Hiders and Finders in the Urban Environments of the Future

            The U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has an eye towards the future, with its Mad Scientist Initiative conducting regular conferences and providing grants to experts and technologists forecasting how warfare will change over the century. One of the papers produced by a recent Mad Scientist Conference was featured on the Modern War Institute’s podcast, and its authors (retired Maj. Gen. David Fastabend and Ian Sullivan) described their vision of how the operational environment will change over the next 32 years.  They foresee a shift from forces fighting for cities, to forces fighting in cities as the proliferation of “finders,” or sensors both overhead and on the ground, drives militaries to try to be better “hiders.”

            They envision three basic options to safeguard key forces and systems—mobility, dispersal, and dormancy.  Notionally, if systems and key forces are mobile, they are harder for the enemy to hit in the opening salvo of a war, but in a pinch, nations can limit the damage of an initial attack by dispersing their forces and systems around their territory.  The best option, especially for systems that don’t require constant human interaction, is dormancy—a dispersed series of weapons systems that don’t produce waste or activity and can blend in seamlessly with their surroundings because they don’t operate until called upon to strike.  Regardless of which route nations take, Maj. Gen. Fastabend believes that the urban environment provides the overhead cover that systems and forces will need to escape detection.

            Don’t tell that to another of the Mad Scientist Initiative’s speakers, Frank Prautzsch, who described his belief that “there’s [no] chance for the element of surprise in the megacity,” in a March 2016 address about the future of urban warfare.  The sensors that Mr. Prautzsch cites are the commercially available, networked devices that constitute the internet of things (IOT), which he reckons could be deployed even by asymmetric adversaries to gain an improved picture of the battlefield within the megacity.  He’s hardly alone in his assessment.  Alfred Crane and Richard Peeke also presented a paper at the 2016 Mad Scientist Initiative, in which they argue that the data analytics technologies being developed by commercial entities could be used by a variety of actors to exploit IOT both offensively and defensively during urban operations.  The belief that IOT will enable a Dark Knight-esque perfect surveillance of a massive city for forces on the ground overlooks its disadvantages in the face of its competition—miniaturized, survivable drones.  

            First, as Mr. Prautzsch acknowledges, the GIS community does not have a very good grasp on what cities look like either underground or inside buildings, and even if information warfare units can access IOT devices inside a building and determine whether there are people near them, that information is not actionable intelligence until you can assign a distinct location to the device.  That would involve building out a floor plan, which no PlayStation camera or coffee maker will help with, by establishing the locations of individual devices on a single router, which will be difficult unless the router is operating on a multi-antenna, timing-advanced system, which would be overengineered for an indoor space, and repeating the process for every single IOT device in the building.  

            Compare asking a brigade-level information warfare asset to exploit the IOT devices in a building versus sending out a pocket-sized drone to map the corridors in front of you as you go.  Which of those options do you think the average infantryman would choose?  The one that involves waiting for geeks to do something that could take hours or days and not be accurate, or the one that projects what’s around the corner right onto his heads-up-display without having to ask for permission?  IOT devices could be useable for the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and establishing patterns of life for High Value Targets, but its tactical application will never beat the efficiency of squad or even team-level drone technology.  As for those of you hoping to take Maj. Gen. Fastabend’s advice and hide ICBMs or MLRSs inside urban structures, maybe just don’t get Alexa.

Continued Drones Over Yemen?

With the U.S., U.K. and France pulling out of Yemen, what is the U.S.'s continued authorization for drone strikes in Yemen? If Yemen has no government, how does the U.S. have authorization from the government for drone strikes? 

It is generally accepted that the drone strikes in Yemen are part of the CIA operated drone strikes rather than the military led ones (both are controversial). On March 25, 2010, Harold Koh, State Department Legal Advisor, stated that "it is the considered view of this Administration . . . that U.S. targeting practices, including lethal operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war." (1) This is based upon the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF). That AUMF is not the one that Obama has recently asked to be repealed. 

As of Friday Feb 6, 2015,  the site The Long War Journal showed the following graph charting drone strikes in Yemen, charting 110 strikes since 2002.

The U.S. claims that they have the support of the Yemni government to help achieve their goal of eliminating Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen. However, with the recent change in power/coup, who has given them that authorization?

On Jan 22, the Houthis seized control of the presidential palace and placed the President under house arrest. The President and his Cabinet soon tendered their resignations. While the negotiation is on going, both sides have walked out on different parts. The government that resigned is stating that the Houthis are threatening them with force if they do not agree to their specific plan to re-form the government. The U.S. is continuing to use drone strikes in this power vacuum.

How is this applicable to the U.S.? 

Well, as the U.S.'s current legal justification rests upon the consent of the now defunct government, is it business as usual until they are notified otherwise? How will they notify the U.S. if they no longer want the strikes to continue, if there are no U.S. personnel in the country? 

CNN is reporting that the Houthis took all U.S. Embassy vehicles parked at the airport and wouldn't let departing marines take their weapons. However, in the next non sensational paragraph, they state "a senior U.S. military official told CNN the Marines disabled their weapons and gave them to a Yemeni security detail, which had escorted them to the airport, because the Marines were flying commercial." 

Further in the CNN article, they state that U.S. officials had not yet engaged in talks with the Houthis as of last month. It is often difficult for the U.S. to "engage in talks" with opposition parties. The government often has problems with the U.S. talking with the "enemy" since the U.S. has a history of "regime change" in many of these countries.

As I wrote this article, The Washington Post published an article about the closure of the U.S. Embassy effecting the CIA operatives in the country (who often are stationed at U.S. Embassies and under diplomatic cover). Further, "a former senior U.S. official said that the embassy had served as the primary base in Yemen for U.S. intelligence operations." 

So not only is the lack of clear legal authority an issue, this closure will now effect the targeting of militants. 

Future of Cooperation?

While one member of the Houhis' political bureau has called U.S. drone strikes as a violation of Yemeni sovereignty, the Houthis do NOT like AQAP. In fact, they might hate AQAP than they dislike the U.S. This could work in the U.S.'s favor as eliminating a possible political threat to their new "all inclusive government" would coincide with the U.S.'s goal of eliminating AQAP. 

However, until a new government is formed, and an official statement released or communicated to the proper U.S. authorities, these questions will remained unanswered. 

For more interactive information, I suggest you head over to International Security to take a look at when and where strikes occurs as well as who was targeted or killed.

Sources not linked above are listed here: (1) Milena Sterio, "The United States' Use of Drones in the War on Terror: The (Il)legality of Targeted Killings Under International Law," Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, vol 45, 2012, p 199