The situation in Ukraine and Crimea has, unsurprisingly,
brought the issue of NATO enlargement to the fore once again. Georgia, a victim
of Russian aggression in 2008, is agitating
for a fast track to membership. Key political figures in Sweden and Finland
have mentioned seriously
reconsidering their policies of non-alignment. U.S. Congress members are
pushing for Macedonia[i] to
join the Alliance. At the same time, some pundits and analysts (and Russian
President Vladimir Putin) have put forth the case that the entire crisis in
Ukraine is in fact a direct result of previous Alliance enlargements and
Russian fears
of encirclement. The implication is that NATO must offer Russia a guarantee
of some kind, that it is done integrating new members and will never menace
Russia’s imperial ambitions. This
is ludicrous.
It is certainly true that Russia has always hated NATO’s
“Open Door” policy, but the idea that it rightly fears for its own security is specious.
NATO in no way directly threatens the territory or security of Russia. The 2010
Strategic Concept explicitly states, “The Alliance does not consider any
country [Russia] to be its adversary” (although it does follow this up with “no
one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members were to
be threatened”). Admittedly, the U.S. and Western Europe built NATO to counter
and contain the Communist east. But when the Cold War ended and the Soviet
Union vanished, so too did this goal. NATO focuses now on ensuring stability
through collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security – all
of which are enhanced by expanded membership. None of these threaten Russia,
except insofar as Russia desires to reestablish the USSR and drag states that
abhor the memory of Soviet rule back under its control. In which case, it is
right that Russia feel constrained and even menaced. Such actions violate
international norms of behavior – especially among developed states and even
more particularly within Europe itself.
Furthermore, the muted response to the 2008 Georgia war (and,
frankly, the annexation of Crimea) suggests that NATO is far from searching for
a reason to fight its former adversary. What Russia truly fears is not so much
its encirclement by a hostile, war-mongering enemy as it is the failure of its
model and appeal. After all, achieving NATO membership is not merely a question
of wanting in and spending enough on defense. There are political and
economic requirements as well, including commitment to the rule of law,
human rights, democracy, and individual liberty. Aspirant states must
demonstrate, among other things, that they have a functioning democratic
political system based on a market economy and that they treat minority
populations fairly. These are not easy things to achieve, and that former
Warsaw Pact and satellite states exerted the effort, including extensive economic
and political capital, suggests an appreciation not only for the security NATO
promised, but for the norms it embodied. Implicitly, they simultaneously
rejected the Russian model as undesirable.
This was perhaps excusable in the 1990s, when the Russian
economy was in shambles (and when it did not have the means to respond or try
to prevent states from falling out of its orbit), but that countries should
continue to prefer NATO and the European Union in light of Russia’s reemergence
is, in President Putin’s eyes, inexcusable. That any nation would prefer the
West to closer ties with Russia is humiliating for a leader who dreams of
regional hegemony and expanding Great Power status. He simply had to put an end
to it. The result? The war in Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in
March.
Curiously enough, the best response to this brutal
denouncement of NATO enlargement may very well be to expand membership once
again. This is not to suggest that Georgia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Ukraine, or
other potential Allies receive any kind of accelerated membership. Indeed, NATO
needs to seriously consider what value these countries may add. It is all well
and good to promote democracy and stability, but the question of what these
states will contribute – and what costs their membership might entail – should
determine whether or not they get a seat at the table in Brussels. There is
significant disagreement within the Alliance over when and even whether these
states should be allowed to join, and their impact on NATO decision-making –
already a challenge with 28 nations – cannot be discounted.
The addition of Sweden and Finland is a different matter. They
are some of NATO’s oldest and closest partners and have participated in the
Partnership for Peace (PfP) since its inception in 1994. Sweden in particular
has a historically close relationship with the Alliance, including secret
bilateral cooperation with the U.S. and other NATO countries during the
Cold War. Sweden has also participated in a number of NATO operations since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, including Operation Unified Protector in Libya.
This is of particular note when you take into consideration the fact that only
14 actual member nations made direct contributions to that operation. NATO has
pretty much always been open to their accession, and periodic Russian
aggressions, including in Georgia in 2008 and now in Ukraine, have prompted
discussion of the possibility.
Expanding membership to include Sweden and Finland is a good
choice for a number of reasons. They are fairly invulnerable
to Russian economic pressure, particularly when it comes to natural gas
dependencies. Russia would thus struggle to respond to accession via economic
retaliation. They are also some of the least corrupt, most stable and
advanced countries in the world – Russia would have no remotely plausible
excuse to intervene, even with a small, Russian-speaking population in Finland.
Finally, they are both already EU members. In other words, Russia’s pretty much
already lost this battle.
Accession would also demonstrate to Russia just how far over
the line it’s gone – these two nations, who resisted NATO’s “siren call” for so
long, are willing to abandon historically entrenched policies of non-alignment
because Russian behavior is so egregious. Their decision to join NATO would be
a significant diplomatic blow for Putin. Furthermore, another round of
enlargement would allow NATO to demonstrate that is has not been intimidated by
Russian posturing – it will incorporate any nation who desires to join, who
meets membership standards, and who’s participation supports NATO’s interests.
This is a vital political message that would strengthen NATO’s position
vis-à-vis Russia.
Of course, all the benefits of Swedish and Finish accession
don’t mean it will come to pass any time soon (if ever). The issue is
contentious domestically (membership is actually opposed by a popular majority
in both countries) and unlikely to be resolved in the near future (although
Sweden has seen a 9%
jump in support over the past two years). That being said, political
leaders there and in NATO should seriously examine the possibility of
enlargement and initiate efforts to shift public opinion. It could be the
Alliance’s best move at this point.
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