Source |
It would be difficult to dispute that the application of
American airpower has had profound effects on the formulation and realization
of US military and political goals. The debut of high tech targeting systems
and guided munitions during Operation Desert Storm, the protective use of NATO
airpower during operations in the former Yugoslavia, the collaborative system
of the Afghan Model and the “Shock and Awe” of the early stages of Operation
Iraqi Freedom continued the ascent of the modern American way of war into the
wild blue yonder, giving a bird’s eye view of strategic and political
objectives.
This perspective, the privilege of a country wealthy,
developed, and technologically invested enough to maintain a competent and
advanced air force, may also distort the realities of warfighting. This same
debate surrounds the utility of Special Forces. Do US capabilities make it
easier for political leaders to consider coercive force as a part of the
foreign policy spectrum?
This question is far more salient when one considers the use
of force against or in weak or failed states, than against mid-to-high level
powers. Although, it is important because it requires a thought process that runs
across the objectives of American military might, especially when related to
changing unamenable political situations in countries we are reluctant to
invade with conventional ground forces.
While military-strategic objectives are often effectively
and expediently carried out by forces that correctly interpret the theoretical
implications of airpower’s operational utility, the political objectives are
often half-baked when they are lost in the awe of winning the air war or
annihilating the enemy on the ground. The fantastic effects of airpower make
this fallacy far more likely to envelope post-operation analysis of victory
conditions.
Source |
Consider the example invoked into banality, the premature
George W. Bush exaltation on the USS Abraham
Lincoln, complete with F/A-18s in the background . As the celebration of the shattering of the Iraqi government and army kicked off, the fragments were gearing up to tie down American ground
troops for the next 8 years. The war had been won, in large part, by the
advantages bestowed upon American combat forces by the use of airpower.
Unfortunately, it would be the tough job of ground troops to try to turn the
quick defeat and dissolution of the Iraqi conventional military into some kind
of political dividend. The same narrative could be used to describe the initial
successes in Afghanistan, and then the long slog to create a functioning
government to administer the peace, in the face of determined resistance by the
Taliban.
An alternative case might be the NATO missions in the former
Yugoslavia during the 1990s. Airpower was used in concert with diplomatic
openings and the consolidation of political gains, through peacekeeping troops,
to bring about an end to the violence that was the impetus of the intervention.
In each of these cases though, airpower achieved its immediate
military objectives against its targets with overwhelming success. While airpower
might be a highly successful tool in its sphere of effectiveness, it cannot
substitute for diplomacy and direct application of ground forces in highly
complex politically situations where control is required to carry out American
foreign policy. As seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, even with a commitment of
ground forces the outcome is variable.
Why then do we see the application of American airpower
without the follow-through of diplomacy and consolidation of gains with the
deployment of ground forces? Unfortunately, it often appears to be that case
that airpower is more politically valuable for what it does not do, rather than
what it is truly capable of achieving. This is why Colin S. Gray warns of measuring the
effectiveness of airpower against the development of unrealistic expectations
of mission success.
The situation on the ground in Libya is a case in point about
how limiting American strategic involvement to air strikes is a gamble on the
political outcome. The increasingly sectarian nature of the fight against ISIS
might also reveal the uglier side of over-reliance on airpower to achieve
political objectives. If the overwhelmingly Shiite Iraqi Army (along with
Shiite militias and Iranian military advisors), sweep through Sunni enclaves,
like Tikrit, carrying out retributive mass murder, the success of American
airpower, in weakening ISIS’s position, will form the basis of the regional
narrative about the massacre. It’s likely that this will be the case on the
ground even if the US is not directly involved in the operations against
Tikrit. In that case, the military defeat of ISIS will not net out a positive,
regional political solution. The violence will feed on itself, reverberating off
the walls of history.
Of course, this is not to say that the solution is to escalate
to the use of ground forces in all circumstances where the United States feels its
interests threatened. To do so would create an infinite and expensive war. But,
the underdeveloped deployment of US airpower without a full appreciation for
its costs and effects, outside of the dearth of US casualties and the ability
to reach out and touch an adversary, creates a more chaotic threat environment
in which the US is at a major disadvantage in shaping events on the ground, and
the overall narrative.
No comments:
Post a Comment