War Hawks in the Trump Era: John McCain vs. Donald Trump

Senator John McCain is the godfather of interventionism in American politics, and his zeal for neo-conservative military solutions has not slowed down even after his arch nemesis Trump came out victorious on election day 2016.   This ideological proxy war between McCain and Trump over America's role in world security has illustrated a ferocious battle within the Republican Party, and by extension the entire political/governmental system. 

McCain has been called a war monger by myriad of political figures, including President Trump, former President Jimmy Carter, and Sen. Rand Paul.  Mother Jones magazine wrote a piece documenting all the states that McCain has mentioned sending troops into at one point in time or another, with the grand total coming to 14 different countries.  Throughout his near 40 year career in Congress, he has mentioned Iraq, Iran, Syria, Georgia, Afghanistan, Libya, Kosovo, Nigeria, Bosnia, North Korea, Russia, Sudan, Mali, and China as countries where the conflicts could be solved by some type of U.S. involvement. 

Since the Iraq War, it seems clear that the American public has no wish to stomach any more military intervention, that includes conservatives.  McCain is steadfast in his belief that strength will lead to peace and security, and refers to any dissent as "dangerous isolationism."  George Will refers to McCain's frequent labeling of disagreement as isolationist as a "flight from thinking."  Will also characterizes McCain worldview as such; "Under the McCain Doctrine, America’s military would have just begun to fight, and would never stop." It is not simply the conservative intelligentsia who are concerned with McCain's military strategy, liberal writer Michael Tomasky of The Daily Beast wrote in 2014 that McCain's approach to Ukraine was not only foolish, but that is could lead to a new Cold War.

 

This brings us to the issues germane to the present administration.  Sen. Lindsey Graham, the Robin to McCain's war mongering Batman, has joined McCain in calling for an investigation into Russian influence on the 2016 election.  Even Trump's detractors notice that this might be used as an excuse by these two senators to justify an armed conflict with Russia.  McCain's proposal to incorporate Georgia into NATO, an action that would undoubtedly poke the Russian bear, is a pattern of antagonism that makes some wonder if McCain is salivating for war with Putin.  NATO's Article 5: an attack on any NATO country will be taken as an attack on all.  Tomasky poses the question, could that be exactly what the "bombs away caucus" wants?

The current disagreement between McCain and Trump took shape in June 2015,  when Trump said that McCain was not a true war hero.  Doing damage control later, Trump spoke of how McCain's status as a veteran is sometimes used to shield him from debate and criticism on the topics of military and foreign policy.  Trump tweeted several weeks ago that the Senate duo are "always looking to start WWIII."   At the moment, it seems like Trump's more Pat Buchanan-like approach to the military is winning out, at least politically.  With McCain's war hawk protege, former Sen. Kelly Ayotte, losing reelection in New Hampshire last November, the evidence suggests that interventionism is ballot box poison.  A six-term incumbent like McCain might be grandfathered in from the political winds of change, but others will have to answer for their advocacy of endless war. 

The Intensification of Submarine Arms Race in Asia

The formulation of a state’s maritime strategy should take into account what pundits call the “maritimization” of the globe. In the eyes of Thayer Mahan, the navy is an important instrument that guarantees states’ interests at sea. To this end, a clear vision is needed to carry out a naval strategy. Many states in Asia have well understood this trend.

 Many reports argue that by 2030, at least half of the submarines of the world will belong to the navies of the powerful Asian countries including China, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Singapore, India, Pakistan, Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia and ,and Pakistan. In fact, they have all embarked on an accelerated modernization of their military forces and especially their fleets. The strategic control of sea lanes has become the subject of a greater rivalry. Click here.

China's ambitions in the South China Sea , the enduring tensions between China and Japan, the historic conflict between China and Taiwan, the war between Pakistan and India ,and the territorial disputes between India and China explain this arms race and,  particularly, towards the military capabilities  that allow to predict  military forces. The acquisition of 36 gusts by India is directly in line with this logic. 

 Submarines programs have become massive and widespread, especially in the face of the Chinese navy power. Chinese military budget has increased by more than 10 percent per year over the past 27 years. The Chinese military budget surpasses Japanese one for at least 3.6 times. China now has the largest fleet of attack submarines in the world with 71 ships and builds an average of 10 annually. The newest models are made in China but purchased under license from Russia and equipped with the latest Russian technology. China has also acquired three nuclear -powered submarines (093-G) and 093-B capable of launching supersonic anti-ship missiles. China finally announced the construction of a second aircraft carrier.

In response, Japan has accelerated the upgrade and development of its submarine fleet with the plan to purchase ten modern submarines. In total, the Japanese submarine fleet is expected to reach 22 vessels. Vietnam, another actor that has adversarial relationships with China, has also acquired six Russian submarines and they are operational today. Australia intends to deploy between 8 and 12 submarines and has decided to spend $ 50 billion more to make them operational.

Fearing retaliation from China, Taiwan has not been able to purchase submarines from its partners such as the Netherlands, Germany, and Australia. However, it is considering building its own ships.  

Pakistan has five submarines purchased from France. It has ordered eight vessels from China and it is seeking to acquire more from the western fleets. The Pakistani navy has a strong desire to equip 12 additional submarines. In response, the Indian Navy has issued tenders to buy several submarines and is particularly interested in purchasing the Japanese Soryu type which it would like to purchase six. The Indian submarine fleet now has 15 ships.

The fact of acquiring submarines shows that the rise of military tensions in Asia is indeed a reality although we have not yet witnessed a direct military confrontation between these countries.

H.R. McMaster: Trump's Chance For A Mulligan

We talked extensively in class after the firing of brief former NSA Mike Flynn, at the time Trump had not named his replacement.  His second choice, H.R. McMaster, has been met with a much different tone and reaction by Trump's detractors.  Many have said, to paraphrase, that this is the first decision they agree with President Trump on.  So the questions for this post include, what will McMaster bring to the Defense apparatus?, what does his personal background tell us about his worldview and approach to defense/intelligence?, and what should the appropriate role be for the National Security Advisor as a member of the NSC?  

The 54 year old, three star General graduated from West Point in 1984, and went on to gain his PhD from UNC Chapel Hill in military history.  His doctoral thesis was on political and military leadership during the Vietnam war, which became a rather famous book titled "Dereliction of Duty".  This could be useful in predicting his interactions with Trump, because in his book he says that military officials were too afraid of LBJ to tell him what he really needed to hear when it came to the dire situation in Vietnam.  Will he be as forthright with Trump?  He has said that he does not find the term, radical Islam, very useful, and that all it does is incite Muslims against the U.S.  That is in stark contrast to Mike Flynn, who emphasized that we were at a war with "radical Islam".

The position he is in has an enormous amount of fluidity, its role and duties vary greatly between the different NSA appointees, who include such notable alumni as Susan Rice, Condoleeza Rice, Colin Powell, and Sandy Berger.  Therefore the definition of the job is hard to come by, for some advisors have limited themselves to just parroting what the joint chiefs or the NSC have already said.  On the other hand, while Henry Kissinger held the position, he made an indelible impression on Nixon and the future of American foreign policy for the next 40 years.  We talked in class about the debate among academia and military historians about the appropriate role the NSA should have with regards to the entire Pentagon.  Some think that it has too much authority in having direct access to the President's ear, while others think the position can be useful in communicating Defense policy articulately and immeadiatly to the White House.

As for what he will bring to the NSC and the Defense apparatus at large, National Review writer David French says that, " McMaster is the Neil Gorsuch of Generals".  He means that favorably, due to the fact that both men are concerned with the non-stop growth of Executive power, and can act as good buffers or critiques if Trump tries to centralize power in the White House too much.  It was McMaster who became famous for among other things, banning the use of power points in his ranks, calling out the their banality and the"illusion of understanding" they created.  Such concern for learning are why he has been called a " warrior-scholar".

The Price for Lack of Inter-Agency Cooperation

          The idea of structure in the Intelligence Community is one that has been battled with for years. In the arena of terrorism and counterterrorism, it has been proven time and again that a good structure within the community makes all the difference. The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is no exception. The benefits of the relationship formed between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and JSOC are numerous.

        Each uniform wearing sect of the United States, the Army, Marines, Navy, Air Force, etc., has their own culture, ideologies and methods of operation. This makes it difficult to work well together. The gaps left in structure by these various cultures begin to affect the outcomes of operations. In the book Spying Blind by Amy Zegart, she points out that 9/11 could possibly have been prevented if only Intel agencies cooperated, worked together and pulled resources. It is also not far-fetched to assume that a lack of inter-agency coordination and cooperation affected the very recent special ops in Yemen.

        In Ackerman's article, How Special Ops Copied Al-Qaeda to Kill It, he explains the level of structure within Al-Qaeda and how that serves as the basis for its 'success' thus far in implementing attacks. Ackerman points out that there is a strategic network system within the organization that allows for effective communication and execution of actions. Due to the different objectives of each military branch or agency, they are all able to focus better on certain components of a mission. Failure to research and share 100% of information found, could jeopardize any given mission. We need to move past suspicion.

        Special Ops Forces are some of the most highly trained individuals who put their lives on the line to collect intelligence, rescue American citizen and keep the United States at large safe from foreign threats. Special Ops Forces require high levels of commitment and seriousness and it only makes sense that they get that back in return. Agencies need to be fully committed when dealing with Special Ops. Lives are on the line and with each passing moment of ineffective organizational structure, the Special Operations Forces suffer more loss of live and more failed missions. With the amount of drudgery that goes into these missions, the best equipment, teams and organizations need to be backing these individuals. Not faulty choppers and subpar gadgets.

        This is not to say that Special Ops have not enjoyed successful operations. They have. It is also not to say that lack of inter-organizational cooperation is the cause of all the mishaps. It’s not.  In the war on terror, they have made their mark, displaying remarkable skills and success over the years. However, American Special Ops can be significantly improved, if uniformity is reached between all Intelligence Agencies and American Forces involved.

Poland's Warm Welcome: Operation Atlantic Resolve

Aside from the unprecedented inauguration in January, another monumental event took place but received far less attention. In an effort to reassure NATO allies in Eastern Europe, the United States officially began Operation Atlantic Resolve. An armored brigade from Ford Carson, Colorado, was warmly welcomed in Poland this past month, which marked the largest deployment of U.S. troops to Europe for defensive purposes. 3,500 troops will begin back-to-back rotations of U.S. soldiers and equipment within the region.

Operation Atlantic Resolve follows rising tensions and fear surrounding Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Russia's advancements in the region provoke instability and insecurity, and at the ushering of Eastern European NATO allies, the U.S. responded. Atlantic Resolve is a continuous commitment to Eastern European security and a reassurance of America's dedication to NATO through multinational military and training cooperation. Its intentions are not only to strengthen the capabilities of the region as a whole, but to increase trust among allies. 

The buildup of NATO forces in Eastern Europe has not sat well with Moscow. Russia deems the operation a 'direct threat' to Russian national security and intends to respond in suit. Frequent increases in Russian forces on the border, under arguably false pretenses of training purposes, strain the delicate relationship between Eastern European states and Russia.

Furthering aggression, the completion of a U.S. missile defense system base in Romania, called Aegis Ashore, was also not well-received by Russia. Aegis Ashore, as per U.S. description, is a necessary security measure to counter threats from rogue states, like Iran. Russia is accusing the U.S. of violating the Immediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; in effect, Russia has threatened to therefore withdrawing from the treaty, leaving the threat of a potential nuclear war looming in the minds of many Eastern Europeans. The possibility is unlikely, however, as Eastern European leaders are hoping to convince President Vladimir Putin to ease his advance in Ukraine and the region. 

Modern States with Ancient Dilemmas: Porous Boundaries Between Civilian & Military Authority

The first session of DIP 750 we touched on the distinction modern states have from the ancient model of statecraft and military policy.  Modern states divide responsibility between civilian and military systems and organizations.  That is in stark contrast to the Ancient Romans, just as one example, where victorious generals often saw their political stock rise along with their military glory.  However, hard as we might try, there continue to be disputes about the parameters set on military power, and not just in developing democracies who have a history of military dictatorship.  One of the most consequential and contentious civilian/military standoffs of the 20th century happened within the United States government post WWII.

One of the most calamitous aspects of the Korean War was the repercussion it had on American foreign policy, illustrated rather perfectly by the policy disagreement and personal collision between President Harry Truman and General MacArthur.  Douglas MacArthur was first introduced to the American military scene in the Far East in 1941, when FDR appointed him Commander of American forces in the region after the Japanese invasion of Indochina.  Having already served as Supreme Commander for Allied Powers in Japan, MacArthur was no typical general.  As de facto ruler of over 80 million Japanese citizens, he was not used to answering to his civilian superiors, including the Commander-in-Chief.

Generally, the characteristics that distinguish politicians from officers are that officers think tactically, while politicians think politically.  MacArthur thought tactically and politically, and he fancied himself to be quite the politician as well as a brilliant General.  The beginning of the miscommunication and mutual distrust between Truman and MacArthur was that Truman initially saw him as a political foe, as someone aligned with the Republican Party.  He feared that MacArthur might run against him in 1952, after a groundswell of support had formed for him during the last several election cycles. The catalyst for their divergence would prove to be less about domestic politics, and more about the dichotomy between the civilian and military control of foreign policy decisions.

Our first session also touched on the fact that the military apparatus inevitably deals with problems of miscommunication between civilians and military personnel.  That very dichotomy began to manifest itself when the Joint Chiefs began reevaluating their initial analysis of Korea and the rest of Eastern Asia in mid-1950. There was a misunderstanding between Washington and the military personnel on the ground with regards to Korea from the beginning of the conflict, for nearly all the U.S. intelligence agencies were disastrously false in their predictions pertaining to North Korea’s attack on South Korea.  Additionally, General MacArthur’s insistence and eagerness to engage the Chinese militarily alarmed the Truman administration. 

Truman was dubious of MacArthur’s dismissive attitude towards him in the past when he reached out to the General, saying, “I have always regretted that General MacArthur declined the invitations that were extended to him to return to the United States, even if only for a short visit, during his years in Japan.” Truman suggest that part of the disconnect between himself and MacArthur was because the General had been in the Orient for 14 years, and all his thinking revolved around the Far East.  Perhaps the straw that broke the camel’s back was Gen. MacArthur’s meddling in domestic politics, as well as his seemingly open alliance with the President’s Republican opponents in Congress.  Truman explained that in his mind there was a right and wrong kind of victory.  It was MacArthur’s apparent zero sum theory of victory in Korea that led Truman to remove him from his post.

On April 11^th, 1951, Truman formally fired MacArthur from all his official posts.  Truman did acknowledge the extraordinary accomplishments of Gen. MacArthur, saying he was “one of our greatest military commanders,” but since he openly disagreed with American foreign policy, he could not remain at his post. Truman writes in his memoirs his justification for MacArthur’s firing, “Our Constitution embodies the principle of civilian control of the military.  This was the principle that General MacArthur threatened.  I do not believe that he purposefully decided to challenge civilian control of the military, but the result of his behavior was that this fundamental principle of free government was in danger.”  The President must be the vanguard against such disregard for civilian authority, by assuring that we do not devolve into a military dictatorship through the oftentimes-subtle neglect of civilian oversight. Truman’s vigilance of this issue was even more indispensable during wartime, when the people are susceptible to such claims about the need for more military autonomy.  While it might have cost him a third term in the White House, his belief in the American system of non-military governance and respect for the Office of the Presidency transcended his ambitions for his political career.