Walking that fine line of deterrence

Today CNN.com posted a story concerning comments made by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in which he stated “Iran’s army will ‘cut off the hand’ of any attacker and is at the ready to fulfill its defensive duties”. Ahmadinejad is not shy about these comments and has made many in the past; however, why make this comment now? What is there to gain from repeating statements made in the past?

Reviewing both deterrence and hegemonic power theories should paint a clear picture of the effect of this statement on both Iran and the international system. Deterrence relies on the defending state to build a perception that by attacking it, the attacker will suffer such costs that the battle isn’t worth fighting. Iran is specifically trying to implement a type of perception – by a type, I am referring to Fearon’s (1997) classification of deterrence that involves rising or sinking costs that are suffered either ex post or ex ante by the defending state – where Ahmadinejad continues to raise audience costs within his state that will be suffered if Iran is attacked and does not retaliate. This has been shown through countless statements much like the one above, as well as aggressive actions – the seizing of the British troops.

It is clear that Ahmadinejad is trying to create the perception that no matter who chooses to go to war with Iran, he is prepared to fight with all he has. While Iran may not be moving troops to the border, Ahmadinejad is effectively “tying his hands” by creating these audience costs within his country. If he ever backed out of these threats, his country would clearly suffer these costs ex post. This perception of retaliation and a willingness to fight gives Iran a credible deterrence threat against possible advancing nations. With these continuing actions and statements, is Iran pushing past simple deterrence to a more taunting aggressive action against America’s hegemonic power.

Hegemonic powers theory rests on the idea that the hegemonic state in a unipolar system exists because it can enforce its will upon the rest of the system. More specifically, Kindleberger (1981), defines this term as when a “country, firm, or person dominated another when the other had to take account of what the first entity did, but the first could equally ignore the second”. For a hegemonic system to remain stable the hegemonic state must be able to act in a manner where they do not concern themselves with the actions of others, as long as those actions are not direct threats to the hegemonic power itself.

In this, we see Iran acting in a deterrence fashion, but at the same time taking it to a point that could theoretically threaten the United States’ position in the international system. By continually issuing threats and showing no fear to the hegemonic power, Iran is almost forcing the United States into a conflict simply to save its reputation as the primary power within the system. In the international system, perception is what truly matters, both the perception of deterrence and the perception of unmatched power by the hegemonic state.

Ahmadinejad has clearly operated in a deterrence fashion and done so successfully in the past. The best example of this is the handling of the British soldiers by the Iranians. First, they took the soldiers showing that they were not to be crossed, and they were willing to do whatever was necessary to defend their sovereignty. Second, they allowed no representatives from Britain to meet with the hostages, showing their resolve and fearlessness concerning a British response. Lastly, Ahmadinejad returned the hostages unharmed to their host country, thus completing an almost perfect showing of deterrence. Now, however, Ahmadinejad is pushing past deterrence to a clear threat to the hegemonic supremacy of the United States, and if it continues, the United States will be forced to respond or lose its own perception as a hegemonic superpower.