Hiders and Finders in the Urban Environments of the Future

            The U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has an eye towards the future, with its Mad Scientist Initiative conducting regular conferences and providing grants to experts and technologists forecasting how warfare will change over the century. One of the papers produced by a recent Mad Scientist Conference was featured on the Modern War Institute’s podcast, and its authors (retired Maj. Gen. David Fastabend and Ian Sullivan) described their vision of how the operational environment will change over the next 32 years.  They foresee a shift from forces fighting for cities, to forces fighting in cities as the proliferation of “finders,” or sensors both overhead and on the ground, drives militaries to try to be better “hiders.”

            They envision three basic options to safeguard key forces and systems—mobility, dispersal, and dormancy.  Notionally, if systems and key forces are mobile, they are harder for the enemy to hit in the opening salvo of a war, but in a pinch, nations can limit the damage of an initial attack by dispersing their forces and systems around their territory.  The best option, especially for systems that don’t require constant human interaction, is dormancy—a dispersed series of weapons systems that don’t produce waste or activity and can blend in seamlessly with their surroundings because they don’t operate until called upon to strike.  Regardless of which route nations take, Maj. Gen. Fastabend believes that the urban environment provides the overhead cover that systems and forces will need to escape detection.

            Don’t tell that to another of the Mad Scientist Initiative’s speakers, Frank Prautzsch, who described his belief that “there’s [no] chance for the element of surprise in the megacity,” in a March 2016 address about the future of urban warfare.  The sensors that Mr. Prautzsch cites are the commercially available, networked devices that constitute the internet of things (IOT), which he reckons could be deployed even by asymmetric adversaries to gain an improved picture of the battlefield within the megacity.  He’s hardly alone in his assessment.  Alfred Crane and Richard Peeke also presented a paper at the 2016 Mad Scientist Initiative, in which they argue that the data analytics technologies being developed by commercial entities could be used by a variety of actors to exploit IOT both offensively and defensively during urban operations.  The belief that IOT will enable a Dark Knight-esque perfect surveillance of a massive city for forces on the ground overlooks its disadvantages in the face of its competition—miniaturized, survivable drones.  

            First, as Mr. Prautzsch acknowledges, the GIS community does not have a very good grasp on what cities look like either underground or inside buildings, and even if information warfare units can access IOT devices inside a building and determine whether there are people near them, that information is not actionable intelligence until you can assign a distinct location to the device.  That would involve building out a floor plan, which no PlayStation camera or coffee maker will help with, by establishing the locations of individual devices on a single router, which will be difficult unless the router is operating on a multi-antenna, timing-advanced system, which would be overengineered for an indoor space, and repeating the process for every single IOT device in the building.  

            Compare asking a brigade-level information warfare asset to exploit the IOT devices in a building versus sending out a pocket-sized drone to map the corridors in front of you as you go.  Which of those options do you think the average infantryman would choose?  The one that involves waiting for geeks to do something that could take hours or days and not be accurate, or the one that projects what’s around the corner right onto his heads-up-display without having to ask for permission?  IOT devices could be useable for the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and establishing patterns of life for High Value Targets, but its tactical application will never beat the efficiency of squad or even team-level drone technology.  As for those of you hoping to take Maj. Gen. Fastabend’s advice and hide ICBMs or MLRSs inside urban structures, maybe just don’t get Alexa.

Military Effectiveness – now for pwning noobs! 1337!

Recently, much has been made of the convergence of consumer electronics and the world’s militaries. The iPod is an increasingly common part of the kit a soldier must lug around, acting as translator, weapons training, and perhaps occasionally, a form of entertainment. Xbox controllers have been modified to control UAVs. Recognizing the collusion between military and consumer industries yields benefits both in the fields and in budgetary spreadsheets, the recent 2010 QDR calls for the Department of Defense to “broaden and deepen relationships with other nations and private firms to create mutually beneficial partnerships to share capabilities, systems, technology, and personnel, while ensuring that we also protect sensitive sources and methods.”

This focus on harnessing the innovative power of the private sector is not unique to the DoD. To ease the burden of refocusing our nation’s space program, NASA is to have greater cooperation with private rocket developers. I hear our nuclear stockpile is need of modernization, perhaps we can get some private firms on that too, while we’re at it.

And yet little has been made of some basic elements of military effectiveness working their way back into consumer culture. Specifically, the current generation of war-themed video games has required players to—at least subconsciously—take into consideration the elements key to military effectiveness in order to succeed. Players, primarily males aged 12-30, are passively learning what is necessary for a successful military engagement by nights spent on games like Modern Warfare 2 or MAG.

Scenarios in war games are moving further and further away from simple “run n’ gun” deathmatch action in favor of more objective-based game types where players must work together to hold points, plant explosives, or establish a headquarters. Clans—teams that practice and play competitively against other clans together online—tend to work out specific roles for each player in order to operate more efficiently in securing objective. War games ever since Counter-Strike have required a team to balance themselves with different weapons and capabilities to improve their chances of victory. Snipers and machine gunners lay down suppressive fire so that light infantry may advance. Players with riot shields may take the place of armor, punching through enemy lines and providing cover for an advance of infantry. A well-balanced team thus replicates the technical skills and weapons handling necessary for success in the real field.

But things have become even more complex. With the advent of headsets (by no means a recent occurrence), information sharing has made the dominance of teams even greater. With the ability to identify and communicate the state of targets or the placement of enemy weapons and personnel, the cohesive team will make short work of casual gamers paired with strangers. Unit cohesion is key, as those that move systematically together on a target are the most likely to take it. In most games, players in close proximity will make recorded announcements that they are throwing a flashbang, reloading, or have taken down an enemy. Elements of the heads up display (HUD) such as radar showing target, enemy, and friendly locations, a running scoreboard, and the amount of ammunition available are a vital source of (albeit unrealistic) information for players. Anyone who has suffered an enemy EMP in Modern Warfare 2 can attest to what an impact the loss of this information can have on players.

Games have been seeking greater integration of different weapons systems, with the ability to call in airstrikes, use UAV missiles, or even call in a game-ending tactical nuke. The more arcade-style Battlefield series allows players to hop from airplane to landing craft to tank to anti-aircraft gun. The integration of these weapons systems has proven unrealistic and rather clumsy, often as a reward for success in the field. Similarly, the ranks players earn through taking checkpoints or killing opponents have had little relevance in the actual heat of battle.

But that appears to be changing. The new Playstation 3 game MAG allows battles of up to 256 players on massive online maps. There are objectives to be held, but other strong points such as pillboxes must be held or destroyed in order to make victory possible. To manage this mass of digital humanity, the game’s designers have made tactical leadership central to the game. Before each match, players interested in an officer’s position may enter their name in the running. Units of eight are each assigned an officer who decides what targets the unit should go after, and based on unit performance may earn the right to call in air strikes or other support. Though it may seem that players would quickly ignore their officer’s commands those that stay close to their leader get benefits such as faster reloading and greater accuracy, providing an incentive for greater tactical play.

As the games support ever larger fields of players, it seems that this sort of tactical leadership will have to be expanded, perhaps to the level of actual generalship where a few players get to decide the overall strategy the lower officers must pursue. Whether this will prove enticing to casual gamers such as myself remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it is interesting that both game developers and players are quickly realizing that basic rules of military effectiveness—unit cohesion, information management, tactical leadership, and perhaps even one day generalship—are just as vital to victory in the virtual world as they are on our modern battlefields. Perhaps greater cooperation between industry and the military will prove better for all involved (it is worth noting that the Navy SEALS have provided technical advice to both the Modern Warfare and SOCOM series). Let’s just hope no one in the field decides a tactical nuke after a twenty-five kill streak is actually a good idea.