Pro of Trump's massive defense budget: Better Super Hornet Fighters!

More than a few eyebrows were raised on Capitol Hill and around the world when Trump announced that he would be ramping up the defense budget- not that anyone was exactly surprised. Already, US defense accounted for 16% of its overall federal spending and far outpaced that of any other country. As the image here illustrates, the US's $611 billion budget a year ago was larger  than the next 8 countries, including China and Russia. Maybe a bit more than necessary? Not a chance!

In that spirit, the proposed 2019 defense budget will bring it up to $686 billion- an increase of 8%.

One Forbes contributor suggests that the larger budget may begin to restore power to the navy, which felt it had been hurt in Obama-era cuts. This may start, he suspects, with upgrading their stock of Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet strike fighters, as well as those still coming off the production line. They hope to bring all Super Hornets up to "Block III" configuration and to extend their lifespan. This particular model faced adversity under the Obama administration's decreased military spending. Now, under Trump era expansion, the Navy is said to be planning a purchase of 134 Super Hornets within the next 5 years that can all travel 500 miles before needing to refuel (aka with new Block III upgrades). They will also receive improved sensors and data exchange capabilities.

Is the new budget a lot? Kind of. Is it and the Super Hornet upgrades it'll help fund unnecessary? Perhaps not. In light of escalated tensions with Russia and an upcoming and unpredictable meeting with "Little Rocket Man," what will happen next is anyone's guess. The contributing writer himself suggests that these advancements have been made more and more necessary by other countries' investments in long-rang missiles that could put our super-carriers. So why not bulk up and be on the top of our military game?

World War II Called: They Want Their Planes Back.

Would you really prefer this...

      The United States Air Force is currently in the process of evaluating and selecting a new Light Attack Craft to provide Close Air Support on the cheap. Light Attack Craft are very small planes driven by a single propeller, just like many aircraft in World War II. Their basic armament consists of .50 caliber machine guns and is complemented with weapon racks for bombs, rockets and gun pods. By virtue of the these factors, Light Attack Craft are indeed cheap. Buying them would be an excellent idea if the U.S. was a developing nation; however, as the state with the largest GDP and the military (by far), it is a fantastically bad plan. The United States already has a cheap and effective CAS plane: the Fairchild Republic A-10A/C Thunderbolt II, better know as the Warthog.

     The Air Force has put forward several talking points supporting their acquisition of Light Attack Craft; however, they do not hold up under closer investigation

• The U.S. Air Force argues that Light Attack Craft will be a cheaper alternative to using F-15’s, F-16’s and F-22’s in low intensity conflict like the current conflict in Syria.
  • While it’s true Light Attack Craft would be a cheaper option, the A-10 is much more capable at CAS. It is equipped with a larger cannon and it carries much more ordinance.

• 

  ...or this? Look at all that ordinance.

  Using Light Attack Craft in low intensity conflicts would allow the Air Force to reserve high-spec planes for high intensity threats such as North Korea.
  • Using A-10’s would also allow higher-spec planes to be reserved for greater threats.
  • Modern “low intensity conflicts” are anything but low intensity. The recent shoot down of a Russian Su-25 Frogfoot, a plane comparable to the A-10, proves that even high-spec attack planes are at risk. Light Attack Craft have less armor (the A-10 is fabled for it’s “titanium bathtub” around the cockpit), less speed and a lower ceiling, making them even more susceptible to enemy fire from MANPADS and even machine guns.
• Light Attack Craft would allow more pilots to stay current and quickly adjust to high-spec aircraft.
  • This completely ignores the current pilot shortage. With pilot numbers low already, why put them in a plane which cannot attack as many targets as an A-10?

     The choice should be clear. The US can either select a propeller pane with less firepower than the average West Virginian SUV, or it can select the A-10, a plane designed around cannon designed to eat Soviet tanks for breakfast, lunch and dinner.

The Red Baron and EBO

The other day was the anniversary of the death of Baron Manfred Von Richthofen, better known as the Red Baron. Unlike the History Channel, I do not get wrapped up in romanticizing enemies. I thought it was worth addressing this in conjunction with how the Libya situation is hopefully de-romanticizing the mythical revolution in military affairs, specifically that our country cannot merely rely on airpower as a strategy.

The revolution of military affairs led military strategists to rely on “effects based operations” (EBO) that assumed that precision guided attacks focused on centers of gravity would allow us to force the enemy to do our bidding. This assumed that technological innovation would lift the fog of war by providing a clear picture of the enemy situation. In short, EBO is enticing to the Air Force because of an overwhelming reliance on mathematical analytics…changing warfare from a “an art to a science.” This article is the best I’ve seen that captures the issues with EBO.

The Libya situation makes clear some of the issues with EBO. Namely, strategists and campaigners cannot assume that they know how their actions will “affect” the enemy. Early in fight, when it became clear that the “No Fly Zone” was a little bit more, Qaddafi’s forces began shedding uniforms, using civilian vehicles, and hiding among the population. These actions likely forecast what future enemy forces will do in the face of an American assault, and should accentuate the concept that we must fight for intelligence and develop the situation while in contact with the enemy. The Army seems to have grasped this, as seen in their Army Capstone Concept, in the wake of works like this one by old Army Officers.

The biggest hope should be that we learn the right lessons from this conflict. Hopefully from an ending that involves a Qaddafi-less Libya. Specifically…this war will not have been won by airpower.
It will require aggressive and thrifty maneuvers on the part of the rebels, with secure lines of logistics, and an iron will in urban combat. Given Defense Secretary Gates’ recent remarks at the United States Military Academy at West Point, we should worry that our strategists will attempt (like the Kosovo example) to twist this into a victory for EBO-enthusiasts. Kind of like how historians made The Red Baron into more than just another enemy shot out of the sky. Better him than any more of ours.