movement that transcended borders. Unfortunately, we can also see
the relevance of the cyber community through the recruiting tactics of ISIS and
other terrorist organizations. As our identities become more stratified between
“meeting area” and the global community, it is likely to be at the cost of
state relevance, which will seem less and less connected to the world we live
in.
In a future that is simultaneously
more local and global than the one we live in today, cities will likely have
more autonomy because the collective populaces will support such a shift. For
example, Boston, New York and Washington, D.C. are likely to have differing priorities
than Vancouver, Seattle and Portland, but all are currently held to the same
trade policies negotiated by the U.S. (and Canadian) government. More
meaningful bilateral and multilateral relations between global cities would
allow for more common ground to be found on a smaller scale, rather than the
current system which sometimes requires decades to make small progress on a grand
scale. Regulations at the federal level would need to be put in place to insure
certain standards, but a greater deal of cooperation between markets could be
achieved if individual cities (and possibly coalitions of cities) could tailor
policies to their interests rather than national policy trying to achieve a
workable one-size-fits-all success. Additionally, city elections may become
more important, and campaign funding from foreign entities may become less
taboo. Rather than waging ideological war domestically, campaigns will likely
become more global as PACs try to swing the ideological pendulum in their favor
around the world.