Nuclear NATO

Back in May of 2012, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization published its “Deterrence and Defence Posture Review,” stating that the Alliance would work towards creating conditions permissive of further non-strategic force reductions in Europe. At the same time, however, nuclear weapons remained a “core component of NATO’s overall capabilities for deterrence and defence.” The crisis in Ukraine, aside from seemingly invigorating NATO, has brought nuclear weapons in Europe – and therefore NATO’s nuclear weapons – back into the spotlight. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said on Wednesday that Russia’s activities in Crimea will likely affect arms control efforts, and pleaded with European Allies to increase their overall defense spending. This, in combination with the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands taking place yesterday and today, suggests that now is a prime opportunity to review NATO’s nuclear reality.

First and foremost, let’s get something straight: Russia’s activities in Ukraine are not a sign of NATO’s failure to deter (although it does not bode particularly well for the Alliance either). Ukraine is not a NATO member and does not officially (or implicitly) fall under its Article 5 mutual defense umbrella. Even the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which specifically concerns respecting Ukraine’s national borders, does not require the United States and the United Kingdom – whom you might call NATO princelings – to respond militarily to a violation of Ukraine’s sovereign territory. Ultimately, Russia has never launched a conventional or nuclear attack against a NATO Member (although some accuse the Kremlin of perpetrating the massive wave of cyber attacks Estonia experienced in 2007). So NATO’s deterrence has not failed.

And yet, the great curse of deterrence is that we cannot truly know if it has succeeded, either. How do you explain a nonevent? Did Russia plan to invade Poland in 2002, and then give up that program in the knowledge that it would trigger a nuclear response? Or perhaps Russia is simply uninterested in Poland (admittedly, this seems unlikely if you take a long view of history and Russia’s tendency to expand outwards in pursuit of security and the Russian exceptionalist dream). It’s nearly impossible to say either way.

There are other problems with NATO’s deterrence posture. For one thing, its development of a ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability flies in the face of traditional deterrence theory (which is no doubt part of why Russia objects so strongly to it).  One of the cardinal rules of deterrence is that both sides (whomever they may be) must have an assured second-strike capability that will inflict unacceptable damage to the enemy in retaliation for launching an initial attack. BMD capabilities reduce the likelihood that unacceptable damage will be inflicted – meaning that your opponent will not be deterred from launching an initial strike. While NATO’s BMD is not truly directed against Russia and is not truly even oriented around deterring nuclear attacks, on the whole missile defense does not – theoretically, at least – work very well with a deterrent posture (hence the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty signed by the U.S. and the USSR back in 1972, and from which the U.S. withdrew in 2002). This issue has been a huge source of tension between the Alliance and it’s Partner for Peace to the east.

Another challenge – this one common to all states possessing nuclear weapons – is credibility. Deterrence does not simply mean having enough weapons to inflict unacceptable damage: Your adversary must believe that you have the capability as well as the will to use it. Would NATO – all 28 Members – ever be able to agree on launching a nuclear response, especially to a non-nuclear attack against one Ally? The Alliance does work to ensure that all member nations participate in planning and in command, control, and consultations regarding nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Planning Group allows nuclear and non-nuclear Allies to help develop NATO’s nuclear policy and posture. The question of whether the Alliance would actually resort to using nuclear weapons, however, remains unanswered. It is not implausible to argue that the stigma surrounding nuclear weapons (and especially their use) may discourage Allies from viewing them as a true option.

Finally, some have expressed exasperation with the fact that NATO’s nuclear deterrence capabilities have proven insufficient to stop Russia from interfering in the internal affairs of Alliance hopefuls. The 2008 war between Georgia and Russia is held up as a prime example of this. NATO had promised Georgia eventual membership during its 2008 summit, but the latter’s war with Russia in August of that year essentially froze momentum. Some have linked Russia’s decision to act directly to Georgia’s “flirtation” with the Alliance. Although there had been no direct overtures between Ukraine and NATO directly preceding this more recent crisis, the argument that protesters’ EU-preferences are suggestive of a desire to join the Alliance are not completely absurd (especially since Allies did agree at that same 2008 summit that Ukraine would eventually become a Member). This represents a legitimate criticism of the Alliance’s deterrence posture, but only if one assumes that it’s nuclear policies extend beyond actual membership to potential, future Allies. That assumption is questionable

An even more important question for NATO today, however, is which of its abilities (or combination thereof) actually bears responsibility for deterring Russian activity against actual Allies (keeping in mind the fact that NATO capabilities are not officially directed against any particular adversary – potential or current). During the Cold War, the Soviet Red Army’s vast conventional superiority meant that nuclear weapons were pretty much all that stood between the USSR and a Soviet European continent – at least in the minds of the West. That is no longer the case. Despite declining defense spending over the past decade in Europe (military budgets have shrunk by 10-15%), NATO has a significant degree of conventional superiority over Russia (in terms of capabilities, if not willingness to use them). Perhaps, then, a nuclear deterrent against Russia is not truly necessary (especially considering the fact that Russia maintains some 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons, NATO is estimated to have between 160 and 200 gravity bombs in Europe).

Of course, all of this is not to recommend that NATO entirely abandon its nuclear weapons. If nothing else, maintaining a minimal deterrence force will help ensure that the Alliance is not subject to nuclear blackmail, even if that force is not solely responsible for preventing Russian (or other) aggression. In addition, the weapons have a great deal of symbolic significance that may only become more important in the aftermath of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. At the same time, NATO and especially its eastern Allies need to recognize (as they have in the past) that playing chicken with Russia is not a good idea. While the argument that Russia has a right to a buffer zone against the Alliance is tired, NATO should recognize that some neutral(ish) space between them might be just as much in its interest.

Putin and Geopolitics

This week, Russian President Vladimir Putin sent troops into Ukraine's Crimean peninsula, igniting what British Foreign Secretary William Hague called the "biggest crisis in Europe in the 21st century." While answers to the question of why Putin invaded Crimea have ranged from the fanciful to the comical, no one seems to have a good grasp on Putin's thinking. Indeed, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has even questioned whether Putin is "in touch with reality." While it may be hard for us 'rationalists' in the West to understand why Putin would accept international condemnation of his actions for what we see as insignificant gains, this way of thinking underscores the West's fundamental misunderstanding of how Putin views the world.

Born and raised at a time during the Cold War when it was generally accepted in the West that the Soviet Union was ascendant in world affairs, Putin must have been crushed by the collapse of the Soviet Empire in the early 1990s. Indeed, in a speech in 2005, Putin said as much when he called the collapse of the Soviet Union the "greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century." Indeed, while the speech seems to be forgotten in the context of the media's coverage of the events in Ukraine, it underscores that, to Putin, the East-West conflict of the last century was rooted much more in geopolitical differences between the US and USSR than in ideological or economic differences. If this holds true, the only way for us to understand why Putin acted in Ukraine is to understand the underpinnings of the geopolitical contest between the two superpowers of last century and how Putin unique brand of Russian irredentism hopes for a return to that contest.

The basic precepts of the geopolitical contest between the US and USSR can be found in the works of British geographer Halford Mackinder. To Mackinder, the world seemed to be divided into two parts; the first and most important was the 'world island.' The world island consisted of both the Eurasian and African continents and contained most of the worlds resources. Within the world island was, Mackinder believed, a 'pivot area' or heartland. The heartland, as Mackinder defined it, was a geographic area inaccessible to influence from the sea. This was important, Mackinder noted, due to the fact that the other major area of the world, the 'insular crescent' of North and South America, had its power based in its unfettered access to the sea. This access to the sea made the insular crescent wholly a maritime power, whereas the heartland was a singular land power. Competition between land and sea power is one of the main precepts of Mackinder's theory.

Mackinder's world, where the 'pivot' or heartland and insular crescent lie in opposition to one another

At the time of Mackinder's writing, in the early 20th century, heartland power was manifest in the Russian Empire, while insular power was manifest in British Empire. The advantage in the competition between land and sea power had, in the past centuries, as Mackinder saw it, laid with sea power and thus the British Empire. This was mostly due to the efficiency sea transport held over land transport and indeed Britain's navy allowed the Empire to exist. However, in a time when rail networks and new transportation options like air travel, were beginning to come online, Mackinder believed the advantage had swung to land power. An industrializing Russia would be able to take advantage of the interior lines of communications the heartland provided to expand its influence. With its new found advantage over sea based power, Mackinder foresaw the inevitable expansion of Russian heartland power out of its traditional boundaries until it controlled the world island and thus world events. Mackinder summed up his argument as:

Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island,

Who rules the World-Island commands the world.

Improving upon Mackinder's theory, American political scientist Nicholas Spykman, writing mid-century, added one more important geographic area to the world, the 'rimland.' Spykman defined the rimland as the area of land between Mackinder's insular crescent and heartland; essentially Western Europe, Arabia and monsoon Asia. Unlike Mackinder, Spykman did not believe the expansion of the heartland out of its boarders was preordained. Instead, he believed the heartland and insular crescent would battle one another for influence over the rimland. If heartland influence dominated the rimland, the heartland would dominate the world, in contrast, if insular crescent sea power exerted a domineering influence on the rimland, it would control world events. Spykman believed the First and Second World Wars had been fought specifically for dominance of the rimland. he summed up his theory:

Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destines of the world.

Spkyman's world, where the heartland and insular crescent (here the new world) vie for control of the rimland

Mackinder and Spykman's theories were both extremely influential in the 20th century. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the US became, much like Mackinder, ever fearful of Soviet expansion out of the heartland. In response, the US attempted to hem in or 'contain' the Soviet Union by developing a series of alliances (NATO, CENTO, and SEATO) based in Spykman's rimland. While the advent of nuclear weapons seemed to negate the importance of geography, allowing instead for the heartland and insular crescent to bypass the rimland and strike one another directly with ICBMs, deterrence theory effectively neutralized any chance of this happening and the rimland retained its geographic importance. By 1989, US domination of the rimland had caused the Soviet Union to collapse.

In the post-Cold War era United States, geography, and its study, fell victim to the 'end of history' and 'world is flat' mindsets popularized by social scientists at the time. US power began to be measured in megabytes and silicon valley start-ups. Geography was bunk. Nevertheless, in the Second World of the former Soviet Union, where the technological revolution was only in its infancy and economic opportunities were limited, the only obvious way, it seemed, to restore Russia to greatness was through regaining geopolitical relevance.

This is what Putin is attempting to do. His 2008 invasion of Georgia, much in the same vein as the invasion of Crimea, was an attempt to reestablish Russian control over the South Caucasus, which has historically been part of the heartland. The Eurasian Union has extended Russian influence over the states of Central Asia, bringing them once more into the fold of the old Soviet sphere of influence. Ukraine, lying at the south western corner of the heartland, must, in Putin's mind, either retain a government friendly to Russia or become a part of Russia proper. In the coming years it may become more common to see attempts by Russia to influence the European part of the rimland. Hopefully, with a better understanding as to why Russia is acting in this way, the US will better be able to preempt or respond to Russian actions. Of course this will require Americans ease back on believing technology has conquered geography a task that, in the age of cell phones and high speed internet, seems almost as untenable as Ukraine retaking the Crimean Peninsula.

The Beginning of the End for NATO?

 In the latest turn of events regarding the evolving crisis in Eastern Europe, Ukraine called on NATO to help protect its territorial integrity and Poland invoked Article IV of the founding Washington Treaty, calling for consultations. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) – including representatives of all 28 NATO member nations – will meet tomorrow (Tuesday) to discuss the developments in Ukraine.

Russia’s movement into Crimea and the escalating tensions in the region are seen as threats to nearby Allied countries, many of whom retain a sensitivity to the security menace represented by their former communist master. A dramatic announcement of NATO action following this meeting is both unlikely and undesirable given the fact that Crimea appears to be a lost cause, that any such action would likely only escalate tensions, and that the U.S., at least, has no desire to intervene militarily. Indeed, one Pentagon official noted that despite Putin’s charge through President Obama’s latest set of red lines, “there has been no change to [the U.S.’s] military deployments.”

And yet, Poland’s request is not an insignificant step. While Article 4 merely calls for consultations and is distinct from the infamous “one-for-all-and-all-for-one” collective defense article (that’s Article 5), it has still only been invoked 3 other times over the course of 63 years (by Turkey, following concerns emanating from wars in Iraq and Syria).[i] This is the first time the Article has been invoked in response to Russian actions, which is significant given the amount of effort NATO has expended over the past decade to illustrate that it perceives Russia as a partner (see the NATO-Russia Council’s website, for example). With friends like these, who needs enemies?

So what is Poland hoping to accomplish by calling for the NAC to meet? It’s not exactly clear, but what is evident is the need for NATO to tread carefully. The Eastern European and Baltic members view the Alliance as an essential component of their ability to resist Russian dominance. One interesting possibility may be for Poland to try to accelerate plans to install missile interceptors as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach missile defense program (currently, these are scheduled to be in place by 2018). Alternatively, Poland may ask for NATO to temporarily reinforce certain capabilities, much as the Alliance supplemented Turkey’s air defense systems back in 2012 following the shooting down of a Turkish jet by Syrian forces. Or Poland might make no requests, simply relying on the significance of the invocation to communicate a political message.

You might remember that, under the original plans for a missile shield in Europe, Poland would have had 10 interceptors in place by 2012 – President Obama scrapped this program back in 2009, in what some perceived as a concession in the effort to “reset” U.S.-Russian relations. Particularly ironic in this situation is the fact that the first of four U.S. Navy ships that will act as the centerpiece of NATO’s ballistic missile defense effort – the USS Donald Cook – arrived in its new homeport in Spain less than a month ago. While great for NATO, this probably won’t do much to reassure Poland or the other Eastern European allies. Importantly, if NATO fails to reassure its Members now, the future of the Alliance will be bleak indeed. This means that NATO must do everything in its power to reinforce its commitment to its Eastern members.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s plea for NATO assistance is nowhere near as interesting as the potential for it to call upon the 1994 Budapest Memorandum between Ukraine, the U.S., the U.K., and Russia. Under this agreement, Ukraine dismantled all of its nuclear weapons and sent them to Russia in return for recognition of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. If ever a situation arose where some aspect of the memorandum was violated (i.e. Russia occupied part of Ukraine), the parties would “consult.”

There is no promise of U.S. or British military (or other) commitment in the event of a Russian invasion of Ukraine contained in the language of the Memorandum, and yet a refusal to intervene by these two nations may have some unexpected consequences on NATO’s future as well.  It must be kept in mind that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty no more obliges military intervention in the event of a territorial attack than does the Budapest Memorandum. The risk, then, is that the Eastern European Allies will look at a failure to respond vigorously (especially by the U.S.) in Ukraine as a sign of NATO’s fading commitment and effectiveness. The ramifications for a variety of issues, from coalition warfare to nuclear proliferation, could be unpleasant. [ii]

NATO is still very much the backbone of security in Europe. And yet the fear that, when it comes down to it, the Alliance will not come to the defense of its members against a major power such as Russia remains. NATO’s path through this crisis is fraught with difficult decisions and limited options. This author only hopes that the Alliance finds its way through without losing its credibility and its soul.

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[i] Article 5 has been invoked once – in response to the 9/11 attacks on the U.S.

[ii] This is not, of course, to suggest that these documents are necessarily of equal significance for their signatories, nor is it meant as an argument for military intervention in Ukraine.

Did American Defense Statecraft doom Ukraine?

To anyone who follows world events, saying "Ukraine is currently a hotbed of activity" would be the understatement of the year (so far).  Within the last few days, events have taken more critical turns.  After months of protests, the Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov resigned.  Repressive anti-protest laws were quickly repealed in attempts to mollify the destructive crowds, then issued a warrant for Azarov's arrest.  Azarov vanished shortly thereafter.

 

This prompted Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev to proclaim Ukraine's acting government as illegitimate, while Russian President Vladimir Putin on claimed that all foreign intervention in the country was "adding to the unrest in the former Soviet republic."  

Now, it appears as though the Russians are planning to invade, or have already done so (as suggested by the presence of heavily armed, unidentified military personnel after the Russian parliament voted to intervene).  In response, Ukraine is mobilizing its army to counter the perceived "declaration of war."  Complicating this mobilization effort is the fact that the Ukraine is an intrinsically diverse country, as evidenced by the apparent defection of the Ukrainian Naval Chief and the Ukrainian naval flagship to the side of pro-Russian forces in the Crimean Peninsula.

The Hetman Sahaydachny, the Ukrainian Frigate in question

Events have certainly shown that the Russians can still "catch the world off guard."  So where did the international community go wrong?  More specifically, where did the United States go wrong?  And how does American Defense Statecraft fit into the mix?

The failure of American Defense Statecraft to dissuade Russian intervention in the Ukraine can easily date to 2008's Russo-Georgian War.  In response to that Russian incursion into a bordering nation, the international reaction was rather tepid, with then-President Bush saying "Bullying and intimidation are not acceptable" in the 21st century.  Aside from political bluster and grandstanding, nothing much happened.  After the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war, President Obama bungled his way through threatening involvement before backing away from his purported commitment to the region.  In response to Russian aggression in the region, rather than mobilize military units Obama said there would be "costs" associated with Putins actions.  Given that Putin is well aware of the United States' much publicized "Asia Pivot," Obama's stated goals to get American troops out of the Middle East, and America's recently announced plans to shrink the size of its military, there can be no doubt that Putin has weighed Obama's "costs" and found them negligible.

The Telegraph claims that it is Putin's goal to make a laughingstock out of the USA, the west, and NATO in general.  Even their journalists recognize that

It is a textbook KGB-led operation: the agent provocateur, followed by a self-organised militia, then Russian military protection to defend 'their’ people. The tactic was used to good effect throughout the Soviet period in Communist coups. It’s what brought down the government of Afghanistan and caused 30 years of war. And again it is unlikely to be resisted.

The pro-war President Bush did nothing to Russia in response to aggression in 2008.  The Peace-prize winning President Obama continues to do nothing in response to the slaughter of the Syrian people, instead letting Russia take the lead.  And rather than meet force with force, Obama is countering Soviet tactics with hollow words.  The United States is not led by a Cold Warrior, and Ukraine will pay the price.

With such terrible Defense Statecraft, perhaps the next set of European protests will be to push a nation towards the ever-dominant Russia, and away from the toothless "alliances" of the EU or NATO.

Teamwork

What makes a military, or a military operation, effective? While it is difficult to concisely say, or narrow it down to one deciding factor, budget, training, culture, leadership, morale, technology, and more all play a role. Recognizing the complexity and interconnectedness of these factors can help in the overall evaluation of the quality and effectiveness of a military.

However, each nation has a unique way of creating a military and then training, equipping, and using it. So given the diversity between one nation’s military and another nation’s military, what happens when militaries work together? Not just in the sense of conducting joint exercises or training, but rather, what happens when troops from different countries come together to collectively fight a war?

For a recent example: NATO. After the September 11 attack on the United States, the United Nations Security Council created the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and eventually NATO was charged with supervising a coalition of troops ultimately assembled from 49 contributing countries. The countries represented were as varied as El Salvador, Germany, Montenegro, Tonga, and the United States.

How effective is a transnational coalition though? Are so many diverse countries able to work together and create meaningful progress? In 2013, reports that Taliban attacks in Afghanistan had decreased in 2012 were proven to be false, leading some to wonder if anything productive and long-lasting is being accomplished by the NATO troops in Afghanistan. The length of the war in Afghanistan is also troubling to many. Additionally, despite NATO’s multinational factor, that has not helped sway global public opinion in support of the war in Afghanistan. The Pew Global Attitudes Project conducted a survey in which the majority of respondents in 32 out of 47 countries thought all foreign troops should leave Afghanistan. Even countries in NATO who had troops in Afghanistan wanted the troops to leave. The war has also grown increasingly unpopular in America and many Americans view the war in Afghanistan as unsuccessful overall. If NATO is truly effective, why is the war so drawn out, why is the Taliban still thriving, and why do most people want the troops to leave?

Yet despite what many would call a futile attempt in regards to the war in Afghanistan, others cite Libya as a recent NATO success story. In 2011, NATO intervened in Libya and President Obama commented on the extraordinary effectiveness of NATO and how closely American and French soldiers were able to work together – even to the extent of having Americans pilot French fighter jets.

So while the merits and likability of NATO are certainly up for debate, perhaps what is most pertinent to this discussion is the question: just how effective can NATO potentially be, given the fact that it is a transnational military force?

Well, in order to be effective, troops need to have some amount of mutual understanding. For this reason, shortly after its creation in 1949, NATO realized the importance of standardizing and it formed the Military Agency for Standardization in 1951.  This later merged with the Office of NATO Standardization, which eventually morphed into the NATO Standardization Agency (NSA). Through this agency, NATO has implemented a number of Standardization Agreements (STANAG) to help coordinate the member nations’ militaries. These STANAGs allow countries to ratify agreements which establish common ground and synchronize operational procedures, technology, equipment, and so on. From aircraft marshalling signals, to doctrine for countering improvised explosive devices, to a glossary of abbreviations, to doctrine for special operations, the STANAGs give all NATO nations a universal framework that if jointly executed, creates a more effective multinational military. Instead of each country trying to accomplish things its own way, finding agreement and commonality with each other will enable more unity, and hence, a greater chance of effectively working together.

NATO’s STANAGs accounts for significant political, strategic, operational, and tactical cooperation that enables NATO to more effectively conduct the operations that it is involved in. But is it enough? Can STANAGs teach initiative, create morale, overlook social differences, and compel information sharing? Can unit cohesion and trust be created in a multinational force? Initial thoughts indicate that NATO has some of the ingredients needed for success. While the STANAGs do not help with the global perception of international war, and while they do not seem to strongly deal with all areas and considerations, they are a step towards ensuring NATO’s military capability is as efficient as possible by addressing issues that could hamper its effectiveness as a military force.

Star Wars, Biddle, and the USMC

     The Star Wars Movie Series is one of the classics in the science fiction genre.  In the original trilogy (movies 3-6, with release dated beginning in 1977), a group of ideological zealots who call themselves Rebels rise up against a technologically and numerically superpower aptly named the Empire.  However popular the Star Wars movies are to movie audiences, they can also function as an alternative visual guideline which reaffirms the relative value of force employment in a modern system similar to that explained in Stephen Biddle's Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle.

Overview
     In the Star Wars movies, both sides essentially typify the combating theories present in Biddle's work.  The Empire follows the Old Theory models, as it has an incredible numerical preponderance over any conceivable adversary, and enjoys an enormous technological edge.  It also has an enormous air force and a moon-sized space station that can destroy planets, aptly named the "Death Star".

The Rebel extremists are outnumbered and technologically outlcassed.  The ground troops use World War 1 style trenches and fixed emplacements (which get destroyed quickly):

 And pack mules with people on them:

Unsurprisingly, they rely quite heavily on their outnumbered air and space forces.

Why it relates to Biddle
     The two sides here are easily analogous to Biddle's "Old Theories" and "New Theory."  The "Old Theories" that relate to victory and defeat in battle tend to overemphasize the roles played by numeric preponderance and technological superiority.  This ignores the dichotomy inherent in the "quality vs. quantity" argument, as there are tradeoffs that must be made in the procurement process.  Just to make things interesting, the Empire figured out a way to solve the apparent inconsistencies between quality and quantity, with a "get both" solution; after all, a military craft the size of a Galilean moon would certainly require both inordinate amounts of manpower and technological prowess.

     The "Old Theory"s reliance on technology and numerical preponderance to explain superiority in battle de-emphasizes the role of tactics and force employment on the tactical level, instead subscribing to the Dyadic Theory of technology (wherein the side with the better technology is better off and will likely win).  This is most clearly seen during various ground battle sequences throughout the movies.  In fact, the only real use of their ground technology involves lumbering slowly towards the enemy in a frontal assault using mechanized troops that have all the grace and maneuverability of elephants:

     The "New Theory" places far more emphasis on the role of Force Employment--a theory to which the Rebels certainly seem to ascribe.  The Rebels lost the winter battle of Hoth (pictured above), as they did not make use of Biddle's recommended defensive measures--hiding their defenses, using interlocking fields of fire, and defense in depth.  They did at least subscribe to the concepts of cover and concealment, dispersion, small-unit independent maneuver,  and combined-arms integration--which would have been great if they were on the offensive.  They did employ all of the above in their ground battle of the 3rd movie of the original trilogy (number 6, when fighting offensively on a forested moon around Endor), and won decisively.

     The Air and Space forces of the two sides show an even larger imbalance than those on the ground, and showcase even more why force employment matters.  As stated previously, the Empire has a space station the size of a small planet, that can blow up bigger planets.  The Rebels have a relatively small space flotilla with a number of small fighters.  The biggest thing the Rebels have that the Empire lacks is tactics and a thorough understanding of force employment.  Despite all the wonders of technology and obvious intergalactic numerical preponderance, the Empire still left a direct port from the exterior straight to some style of nuclear-powered core--a defect around which the Rebels planned an entire offensive operation.

     This is an oversight that the IAF would have loved during Operation Opera in 1981, when they bombed Iraq's nuclear reactor.  In any event, the outcomes were the same:

Why does it matter?

     The inevitable question.  Why go through a science fiction movie to attempt to explain military power theories of the real world?  Simple--an outgunned, out-manned force that is technologically outmatched can still fight and win if their underlying theories are correct.  The most obvious set of examples of such occurrences come from any number of Arab/Israeli conflicts from the 20th century, and a number of delightful summaries can be found in Kenneth M. Pollack's book Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991.  Contained within the first 150 or so pages are a number of exposes regarding the performances of the Egyptian military in a number of wars against Israel during the latter half of the 20th century.  In a number of the conflicts, the Egyptian military possessed a preponderance of then-modern Soviet equipment that was technologically superior to the motley assortment possessed by the Israelis. However, the Israelis consistently beat back their Egyptian foes, in fight of odds that would be thought suicidal to any "Old Theory" adherents. 

     How were the Israelis able to consistently claim victory?  According to Biddle, any "New Theory" modern-system military will consistently come out victorious when faced up against a non-modern-system adversary, even if that adversary possesses the technological or numeric edge.  This plays out in any number of wars the Israelis have fought against their admittedly underwhelming neighbors.  

     Famously, this lop-sided match between the modern system and non-modern system played out in Gulf War 1 and Gulf War 2, prompting many to speculate that it was the cusp of a revolution in military affairs.  Biddle implies that the technological advancement demonstrated in the Gulf Wars is merely a result of the modern system's merging with the latest technology, rather than a full-scale revolution.  In Gulf War 1 there were USMC tankers plodding around in outdated M60 tanks rather than the newest M1 Abrams.  These armored columns were technologically outdated according to "Old Theory" adherents, and still dominated the battlefield because they had a better system of force employment.

While an reactive-armor plated M60 astride a dirt mound might not be as theatrically pleasing as snowbound pack mules, anachronistic trench warfare, and space battles culminating in an exploding moon-sized object, when viewed in the framework of Biddle's theories on Military Power, they can all do justice in showcasing the versatility and "galactic" truth of the primacy of force employment in the modern system.