In Response to Checkbook Heroism

I stopped and thought about this post for a couple days before sitting down and putting my thoughts on paper. I wondered what I would do in that situation, or more likely what I would like to hope I would do. Would I be able to turn down money that would undoubtedly help me and my family and do the honorable thing? Could I just do my “damn job” and be done with it. I’m not sure, but I’m surely not one to condemn someone that does take that money.

I agree that in a perfect world heroism, pride, and honor would be the driving force behind all acts; however, this world is far from perfect. To argue that it is or that it should be is both a waste of time and self indulgent. The fact of the matter is, service men and women do a job few want and they do it at pay that is almost insulting. A majority of armed servicemen come from the middle and sometimes lower socioeconomic families. Most online organizations show US armed forces hailing from economic backgrounds around 40,000 annually. They then enter into one of the most dangerous jobs on the planet where their starting salary is going to be less than 50,000 annually at the maximum and as low as 28,000 at the minimum.

These figures are amazing to me. People who risk their lives on a daily basis to protect our freedoms deserve more than a paltry wage. To make it worse, people get mad at them when they wish to make money on something that their armed branch gives them permission to do. They were heroes simply by signing up, as are all members of the services in my opinion; making money off stories the government has granted them permission to sell doesn’t change that fact. It would be one thing to be upset had they sold these stories without the approval of the British Navy, but that just isn’t the case. The proper channels were used, and permission was granted; how then can you expect them not to take money for their stories? In a world where a man who can place a ball through a hoop can make millions, I find it saddening that anyone could possibly condemn or disparage a service man or woman who does something sanctioned by his or her own country to make money they deserved in the first place.

Need for Cultural Understanding

Moving away from what the Founding Fathers wanted or intended (not because I think it is irrelevant or uninteresting but perhaps straying from the class content). I was wondering if anyone had any thoughts about the Quadrennial Defense Report (QDR) 2006, especially regarding the need for better language skills and cultural understanding.
Page 14 (among others) says "Recent operations have reinforced the need for US forces to have greater language skills and cultural awareness. It is advantageous for the US forces to speak the languages of the regions where the enemy will operate." I completely agree with the statement, but feel it does raise some interesting questions.
Firstly, will the Armed Forces train new recruits to speak languages and create cultural awareness or will there be more recruiting for those that already possess those skills? Secondly, perhaps the need for cultural awareness is indicative of a greater problem in the US, where foreign languages are considered unimportant since "everyone speaks English" and we are the dominant culture worldwide? Perhaps, a greater emphasis should be placed on these subjects/skills from early childhood so everyone can learn them to make for a more educated and informed America overall.
Also, does this need to create an Armed Force that is well-versed in language and cultural studies underline the type of wars we are expecting to fight in the future? That small groups of Armed Forces will be conducting counterinsurgency warfare a la Krepinevich for some time to come? If this is the case will the American public be able to come to terms with wars fought this way or will they resist and hope for a by-gone era in which the biggest and shiniest toys won wars..not language skills, understanding and getting your hands dirty on the ground?
Will the addition of Robert Gates help in the creation of an Armed Forces like this or will DoD continue on as before?
Although this may be a small detail in the grand scheme of wars, diplomacy and international politics, the need for cultural understanding and language skills touches on all of these issues. Perhaps the Armed Forces is onto something that would not only benefit DoD, but all Americans in every walk of life?

Thomas Crown: Freedom-Hater

Ok Skip, let's get a few things straight. It takes a special kind of mushy-headed, whiny liberal to call a 220 year old piece of parchment a living document. It can bend for reforms, (Civil Rights Act) but needs to be amended for revolutions (16th Amendment), or did you skip that day of Civics 101 to sell hemp necklaces to raise money for your Save the Spotted Whales Foundation?

To be honest, I’m not sure what you’re arguing. Are you in favor of restricting the demonstrators from chanting their “vulgar (sic), hateful protests” or just want some distance from the event in question? Distance is no issue (to me, at least), but using the weighty hand of the federal government to coerce citizens from exercising their G*d-given rights is an abomination. Stop flip-flopping and tell this forum where you stand.

As for “that part is not applicable at this point in time,” who do you think you are telling me which rights I have and which are ‘obsolete?’ In the event a government becomes tyrannical, each citizen has a sovereign right to insurrection. We are, of course, nowhere near a despotism and only extremists would paint us thus, but you seem to forget that the American Revolution used force in addition a political/intellectual artillery.

Concerning, “the writers had meant at the time, nor was it their intent,” is there a particular reason you think yourself able to divine the thoughts and motivations of centuries-dead politicians? Even if you could, and you can’t, you’d eventually come to the realization that it was a document made by committee, hence the final product prevails over all other subsidiary claims. If you find an obscure letter from James Madison to Dolly saying “These citizens are chumps; screw freedom of speech!” it wouldn’t make one bit of difference (Madison was kind of a jerk anyway) because the
Constitution says otherwise. Intent; bah!

The Constitution says the federal government can never restrict “the right of the people peaceably to assemble.” When you take the position you have, you’re effectively saying, ‘yeah, but I feel bad for people who feel bad right now, so I’m going to take the rights of others away at gunpoint just so people don’t feel bad.’ Sir, you have no right to not be offended. You have no right to silence others, and you have no right to restrict my freedoms in pursuit of a less offensive world.

Your final thought asked, “Mr. Valla and Sphere, do you two thank god dead soldiers? (sic)” Of course not; but I thank g*d that we have the freedom for you to ask such a mindless, grammatically-incorrect question.

Regarding a few comments made on the "a few questions" post.

You obviously take more of an "originalist" approach to the Constitution. That statements about freedoms of the press, religion, to assemble, etc... still carry the same meaning today as it did then. I suppose you believe the right to bear arms is only applicable when in a state run militia.
I do not think the writers intended for people take the document and use it as justification to preach, "Thank god for dead soldiers", "Thank god for 9/11", and "Thank god for IED's".

I look at the Constitution as more of a "living one", where the meaning changes according to the times. These days, the right to bear arms can be exercised without being a part of a state militia. Because that part is not applicable at this point in time.

I do not think this is what the writers had meant at the time, nor was it their intent. At the time, gaining these freedoms was very important, because it was what they officially lacked. Now, some restraint must be exercised; if only for the well being of the families of the fallen. There are times when protesters are restricted from being in certain locations, or from being within a certain distance of something or someone. Protesters at Presidential addresses or appearances are kept a certain distance away. I believe this is a case where the same type of restriction should be used. Some states have already enacted legislation that keeps protesters at variable distance from the funeral sevices; now there is a push in the federal government to keep these people upwards of 500 ft away from the services.

-http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12071434/

I do love freedom and America, I would sacrifice my life to keep the freedoms that we have enjoy; I would however not want my family to be exposed to this type of exercise of freedom, especially since I may have died for them to have these freedoms. I would want some restrictions in place to keep my grieving family from witnessing that.

Mr. Valla and Sphere, do you two thank god dead soldiers?

All I need are some jumpercables...a car battery....and some steel wool

So once again the United States brutal interrogation tactics are in the news. It has come to light that at prisoners participating in hunger strikes at Guantanamo Bay have been force fed, a nasty little practice that involves being strapped to a chair and a tube inserted through the nose. In reading about this and other methods that you don't tell your congressman about, I came across an interesting article in Harper's. This outlined how the US gained information that allowed them to kill Abu Musab al-Zarqawi through other means of interrogation. I would recommend that you take a look at this overview of the article because the actual article requires a subscription. Seems that finally we may be on the right track in gaining information from prisoners.

The return of Suitblogging!

The Brits aren't prefect, but they're pretty damn good at sarcasm.

A few questions.

Just curious, did you have that memorized, or did you have that part playing inorder to write it?

Are you saying that these people are demonstrating what makes America great? That these people should have the right to do these vulger, hateful protests at soldiers funerals?

I see the point in your previous post, but I do not agree with it's outcome.

A Quote and a Shameless Plug

This country is pretty frickin' sweet, that's for sure. For my two cents, I go along with a sappy movie:

“Everybody knows American isn't easy. America is advanced citizenship. You gotta want it bad, 'cause it's gonna put up a fight. It's gonna say, "You want free speech? Let's see you acknowledge a man whose words make your blood boil, who's standing center stage and advocating, at the top of his lungs, that which you would spend a lifetime opposing at the top of yours. You want to claim this land as the land of the free, then the symbol of your country can't just be a flag; the symbol also has to be one of its citizens exercising his right to burn that flag in protest." Show me that, defend that, celebrate that in your classrooms. Then you can stand up and sing about the land of the free.”
---The American President

At any rate, why not celebrate your own freedom of academic thought by submitting to the First (And Likely Last) Annual Patterson Absurd Anti-American Video Awards? (And you thought I couldn't make a segue like that!) All you do is nominate the most preposterous, inane, over-the-top, or otherwise interesting anti-US video you’ve found during your studies.

Freedom of Speech

I just watched the BBC documentary on the Phelps family and have to admit that I am so appalled that I am not sure this will even be a coherent blog. I, of course, had heard of the Phelps family, and was always disgusted by the family, but now I am simply seething...
I agree that it is their right as Americans to enjoy freedom of speech and to hate or love this country. However, I couldn't help but think if there is ever a draft instated, that the Phelps children should be the first to go, just to give the mother a taste of the anguish of those families they so ridicule.
I find it repulsive that the Phelps family brainwashes its children and preaches hate at all, let alone at a funeral for fallen service members.
Perhaps "Christian Fundamentalism" should be defined as terrorism as well, so we can throw the Phelps family in Gitmo?

What Makes America Great?

Click here first

It could be argued that this is what makes America great. This is what freedom of speech affords people the right to preach what they like, wherever they like. Anyone can make claims and have preach beliefs, no matter how controversial they may be, without the fear of being stopped by a local, state, or federal body.

Though, it could also be argued that this is what makes America not so great. That this type of thing cannot be restricted and stopped. Even if the preaching cannot be stopped, at least stop the preaching from being done at the funerals of fallen soldiers. It takes independent citizens (the Patriot Guard Riders) to do whatever they can to make these protesters invisible to the grieving families. These soldiers fell for their country and the country cannot stop their families from seeing displays of hate at the funeral.

In my opinion, these preachings and protests are appalling. There is no place in our society for ones devotion to god to be displayed like this publicly. These soldier's funerals that they are protesting at, are fighting to keep these freedoms us, and for these people. This is a hell of a way to show thanks and/or respect. Whether you agree with the wars or not, you should still have respect.

I am not trying to turn this into a religious post, but one about the rights of the citizens of the United States. The question, "what makes America great", can have very different responses. This video shows the freedom of speech in its most extreme form, while at the same time, gives us ideas of why some freedoms should have limits.

Checkbook Heroism

There are very few things more nauseating than black pudding, but the possibility of Britain’s newest ‘heroes’ selling out to the press may be one of them. Citing “exceptional circumstances,” Britain’s Ministry of Defense has decided to allow the 15 sailors and marines to sell their stories of Iranian captivity for sums estimated at about £250,000. What’s happened to good old-fashioned heroism? Or, more to the point, what ever happened to just doing your damn job? I suppose nowadays, everyone is trying to cash in—including members of the Armed Forces.

It is all bitterly ironic considering that British soldiers in Basra and elsewhere are giving their lives for their country without any pageantry or press deals. Indeed, when the 15 were finally released on Thursday, four more British soldiers were killed in Iraq. 15 received a hero’s welcome and money offers, and four were easily forgotten in the hoopla. If these 15 have any intention of profiting from their experiences, they should at least put the money towards a service charity which will honor those British forces that have fought and died. At least that will make the MoD’s decision a bit easier to swallow.

Pedantry

So I was reading the Desch article, "Planning War in Peacetime," and a quote caught my eye.

As Sir Basil Liddell Hart has noted, "The statesman may continue to send telegrams, but they are merely waste paper. The military machine has completely taken charge."(1)

It's an interesting thing to say; and I admit ignorance of Sir Basil. Interpreting the quote requires a little context: was he a cabinet minister, writing a despairing letter on 30 July 1914? A 1970s paranoid critic of the military-industrial complex? Dunno. So I tried to check the footnote, expecting that it would provide the context, or at least a sense of when Hart wrote (or spoke) those words.

Instead, Desch cites another author's 1986 International Studies Quarterly article.

So I looked up the article on JSTOR; a handy tool to have. In that article, Jack Levy uses a similar, but not identical, quote -- and provides a citation to a 1970 book, Origins of the First World War, by L. C. F. Turner. Again, no indication of when, or in what context, Sir Basil Liddell Hart used those (or similar) words.

Strictly speaking, those citations only show that Levy and Turner attribute that quote to Hart; they have not yet cited Hart's use of those words.

It's sloppy, lazy work; it is at best uninformative, and at worst deceptive, to provide such weak citations. In a better edited journal, that would have been cleaned up. In a non-academic field, an author could face serious repurcussions for citations that don't actually stand for the principle for which they are cited. It's called "contempt of court," and it can get a lawyer suspended from practice.

Sir Basil Liddell Hart, for the record, served -- and was gassed -- in World War I; he was 18 in August of 1914. He was a military historian, and he died in 1970.

Googling the two variants of the quote returns only the Desch and Levy articles.

On Sale Now! Special LOW LOW Prices!!!

I find it hard to decide which is in our national interests. By now you have read that Israel is protesting about an arms deal between the US and its Middle Eastern allies including Saudi Arabia and others. Should we go through with the deal, or not; that is the question?

The proposed sale is featuring tanks, warships, advanced air defenses, and guided missiles totaling $5-10 billion. This could very likely create an unbalancing situation when compared to Israel; which is why the Israeli government has protested against the pending deal. They say that with the guided missiles, Saudi warplanes will have a much greater ability to strike targets. That is of course true, but the Israelis have been enjoying these capabilities for quite some time now. As we have seen them exercise their capabilities in the recent conflict against Hezbollah.

Obviously by going through with the deal, we will likely gain closer relations with the Middle Eastern states involved. As a side benefit, by us going against Israel’s protest, it could make us more popular to some people in the region who do not think highly of us now. Also, these states will have a better capability in fighting the war on terror, if they choose to get involved. Though, this will lower our support from Israel. The Israelis are very powerful in the region now and by this deal continuing, they could be balanced by the other states in the region. The bad side is, if any of the weapons that we sell some how get in the possession of terrorists, the US would have contributed to terrorism. If these weapons are used in a conflict with Israel, we would have contributed to this. There are many things that need to be looked at and evaluated.

The other side of the coin is if we do not go through with the deal. Obviously, Israel will rejoice in this, however, we could damage relations with Saudi Arabia and the other states named in the deal. They will see that Israel is drastically more important, than they are and could take it as a sign of disrespect. Enemies of the United States will see that we side with Israel against the Arab states in order to keep them weaker than Israel. In the event of a conflict it will be apparent who we support, whether we state it or not. All death and destruction in the Middle East as a result from a conflict with Israel that could have been avoided by the sale of these arms would be on us.

This deal needs to be carefully evaluated by the people in charge. Keeping support in the region is important, and if we make moves to keep those states weaker, it could cause bad blood. However, if we continue with it and the weapons are used against our other allies, then we are responsible. Or, if terrorists acquire these, it will be counter to what we have been fighting for over the past six years.

I realize there are a lot of “what ifs” here, but I am trying to see all sides, and everywhere you look, it seems daunting. Whichever direction the United States decides to go could cause problems; this we are already seeing from the Israelis.

What are your thoughts?

Referencing article: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/05/world/middleeast/05weapons.html?ref=world

First (And Likely Last) Annual Patterson Absurd Anti-American Video Awards

Howdy, folks. As we ramp up for finals and papers, I think we could all use a spot of fun. The recent spat with Iran should remind us how ridiculous anti-Americanism is. In that spirit, I’ve decided to announce the First (And Likely Last) Annual Patterson Absurd Anti-American Video Awards.

Send me the most preposterous, inane, over-the-top, or otherwise interesting anti-US video you’ve found during your studies. Old propaganda, music videos, and state-sponsored are usually treasure troves, but I’d appreciate anything you have to offer.

Winners will selected and posted once a reasonable amount of entries have been received. The grand prize will be determined at a later date but will likely consist of a six-pack of your preferred beverage (which I’m assuming will be Hawaiian Punch).

In re: Iranian Crisis Over? For now...

Well Mr. Talabani (Forgive a full posting rather than a reply, but I needed to post a picture to respond), you’ve raised an interesting point.


A Picture is Worth 1000 (Swear) Words
I find it intriguing that the group’s response was not uniform. If you look at one of the publicity photos, it becomes clear immediately that the soldiers are not in agreement as to a reaction. Some in the middle are hamming it up for the cameras while those on the far right of the group don’t seem particularly relieved—they seem furious. I think this is a visual cue that some members of the group were coerced (some ’79 hostages were tortured).

Documents Shmockuments
As for the confession, at least one of the letters (I suspect them all, but only challenge one here for the sake of brevity) was penned by a person writing English as a Second Language. Have a read and, if you disagree, I suggest you talk to anyone who’s ever taught ESL—one sentence: “I am writing to you as a British service person who has been sent to Iraqi, sacrificed due to the intervening policies of the Bush and Blair governments.” is clearly problematic.

Islamic Fashion Sense and Other Travesties
The business suits are nice but it looks like the Islamic Republic skimped on ties. Of course, I’m being facetious because wearing a tie in Iran is more of a political statement than one of fashion, ties being the uniform of the West. The suits aren’t tailored and show that odd Middle Eastern habit of sewing the buttons mid-chest rather than a bit lower, but they seem nice enough. Faye Turney, the women sailor, sports a ghastly manteau typical of middle-of-the-road Iranian women- neither overly showy nor totally covering. What’s vital is that they are not sporting uniforms; hence, they are hostages not POWS.

Stiff Upper Lip
As for embarrassing or understandable, I return to my original point about the reactions being individual rather than collective. I think most of us, with the huff of bravado that comes from being nowhere near danger, would like to think we’d hold out and resist our captors to the last. In their situation, I’m not sure how I’d react because as the movie “The Recruit” notes, “Don’t get caught,” because anyone will crack under torture. We have no idea what they’ve been through and it’s probably best to wait before proffering judgment. That having been said, if torture wasn’t used, revealing anything but name, rank, and serial number is a national disgrace for Britain. The former is forgivable because it’s a human reaction, the latter is an accommodating act of cowardice.

Iranian Crisis Over? For now...

Well...Iran has agreed to allow the British sailors and Marines to return home...I suppose that this may be the best possible scenario (no more provocation, no war). However, the real question, once again, comes down to motives.
Why is Iran allowing the British to return home without making public demands? Is it because by holding the British they were pushing Europe into further aligning with the United States? Or was the plan all along to hold the British and then show how benevolent and good Iran could be by releasing them? Or perhaps, this entire incident was a way for Iran to show they are serious and to slow down the rhetoric and calm the pace of actions occurring between Iran and the international community.
Another important question when dealing with Iran is whether or not the release of the British in this manner was the idea of Ahmadinejad or the idea of the more pragmatic politicians in Iran like Larijani...It is this larger, looming questions which will have an impact on future relations between Iran and the world..Today it looks as though the pragmatists may have won out.
On a side note...What does everyone think about the British soldiers "confessing" and wearing suits (not their military uniforms) and speaking with Ahmadinejad? Do you think their actions are understandable in that situation or an embarrassment to Britain?

New Blog Roll

All,

We have put together a new blog roll for your viewing and educational pleasure. A lot of the blogs that were on the original blog roll that hadn't been updated in a while were deleted, and some new ones were added. We also put together the blogs into a new type of classification (conservative, liberal, milblogs, etc.)

Some new blogs added are: Wired magazine's mostly nonpartisan defense blog Danger Room, an Asian defense issues blogger Asia Burning, Armchair Generalist's keen insight on CB weaponary and tactics, and roving on-the-ground blogger Michael Totten among several others that I'm too lazy to link (Michelle Malkin, Little Green Footballs, Andrew Sullivan, 4th Rail, Op-For, Spencer Ackerman, and the Middle East blogs--Ed).

As previously mentioned, we've also added several Milblogs which are blogs mostly written by soldiers in theatre, or who have returned home and decided to start blogging. The Middle East blogs are all blogs that are written by people in the countries in which they write about.

We've also added a Newsfeed that gives updated news on security related issues. There is also a Video Bar that has related issues.

So what do you think? Would you like to see defense related blogs from other regions of the world like Africa, Latin America, Europe, South East and East Asia?

The Oddest of Bedfellows

The question of the moment remains: why would the Islamic Republic steal 15 British sailors? The controversy surrounding the particular circumstances of the kidnapping (actual location of ship, details of capture, etc) is exciting, but not particularly edifying. So, lets look to motive.

A Matter of Survival
Preservation of the Islamic Revolution and freedom from foreign influence are the sine qua nons of Iranian policy. In order to guarantee that, Iran fixates on foreign targets provoking conflicts tailor-made for domestic consumption. Xenophobia boosted by Islamic nationalism is the only common denominator in Iranian society; without it, the regime will disintegrate. The recent spat with Britain is only the most recent reflection of a lengthy trend.

Britain: The Other Great Satan
Why attack Britain and not the US? Iran has a strong historical beef with Britain, starting with direct Limey intervention in Iran’s affairs starting at about the turn of the 20th century working its way through Musadagh’s nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (they survived the process; today we call them BP, btw). At any rate, after Britain’s role in the 1953 overthrow of Musadagh, Britain sealed their fate and became popularly reviled throughout Persia. Hell, Whitehall wouldn’t send a full ambassador between 1979 and 1998 (Iran actually had the gall to call ambassadorial appointee David Reddaway a ‘spy’ and PNG him in 2002). Besides, Iran has been sticking it to the Brits for years; have a look at the short list. So, the better question is: Why not attack Britain?

Mullahs, Mayors, and a Last Name I Still Can’t Say Correctly
Ahmandinajiad is not in control of the Islamic Republic but he does play that role on TV. Real power lies with Ayatullah Khatami and the 12 members [six Islamic jurists (faqih) and six clerics (imam)] of the Guardian Council. These men have long known one simple and immutable way of controlling the Persian water boiler: release the pressure valve on foreign threats. Rabid xenophobia remains the hallmark of Iranian policy, both foreign and domestic. At times of domestic turbulence, Iran finds a foreign adversary. To wit: Sure, Saddam started the Iran-Iraq War, but Khomeni refused to end it in 1982, insisting on reparations. When the war ended 7 years later, he gained nothing he wouldn’t have walked away with in ’82—unless you count a relatively united domestic front. Then the Rushdie Affair in ’89. Fingerpointing during Desert Storm. Iran stayed a bit quiet (though not entirely as efforts to export the Revolution proved unsuccessful) during the mid-90s but then started ramping up support of the likes of Hizbullah and other terrorist groups. After the crackdown on students in 1999, Tehran has pointed its eye to the West once more in search of scapegoats.

You Can Call Him Al
Ayatullah Ali Khameini is confident that the EU will do nothing because the EU will do nothing. He can also be fairly certain the UN will do nothing because they will do nothing (China and Russia would never allow it). Does anyone want to argue otherwise? That forces Britain to move closer towards the only game in town: America. Since the US is still poised to swing on Tehran over her nukes, Iran seems to be heaping up the causi belli with this latest spat. I think the Guardian Council suspects that it needs a fight to stay relevant and legitimate. Taking American servicemen would have provoked serious and immediate retaliation. The Brits, however, will try talking first. But what happens in a week, a month, a year? If Iran continues down this path, Britain and the US will be compelled to act unilaterally. Iran needs this to check internal dissidence and they’re eventually going to run out of non-confrontational Westerners. All that remains is a spark.

What happened in the Gulf?

Two vastly different stories of what happened in the Persian Gulf near the Shatt al-Arab waterway are put forth by the British and Iranian governments. The British maintain that the HSM Cornwall was 1.7 nautical miles within Iraqi waters inspecting a merchant vessel, while the Iranians claim that the Cornwall strayed 0.7 nautical miles within Iranian waters. Then, on March 24th, the Iranians changed the location of where the Cornwall was located, to which the British pointed out was still within Iraqi waters. When confronted with these facts the Iranians provided a new location for the Cornwall…one mile away from where they originally stated it was. The British countered by saying the Cornwall’s own GPS data confirms that they were over two nautical miles from the Iranian position. Both sides provided charts.


Now the thing about all those pretty charts is that they are apparently meaningless. Craig Murray, former British ambassador to Uzbekistan and head of the U.K. Maritime Section of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office from 1989 to 1992 wrote that there is no agreed maritime boundary between Iran and Iraq in the Persian Gulf; a statement that was later confirmed by Professor Khan of the University for the Federal Armed Forces in Munich. Nevertheless Iran has fifteen British sailors.

If Iran knew the condition of the maritime boarders why did they do this blatantly aggressive act and why take a British ship and not an American one? One answer is “well they were there;” or it could have been a sly attempt to get the five Iranians officials currently held by the US without actually directly ruffling America’s feathers. Another possibility is that the Iranians dislike the Brits even more then the Americans. In 1937 the British brokered a deal between Iraq and Iran that gave Iraq most of the Shatt al-Arab; a deal the Iranians only signed under British pressure. The Brits also helped the United States overthrow Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953, thus the calls for Great Britain to “apologize” could be the Iranian way to get the U.K. to “loose face.” Finally, with new nuclear sanctions in place by the UN, as stated by Talibani, the capture of these soldiers could have been a way to strike back at the world. I feel it was a combination of all of the above.

Thankfully Britain has remained calm in this matter. (An amazing thing to do since the British Embassy in Tehran was more or less attacked by an angry mob of two hundred people.) Direct talks between the two nations have never been cut since the incident and hopefully the moderates in Iran will prevail and this will go down as a blip in the history books. But if things do not go the right way, or this was something very deliberately done by Iran, things could get messy and I would not be surprised to see the hostages in Iran for a very long time.

We still have one more, albeit unlikely, scary possibility; this all could be the start of a very dangerous gambit by a pressured Iran---whose end goal would be to establish Iranian regional hegemony. (I do not feel this is the case but there is a reason that some members of the Iranian government are called “radicals”.)

Larger Problems Looming with Iran?

The kidnapping of the 15 British sailors has created a new drama in the ever volatile Persian Gulf. Although my esteemed colleague has said that the British must scream "war crimes" I am not exactly sure what that will get them, or the international community in general. Iran has already kicked out IAEA inspectors, which are under UN auspices. Perhaps claiming war crimes could help, but would it simply lead to more UN sanctions? Or would claiming war crimes actually lead to military action? By whom?
The UN last week passed new "targeted" sanctions on several Iranians and a large bank The sanctions were passed by all members of the Permanent 5, meaning that Iran has already begun to isolate it's allies China and Russia. When Iran took the Britons onto their ships, what were they thinking? That they would look tough? That they would appeal to their domestic audience by making fools of the "Little Satan"? Or was this somehow posturing gone awry on the part of the Iranians? Whatever the reason, taking the Britons hostage will further alienate the global community from the Iranian cause.
It is not easy to predict what now will happen in Iran. It is doubtful that the Iranians will hold the Britons for 444 days, as was the case with the American hostages. It is also doubtful that Iran will just give the sailors back without some kind of concession. However, with the entire world worried about Iran's bellicose behavior and nuclear weapons, concessions of any kind seem unlikely.
The question at the moment is, will this event lead to drastic action? The European Unions' Javier Solana has already said that Britain is a part of the EU and that this action was considered an affront to the entire European Union..(Although I doubt the EU could even coordinate military action, let alone take it.) Perhaps the taking will prompt military action that so many have long predicted?
In my mind however, the long-term question is, what was Iran thinking? Was the taking of the British sailors a coordinated action on behalf of the entire Iranian government? Or a more radical sector of the government exerting control? If that is the case, are there serious fissures withing the Iranian government, which will create new tensions and problems for the international community. Was Iran simply hoping to bump up the price of oil, as one of friends suggested, by making the oil markets even more volatile?
Whatever the answer, Iranian actions over the coming weeks and months will be important signs as to how the tense situation between Iran and the world will finally play out...

How badly have you screwed up...

if Iran can kidnap 15 British soldiers, and still have the moral high ground?

Here's the thing: releasing those letters of confession, videotaped apologies, etc. is a war crime. Prisoners of war aren't supposed to be used for publicity, as instruments of propaganda etc. etc.

So why aren't the British (or the US) screaming "War Crimes!" to high heaven? Because the Iranians would laugh, and would compare, say, three letters from soldiers who say they've been well-treated for a week to show trials of people who were held in secret prisons and tortured for five years.

And the US and its allies can't really look good in that comparison.
That, by the way, is a pizza ad.

Bigger.....Faster....Stronger!!!!

The modern soldier is now gaining another upgrade. Not a weapons system or computers but actual physical augmentation.

It will be interesting to see what the soldier twenty years from now will look like. Personally, I can't wait to see this move to private sector. Can you imagine the damage a middle linebacker could do to a runningback?!?!

Britain’s Trident: Will the sun never set?

Two weeks ago, the British House of Commons agreed to acquire a new generation of nuclear submarines in order to maintain their current deterrent. The Trident proposal met with considerable dissonance within the Labor ranks, and a total of 95 Labor MPs voted against the Prime Minister and a gaggle of Conservative representatives.

Given the historical position of the Labor party, it is hardly surprising that nearly two-thirds of their members voted against the scheme. For, since the 1960s, the Labor party has advocated for unilateral nuclear disarmament, and indeed, both Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were at one point stanch supporters of this policy.

But times change. Now, it seems that the majority of the Labor party is unlikely to have their way even when Tony Blair steps down and Gordon Brown most likely assumes power. Thus, it appears that in the near future, the sun is not likely to set on Britain’s thriving nuclear program. However, according to most Labor MPs, that future may not be so bright….

Iraq from a Different Point of View

Much has been said and written about why America is having trouble in Iraq---not enough commitment, not enough troops, not enough money, not giving the Iraqi army jobs ASAP, or too much de-baathification. One argument that has not seen as much print is the comparison of Iraq to the former nation of Yugoslavia.

Both Iraq and Yugoslavia are/were ethnically/religiously divided nations that were held together by brutal, but capable, dictators (Saddam Hussein and Josip Broz Tito respectively.) When these dictators were removed/died power struggles amongst ethnic groups ensued; which is the case for Iraq today and was the case for over twenty years.

Unlike Yugoslavia, where there were a myriad of ethnic groups, Iraq only has three: Shia, Sunni, and Kurd. The major issue in the Iraqi ethnic violence, at least for Shia-Sunni violence, is the fact that ever since the time of the Ottoman Empire (founded 1453) is that this Shia majority country has been ruled by the minority Sunnis! When the minority controls the majority it rarely turns out well (the India-Pakistan and Sri Lankaian conflicts jump to mind at the moment.)

Currently if I was Shia very little could be done to quell my internal fires as seeing this “American Occupation” as my people’s chance to be in power for the first time. On the other hand if I was Sunni I would see it as my historical right to control Iraq and want things to go back to the way they were prior to American intervention. As for the Kurdish nation they are on a militaristic precipice with Turkey.

This is the wasp’s nest America has gotten itself into.

A recent poll conducted by D3 systems in Iraq for the BBC, ABC, and other news agencies supports the idea the nation is almost irrevocably torn. Some of the more glaring facts are that seventy-eight percent of Sunnis said it was absolutely wrong for America to have invaded Iraq while seventy percent of Shia felt that it was the correct thing to do. Iraq is expectedly totally divided on the way Saddam Hussein’s execution was held. Optimistically fifty-three percent of Iraqi’s think that in five years Iraq will be a democracy. Pessimistically they blame just about all of Iraq’s woes on the United States and Coalition Forces; seventy-six percent feel that United States and Coalition Forces have done “quite a bad job or a very bad job” since the war, and sixty-nine percent feel that US forces are making Iraq worse.

With that last statistic in mind I want to make one thing very clear: the only time in the past four hundred years the religious and ethnic factions of Iraq could work together on anything was in 1920 during “The Great Iraq Revolution”; an attempt to dislodge the occupying British during the post World One I British occupation of Iraq. The only thing agreed upon in hundreds of years was they did not like foreigners!

I think it is very clear that no matter what type of counterinsurgency the US Army comes up with (short of all out genocide or a massive troop deployment) the only people who will ever be able to stop the violence in Iraq are Iraqis. I have no malice towards the Iraqi people but I think the Iraqi people have “hate” for one and other. Until that ethnic discrimination is eliminated stability and democracy is just a dream.

Currently the United States is trapped---if we leave the nation collapses, if we stay our budget deficit grows larger, and more brave American troops die. The quickest solution, I feel, is to create strong autonomous regions cut, as best they can, along ethnic lines. This Combined with strong revenue sharing across regions could create a stable Iraq; if not Iraq will eventually disintegrate like Yugoslavia or end up in another dictatorial situation with ethnic suppression.

Class Cancelled Thursday

The bloody listserv is defying me, so I hope people are reading this: Class Thursday (March 22) is cancelled in favor of preparation for the simulation. The presentation scheduled for Thursday will be rescheduled for next week.

If you read this, pass it on.

Prepping for War?

As tensions escalate between the United States and Iran an interesting article has been getting press overseas but has not really been reported in the United States. Recently, a former Iranian defense minister, Asgari, was kidnapped in Turkey. Not only did this person most likely have information about Ron Arad, missing in action since a 1986 mission over Sidon, Lebanon but also had intimate knowledge in the inner workings of ran's nuclear and military projects.

What makes this story interesting is the supposed CIA or Mossad connection. Furthermore, according to the New York Post, it is believed that Asgari took part, or has links to, the armed group that stormed a U.S.-Iraqi command center in the holy city of Karbala on Jan. 20 and killed five U.S. troops. A Middle East intelligence source said the United States could not let the outrage stand and had been hunting the general ever since. Any information that is gained from this kidnapped general if he was in fact kidnapped by Mossad or the CIA could go a long way in creating a “strong argument” for a war against Iran.

"Lack of Effective Air Power in The Gulf War"

Cyrus, I can somewhat see where you are going but I think you may still be hedging a bet that in the next conflict, the air power will “get them bad guys”. I agree that, yes air power did a good bit. They hit a lot of deep targets within Iraq, they quite possibly demoralized forces and they knocked out 40%, (according to Press) of Iraq’s armored forces.

But Cyrus, your giving air power too much credit. Let’s take a closer look on air power’s effectiveness.

First, there were clear indications that air power’s strategy of decapitation for six weeks prior to major ground operations did not accomplish its goal. This goal, the death of Iraqi leadership and/or the complete breakdown of Iraqi military communications, command and control. We know that key leadership made it out unscathed. Press clearly shows that the Iraqi’s were able to mount a retreat and additionally reposition defensive forces to meet the Coalition left hook. Even over a six week period we must begin to question the value spent in launching sorties, both in time spent and dollar cost, as compared to launching ground forces forward. It could be argued that the air campaign had reached its likely full potential over that six weeks and more time would not necessarily lead to much more progress.

Second, Press explains that many of the forward positioned stocks of supplies (XVIII Corps finds) and the defensively positioned armor of Iraqi forces were largely undisturbed by air power (Amazingly even in open desert!). Majority of the Iraqi armored forces eliminated were on the move, in retreat, on open road. Kind of reminds us of the similar experience we recently had in Afghanistan. Stephen Biddle provides us the vivid examples of a small, small area where concentrated air power still rendered not nearly the destructive effectiveness they sold us on. Imaging taking that air power and diluting it over a much larger theater of Iraq and Kuwait!

Third, if air power failed in any of its missions overall it was the mission to protect the land forces’ penetrating advance through the enemy lines. Robert Pape is clear that this is where air power can earn its money in Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Pape predicts just what Press shows, air power is less effective against defensive forces. Pape goes further and says that air power should be used to protect the flanks of an attacking force by concentrating its firepower against the repositioning defensive forces maneuvering to meet the attacker. Air power missed this completely in the first engagement in the Gulf. The attacking forces ended up eliminating this counterattacking force itself. What if the Iraqi’s were armed with better armor? What if they had longer ranged fire power? I bet we may not be gloating over the small number of soldiers killed in that conflict now if the Iraqi’s were better equipped. It is clear that air power failed miserably in neutralizing that counterattack and covering the attacking force’s flank.

Cyrus, I’m baffled too. Maybe it was intelligence that failed to point the airpower in the right direction. Maybe it was that they were occupied on other targets. I don’t know. But I know that, had our ground forces not been better equipped, I think they would have had a tough and bloody slog through that attack and that air power, or lack thereof, would be shouldering a large blame for it.


Try this on Cyrus, for an interesting read:


http://stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=15295&archive=true

Airpower in the Gulf War

In The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare Daryl Press says that the role of airpower was insignificant in defeating the Iraqis. He challenges conventional interpretations of the Gulf War by contending that the six week pre-invasion air campaign did not seriously weaken Iraq’s warfighting capabilities. His evidence, however, is inconclusive.

Press writes that the air campaign failed to impair Iraqi forces in five key aspects: it did not critically damage or restrict maneuver, C3I, supply lines, or Iraqi morale, nor did it critically attrite Iraqi forces. If the Iraq military retained all these capabilities up to the beginning of ground operations, Press argues, the Coalition victory cannot be attributed to the air campaign. This conclusion leads Press to downplay the importance of airpower. However, the evidence he cites is questionable and can support contrary interpretations.

First, consider the attrition of Iraqi forces. About forty percent of Iraqi armored vehicles were damaged during the air war. Press asserts this says little about air effectiveness: Iraqi defensive forces still had favorable force ratios when they were routed by Coalition forces. This is true, but losing forty percent of ones armor (well over one out of every three vehicles), especially when ones military is already outclassed, is still a crucial diminution in warfighting and logistical abilities. Furthermore, Press notes that Coalition commanders missed key air strike opportunities, such as against redeploying Republican Guard divisions during the “left hook” invasion. A well executed air assault on these divisions could have yielded results on par with al-Khafji and the Highway of Death. Thus, rather than demonstrating the inherent limits of airpower, the Gulf War shows both its utility (forty percent attrition is big) and even a greater potential for lethality through improved battlefield awareness.

In addition to forty percent attrition, the six week air strike discombobulated Iraqi forces. Press argues that the Republican Guard and the regular army gave no indication of low morale but fought bravely. However, what appears to be feats of bravery—individual surprise attacks, hopeless forays, etc.—can also be the actions of a befuddled, desperate enemy. The Republican Guard and the regular army may have been quite fazed by the air campaign and simply kept fighting because it was the best alternative option to surrender.

The Front Line Iraqi forces at least were clearly demoralized. They likely caught the worst of the air campaign in terms of supply disruption and attrition, and it was they who in mass either turned tail or surrendered to the (decoy) Marine invasion. At the close of the second day of ground operations, before any major battles had been fought in the “left hook” invasion, Baghdad announced its withdrawal from Kuwait. Thus the Coalition in a sense achieved its primary goal through the complete disintegration of the Iraqi Front Line--the place where the prewar air campaign had been most intense.

In sum, Press is correct to eschew overconfidence in airpower and assert the enduring importance of ground force deployment. However, his argument that the prewar air campaign contributed only slightly to the Coalition’s stunning success rests on inconclusive evidence and may, in fact, be wrong.

The Gettysburg Powerpoint

Not to bite the hand that feeds us; the class does feature an awful lot of ppt. But DOD does a lot of planning via powerpoint; and it's important to keep in mind the limitations of the medium.

Would we be better off if they were communicating plans in actual sentences, rather than this sort of thing?

"Here may be the clearest manifestation of OSD’s contempt for the accumulated wisdom of the military profession and of the assumption among forward thinkers that technology—above all information technology—has rendered obsolete the conventions traditionally governing the preparation and conduct of war," commented retired Army Col. Andrew Bacevich

I get the graphic from some old blog posts, and I haven't read the book quoted; so take it for what it's worth.

We've read the Army's counterinsurgency manual; and though we noted a lot of material that looked like a sociology 101 text, it's a thorough document, with actual ideas contained therein.

But decisionmaking at the political levels learned its lessons from the ppt-rich, communication-poor corporate world.

For all the misgivings sociology profs might have at their work being used in an army manual, isn't it miles better than military decisions made and communicated in incomprehensible gibberish?

Cheney’s Analysis of China’s Rise

Vice President Cheney said in a speech in Sydney Austrailia February 23rd that, “Last month's anti-satellite test, China's continued fast-paced military buildup are less constructive and are not consistent with China's stated goal of a peaceful rise.'' The location of this speech is not trivial either, as the Chinese have begun demonstrable efforts to strengthen their leadership in bilateral and multilateral ties with their Asian neighbors and in ASEAN.

Pardon me Mr. Vice President, with all due respect, its called deterrence. Deterrence is a key element to maintaining peace, and thereby to a peaceful rise. A state’s capacity to remove an object from within the airspace over its sovereign territory is simply a vertical extension of its national security. A state demonstrating this capacity for the flock of spy satellites perched to keep an eye on that state is simply manifested deterrence.

If the Chinese had dropped 5 JDAM’s into a US Embassy in Europe, or had been conducting spy operations all over the US airspace and coast line, perhaps I could be convinced the Chinese had aggressive rather than defensive motivations. However I can’t help but notice that it is the United States and our dwindling allies that are conducting the warcapades around the world.

Mr. Vice President, I don’t mean to imply that you’re not a reliable source of intelligence data or analysis, but I think I’ll wait until China begins to develop some power projection capabilities that could reach beyond greater China before concluding that China’s rise is anything but peaceful.

Troop Commander Wales

The United Kingdom is withdrawing 1,600 of their now 7,100 troops in Iraq. Even while Prince Harry is being voluntarily deployed to Southern Iraq, Parliament is discussing a complete withdraw of British troops by the end of this year. Troop Commander Wales must be quite the soldier. I can’t help but assume that the White House was aware of this and other allied withdrawals when planning the recent troop surge. I'm wondering, what is the implication for the United States when cornerstone of the “coalition of the willing” is no-longer willing?

New Plan for Iraq

With the new plan of increasing troops in the Iraq, yesterday, Gen. Fil claimed a new strategy----“clear, control and retain”. He explained,

“The first objective within each of the security districts in the Iraqi capital is to clear out extremist elements neighborhood by neighborhood in an effort to protect the population. And after an area is cleared, we're moving to what we call the control operation. Together with our Iraqi counterparts, we'll maintain a full-time presence on the streets, and we'll do this by building and maintaining joint security stations throughout the city. This effort to re-establish the joint security stations is well under way. The number of stations in each district will be determined by the commanders on the ground who control that area. An area moves into the retain phase when the Iraqi security forces are fully responsible for the day-to-day security mission. At this point, coalition forces begin to move out of the neighborhood and into locations where they can respond to requests for assistance as needed. " [1]

Let’s see the former strategy, “clear, hold and build”. Condoleezza Rice explained,
“Clear the toughest places, no sanctuaries to the enemy, and to disrupt foreign support for the insurgents. We are working to hold and steadily enlarge the secure areas, integrating political and economic outreach with our military operations. We are working to build truly national institutions by working with more capable provincial and local authorities. We are challenging them to embody a national compact, not tools of a particular sect or ethnic group. These Iraqi institutions must sustain security forces, bring rule of law, visibly deliver essential services, and offer the Iraqi people hope for a better economic future. " [2]

Compared with the former strategy, the new plan requires more role of the Iraqi government. The new plan focuses not only on “we” but also on the allies. Having been trained for years, the Iraqi military and police have the capability to share some burden of the US troops. Second, the “clear” task is accomplished in the form of small warfare, which is defined as “neighborhood by neighborhood”. The new tactic may be more suitable for the current Iraqi situation. Third, the Iraqi military is needed in the second phase and security forces are needed in the third phase. They can improve the relationships between Iraqi populace and Coalition Force. Iraqi forces understand the culture, and know how to get along with the populace. More importantly, when they secure and help the area develop, the populace regards them as representative of government, and will respect and support them. If the securing and building job is done by the US army, the Iraqi government cannot establish its own foundation from its people. On the other hand, with the new plan the US can deploy the skilled troops whose positions are handed to Iraqi security forces to achieve the first phase in the new front.

Another interesting stuff is that the new plan gives up the “build” task. Isn’t the status quo situation ready for rebuilding, or does the US want to let Iraqi people develop with their own hands? If the US doesn’t want to help Iraqi economic development, then I think the Iraq War will be a failure, because with the economy deteriorating, Iraqi people can be easily influenced by the extremists and terrorists. If it is not ready, then when is the appropriate time? The moment when all the extremists are cleared out or when the certain area is controlled, or when the area is retained?

Response to Several Responses

In response to the third and fourth comments of the "We Need More Time, Not Major Shift" post, I see and understand the points both arguments are making. If you look through history, there are many conflicts, both conventional state-on-state, and unconventional; but I believe the fututre holds something different.

Gen. Zinni made the point that conventional battles is the exception, I believe in the future that is true. Iraq and Afghanistan are obviously insurgent battles. If a conflict with Iran irrupts, then that too will be an insurgent battle. They have already threatened the use of tens of thousands of terror style attacks on US interests throughout the world. Terror style attacks in my opinion is not a conventional form of fighting. You may thinik of cases where US, or other state militaries had used this form of attack, but I would argue that they were not fighting conventional battles.

Insurgency is the way of the future I believe, it will certainly be the type of fighting in Iran, and using Iraq and Afghanistan as examples, any leader of a rogue or otherwise enemy state would be folish to do otherwise. It is the only way that does not gaurantee downright defeat. Maybe eventual defeat, but not without taking many lives of their enemy.

North Korea may be the exception, with its vast armies and years worth of targetting and placement of forces. But I would not doubt that Kim has plans at the ready for insurgent tactics. It would be irrational for him not to learn from history. America cannot quickly and successfully fight unconventional wars. It takes much more time and bloodshed to win. This would seem right up Kims ally, he knows he could never win against the US, what else would he have to fall back on. The only other thought would be that he uses his remaining nukes incase of invasion. He could use them tacticly on the battle field. But, do not think for a second he has not thought about, or planned to fight using insurgency tactics.

The fourth comment points out that insurgency is the exception. That might have been true in the past, but not for the future. There a few formidable state militaries could stand against the US, though not successfully. The rest will rely on the only proven tactic they have left; insurgency. Counterinsurgency is a tactic our forces must learn and learn quickly, because it is the battlefield of the future.

A New Threat

With the introduction of China’s new weapon system that can successfully destroy an orbiting satellite, the United States is going to have to reevaluate its intelligence, communications, and military systems. There has been a long running controversy over the use of weapons in space, though the technology is available, it is not known with certainty that there are active weapons systems in space at this time. However, if the reports are true of China’s test, this could bring a new era of a space arms race; one aimed at combating the new technological threats.

Through out the past decade, the United States has increasingly relied on satellite systems for the nation’s national security. They are not only used to protect the home front, but used extensively for military engagements through out the world. The Department of Defenses (DoD) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program relies on GPS and satellite systems to conduct their missions. Smart bombs to pinpoint and strike targets, as well as troops on the ground to know exactly where other forces are located in real time rely on GPS and satellite communications. Additionally, these systems are used for intelligence gathering. The National Security Agency (NSA) uses satellites for surveillance, and most all other radio detection and interception. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) uses them for surveillance on foreign locations and intelligence collection. Most all communications systems for intelligence and military units on the ground are made through the use of satellite systems.

If this new technology is exploited further, there are many concerns that would need to be addressed. The path our national security agencies have been traveling could have leaded us in the wrong direction. We have come to rely on satellites, that if they can be destroyed when we need them most, we do not have a reliable system in place. If America got in a conflict with China regarding any number of issues particularly Taiwan, our satellites would be in grave risk and so would our strategic capability. America needs to be researching and developing new technologies for its communications and intelligence gathering needs. Satellites that are undetectable or that create ghosts to conceal its true location are a few of the defenses our satellites currently have. But new, more secure ways must be developed.

Finally, this new Chinese system may be the start of the new space arms race. Undoubtedly, our intelligence agencies are working to acquire information regarding this Chinese technology. Though America has been the leader in developing new defense technology, it is still necessary to know your opponents full capabilities. A whole new type of weaponry and communications is in the future. Even if this technology is not pursued further, the fact the capabilities are present is something the United States cannot ignore. The Chinese are in the lead when compared to the United States since they have developed this technology first and they likely are already developing ways to combat it. America must make every effort to be at the forefront of this race, if not, our national security policy could be much different than it was just a month back.

New Approach

The blog posting is now going bare-knuckles. This could get interesting.

Security Needed, Inquire Within.

While we are contemplating an insurgency operation against the U.S. in Iraq, let’s look at the counter-insurgency Iraq itself faces…aka: civil war. What teeth does the young government have to effectively conduct a counter-insurgency of its own?

Pivotal is the establishment of a legitimate government that can effectively provide for the people…and here is the catch…it must be viewed as legitimate by all the people. So what is job one? SECURITY

Much to Thursday’s speaker’s chagrin, Iraq needs some effective force loyal to the government that is capable of maintaining a stable environment which all Iraqi’s feel secure. Anything short of this provides fodder for those groups or individuals that can provide security to its base.

So what folks be might an Iraqi enlist support?

a) Shiite Militias come to mind. Wow…they are already organized, trained and tacitly supported by a big country full of resources. I wonder if those Shiites would try to use their influence to take control of the government…by means other than popular election.

b) Sunni. Small, effective at guarding turf through terror tactics. Hardly the guys I would want to protect the resource-rich land that I have and they don’t.

c) Kurds. They’re nice guys. They have somewhat of an organized security force (when it’s not busy in Turkey). They could cover down on the rest of Iraq and provide security. But what is the incentive…besides that… they have to work on getting ready to defend Kurdistan.

d) The Americans!!! That’s it. They started this thing. Why don’t they hang around indefinitely and do it. Nnaaa. Their public will never support it…especially with media trolling the streets. Besides…they have other world wide operations and elections to worry about.

e) Hey…how about some of the neighbors. They would love to help out in Iraq. Eyeeee…it could just be a repeat of a, b, and c.

Well, I guess we are just going to have to go with the Iraqi Security Force. Yep..definitely. The trick will be to build a strong enough loyal force and eliminate, or render them ineffective, the partisan forces that could pose future threats and derail the government. But how do we do that?

I would imagine that we have to increase the effectiveness of our bureaucracy. That could be real tough and time consuming considering we have not had an effective government bureaucracy that tended to all the populace’s needs in nearly 40 years. That of course will require an organizational culture change at a minimum. Secondly, perhaps some mentorship would help. Are there any effective governments out there that could really help us with our lower echelon bureaucratic workings and issues at the local (not provincial) level? Sounds like the U.S. is running short.
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2007&m=February&x=20070208145128sjhtrop0.3155481

Train Iraqis?

One of the more controversial points in Thursday’s presentation was the recommendation for the US to abandon, temporarily at least, the training of Iraqi security forces. The argument is that training Iraqis at this time has a higher opportunity cost than does focusing solely on a US led counterinsurgency. This viewpoint has a few flaws.

It is argued that the US should exercise caution in training and equipping Iraqi forces since such accoutering may be turned against the US down the road. But unless the US plans to provide security in Iraq indefinitely, it must eventually outfit and train an effective Iraqi security force. The longer this is delayed, the more turbulent will be the transition from a predominantly US military administration to an Iraqi one.

A well trained Iraqi security force would also provide a strong boost to the counterinsurgency. An Iraqi force would come naturally equipped with local knowledge—language ability, cultural and geographical awareness, understanding of community norms—and would also enhance domestic support for the war, two advantages that are highly valuable (perhaps vital) to waging counterinsurgency.[1] Indeed, Krepinevich argues that a key error in General Westmorland’s approach to the Vietnam war was his reluctance to improve coordination between the US and the ARVN. While there are salient differences between Vietnam and the current situation in Iraq, the principle of cooperating with indigenous anti-insurgency forces still applies.

Finally, training Iraqi forces is consistent with the nature of the ongoing conflict. The US is fighting a counterinsurgency, not against itself, but on behalf of another government. Accordingly, making full use of that government’s forces, cooperating with them and training them, is not only judicious but more or less demanded by the conventions of interstate relations. By relegating the role of Iraqi forces in the defense of their own nation, the US will only give credence to the criticisms of those who have described Iraq as a pawn on the US chessboard of international statecraft.

It may be that training Iraqis decreases the resources available for a purely US counterinsurgency. But the advantages that would be realized through an effective Iraqi force, not to mention the satisfaction it would give to international opinion, more than compensate for the loss.
[1] Joes, Anthony, Resisting Rebellion, The University Press of Kentucky, 122-155.

Public Perception of the War on Terror

The hunt for Al Qaeda to the general public has been focused mainly in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, it must be realized that this hunt does not solely reside in this region, but expands across all regions of the world. The reason for this lack of knowledge could be traced back to the operational tactics used by US and other ally forces. Additionally, this could also be a cause for the lowered support for the war on terror.

Under a White House directive, the Pentagon after September 11th was given the “authority to hunt and kill suspected terrorists around the globe”. [1] Though the hunt continues to this day yielding very few “high value targets”, these operations are conducted by highly trained special operations units, many of which have been redeployed from Iraq and Afghanistan. Aside from these units’ roles as forward military operators, they also conduct operations very similar to those of intelligence officers. This dual role has called into question their use as spies, rather than as a military fighting force.

These special operations units have come increasingly in the public eye since Islamic forces have fought against the Ethiopian military in Somalia. The United States has been giving the Ethiopian forces updated intelligence reports to almost assure the Ethiopians success in their operations. Recently, an American gunship was used to strike a position believed to be that of several senior level Al Qaeda members in Somalia. Later, American special operations units were used to secure the air strike sight and collect evidence.

The tactics used for fighting the various al qaeda groups vary greatly when comparing Iraq and Afghanistan to those in Somalia. The first two consist of a large military force, the troops are overt in military dress, gear, and they are transported in large convoys obvious to al qaeda fighters. In Somalia, the tactics are much more discreet. These unites are trained in covert counterterrorism forms of combat. They execute their duties covertly whether it is a military operation or an intelligence operation. The styles and tactics used is a major cause for the lack of information the general public has about counterterrorism operations in other parts of the world.

Support for the war on terror has been dwindling and in order to gain it back, the public must have a clear picture of what the tasks at hand are. There is much attention from the news and political leaders about what’s going on in Afghanistan and Iraq, that it is forgotten where else the fight is also taking place. Due to the nature of the warfare taking place in Africa and in order for the public to understand the magnitude of the fight against terror, there must be special attention made to inform the public about other areas of the world where the war on terror is also taking place. Perhaps with an increase in knowledge and understanding, public support may raise to levels seen in years past.

[1] Pentagon Sees Move in Somalia as Blueprint, MARK MAZZETTI, January 13, 2007 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/13/world/africa/13proxy.html?_r=1

In Just and Unjust Wars Michael Walzer gives some moral guidelines concerning war. But neither Walzer nor just war theory provides clean cut rules for military behavior. There is always a degree of uncertainty in warfare, and this uncertainty is centrally important to just war analysis, particularly the principle of proportionality.

Just war theory usually has two “in war” guidelines: discrimination and proportionality. Discrimination argues that military force ought only to be applied against combatants, and civilians should be exempt. There does not seem to be much uncertainty here. It is generally incorrect to kill people, and even in war, the logic goes, civilians should be spared since they pose no direct threat to combatants. Fair enough. But the waters become murkier when we make the jump to proportionality.

Proportionality argues that the use of force should be limited such that the achieved goal justifies the injury inflicted. This injury, Walzer tells us, may sometimes include civilians. Now at first this sounds utilitarian: if the object seems useful enough, proceed with your destruction. But in fact “proportionality” is a blend of principle and uncertainty and is not utilitarian. There are actually two principles at work: the first is to avoid destruction. However, since we are currently engaged in war it is assumed we believe there is some higher principle at stake—perhaps our territorial integrity or the protection of our population.

Thus there is a collision of principles: the principle to avoid human destruction versus, say, the right to territorial integrity. This is where uncertainty comes alive. Just war theory will say that the right of national territory is in fact the higher principle. But how “higher” is it? And what level of retaliation does it justify? Are we allowed, morally speaking, to lie to the enemy? Can we kill the enemy soldiers? Bomb his cities? Invade his country? And after we win, can we devastate his country to remove a future threat? The answer, to all of these questions, is: we’re not sure. There is no rule. So, we introduce proportionality, which in a reworded definition could read: “keep your application of violence at the lowest level possible that will still allow you to achieve your goal in fighting.” We are uncertain how much violence we can morally employ in response to their aggression, so let’s limit it all we can.

To borrow from Clausewitz, the “fog of war” encompasses more than strategic and tactical moves; it also includes the realm of moral decision-making. Since we are never certain what exigencies justify violence against human life, nor the level of that violence, we are well advised at all times to proceed cautiously. This is the principle of proportionality.

Joseph Nye and the Domestic Front

Nye’s ideas of soft and hard power represent an excellent view of how the US should progress in the current international system. However, his ideas are only truly effective when all of the assumptions he makes, of which there are quite a few (e.g. the economy will be sustained, society will not decay, that Americans do not become isolationists, and that America’s interests will be shaped in a broad and farsighted way that incorporates global interests (171)), work in harmony with each other. While Nye acknowledges all of these and even more that I have omitted, he glosses over them and seems content that the reality of the situation is that the United States is poised to continue with the blessing of both hard and soft power.

But is this the case? When reviewing the domestic sphere in the US, Nye notes that the power of the American domestic sphere is found in numerous aspects, but the one I take issue with in this entry is in the continuing power of the “melting pot” ideal (118). Nye notes that this idea of the melting pot continues to shape American culture as it both integrates different cultures into the American domestic sphere and broadens America’s interests abroad (118, 119). However, many political theorists, including but certainly not limited to Kimberly Curtis in Our Sense of the Real, Michael Warner in Publics and Counter Publics, Jurgen Habermas in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and John Dewey in The Public and Its Problems bring forth arguments that oppose Nye’s mystical melting pot. I will only expand on Curtis here.

Kimberly Curtis notes a strong increase in enclaving within America’s domestic sphere. In enclaving similar and likeminded individuals are choosing to group together in communities out of fear of what is different. This idea is represented best in gated communities within the US. In these communities people segregate themselves from outsiders or those who might be different out of a since of necessity or even fear. By removing themselves from the general population and grouping with other likeminded individuals, society as a whole begins to lose its plurality and rely upon a false sense of what reality truly is. Instead of living in a reality sustained by a diverse public, a homogeneous reality takes over in which change and debate become a scarce event.

More importantly, however, is the role of shaping reality to each individual person. Curtis states that “our ability to experience and constitute a world shared in common is utterly dependent on that world appearing to us through the eyes of others” (16). It then logically follows that if we are to understand and comprehend a true sense of reality the eyes that we look through must be the eyes of those different from us. Otherwise, if we are to live in a homogenous society, we are basically seeing ourselves through our own eyes at all times and thus never experiencing a true reality.

The breakdown of the plurality of our society deeply undermines not only our soft power but also our hard power. In Nye’s words “If these divisions were as deep as portrayed, they could undercut our hard power by inhibiting our capacity to act collectively, and diminish our soft power by reducing the attractiveness of our society and culture” (113).

If the fears of these theorists are true and the undermining of America’s domestic sphere is indeed in progress, Nye’s hopes are in jeopardy. In this reality America’s goals and tasks should no longer be focused on how they act within the international sphere, but instead how they bring about the melting pot so sought after by Nye on the domestic front. Otherwise, America’s place in the international system is neither secure nor progressive, as Nye had hoped.

Starring: The USA

Since the end of the Cold War, American power has surged to unprecedented heights and currently dominates the international stage. The absence of counterbalancing on the part of other major powers has lead several scholars to conclude that the international system has evolved from a balance-of-power framework to a more complex international network. Moreover, according to several theorists like Joseph Nye, power itself has developed into something “less tangible and less coercive,” and currently exists in two forms: coercive “hard power” and co-opting “soft power.” With the transformative influence of globalization, power has evolved into something more than brute strength; and with the fall of the Iron Curtain, the United States has taken the international stage as the main actor in this current power play.

Now the main question is: for how long will it last? America plays an unprecedented role, and it appears that as long as the international audience is satisfied, the performance will most likely continue. Indeed, it seems that in the twenty-first century, the biggest threat to American power is not the emergence of another strong actor or troupe of actors; instead, the biggest threat to American power is America itself. If the United States acts as a prima donna and irritates her captive audience, she may be ushered off the international stage. Conversely, America may choose to exit the world stage prematurely, thus ushering in a new wave of international actors in a new power play.

If the United States is to continue as the world’s superpower, it must learn how to effectively use both hard and soft power resources. The danger is that the United States will bow out of the international power play, financially burdened by military costs; or, the United States may become arrogant, and fail to temper hard power with attractive, soft power. Both situations may be avoided if America recognizes and respects her fellow actors. As Nye relates in the Paradox of American Power: “The multiplicity of new actors means that there is very little the United States can achieve alone” (169). Thus, it appears that on the international stage, there truly are no small parts, only small actors. The United States, as the ‘biggest’ player on world stage, should recognize that its powerful size is largely contingent upon the support of fellow actors.