How badly have you screwed up...

if Iran can kidnap 15 British soldiers, and still have the moral high ground?

Here's the thing: releasing those letters of confession, videotaped apologies, etc. is a war crime. Prisoners of war aren't supposed to be used for publicity, as instruments of propaganda etc. etc.

So why aren't the British (or the US) screaming "War Crimes!" to high heaven? Because the Iranians would laugh, and would compare, say, three letters from soldiers who say they've been well-treated for a week to show trials of people who were held in secret prisons and tortured for five years.

And the US and its allies can't really look good in that comparison.
That, by the way, is a pizza ad.

Bigger.....Faster....Stronger!!!!

The modern soldier is now gaining another upgrade. Not a weapons system or computers but actual physical augmentation.

It will be interesting to see what the soldier twenty years from now will look like. Personally, I can't wait to see this move to private sector. Can you imagine the damage a middle linebacker could do to a runningback?!?!

Britain’s Trident: Will the sun never set?

Two weeks ago, the British House of Commons agreed to acquire a new generation of nuclear submarines in order to maintain their current deterrent. The Trident proposal met with considerable dissonance within the Labor ranks, and a total of 95 Labor MPs voted against the Prime Minister and a gaggle of Conservative representatives.

Given the historical position of the Labor party, it is hardly surprising that nearly two-thirds of their members voted against the scheme. For, since the 1960s, the Labor party has advocated for unilateral nuclear disarmament, and indeed, both Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were at one point stanch supporters of this policy.

But times change. Now, it seems that the majority of the Labor party is unlikely to have their way even when Tony Blair steps down and Gordon Brown most likely assumes power. Thus, it appears that in the near future, the sun is not likely to set on Britain’s thriving nuclear program. However, according to most Labor MPs, that future may not be so bright….

Iraq from a Different Point of View

Much has been said and written about why America is having trouble in Iraq---not enough commitment, not enough troops, not enough money, not giving the Iraqi army jobs ASAP, or too much de-baathification. One argument that has not seen as much print is the comparison of Iraq to the former nation of Yugoslavia.

Both Iraq and Yugoslavia are/were ethnically/religiously divided nations that were held together by brutal, but capable, dictators (Saddam Hussein and Josip Broz Tito respectively.) When these dictators were removed/died power struggles amongst ethnic groups ensued; which is the case for Iraq today and was the case for over twenty years.

Unlike Yugoslavia, where there were a myriad of ethnic groups, Iraq only has three: Shia, Sunni, and Kurd. The major issue in the Iraqi ethnic violence, at least for Shia-Sunni violence, is the fact that ever since the time of the Ottoman Empire (founded 1453) is that this Shia majority country has been ruled by the minority Sunnis! When the minority controls the majority it rarely turns out well (the India-Pakistan and Sri Lankaian conflicts jump to mind at the moment.)

Currently if I was Shia very little could be done to quell my internal fires as seeing this “American Occupation” as my people’s chance to be in power for the first time. On the other hand if I was Sunni I would see it as my historical right to control Iraq and want things to go back to the way they were prior to American intervention. As for the Kurdish nation they are on a militaristic precipice with Turkey.

This is the wasp’s nest America has gotten itself into.

A recent poll conducted by D3 systems in Iraq for the BBC, ABC, and other news agencies supports the idea the nation is almost irrevocably torn. Some of the more glaring facts are that seventy-eight percent of Sunnis said it was absolutely wrong for America to have invaded Iraq while seventy percent of Shia felt that it was the correct thing to do. Iraq is expectedly totally divided on the way Saddam Hussein’s execution was held. Optimistically fifty-three percent of Iraqi’s think that in five years Iraq will be a democracy. Pessimistically they blame just about all of Iraq’s woes on the United States and Coalition Forces; seventy-six percent feel that United States and Coalition Forces have done “quite a bad job or a very bad job” since the war, and sixty-nine percent feel that US forces are making Iraq worse.

With that last statistic in mind I want to make one thing very clear: the only time in the past four hundred years the religious and ethnic factions of Iraq could work together on anything was in 1920 during “The Great Iraq Revolution”; an attempt to dislodge the occupying British during the post World One I British occupation of Iraq. The only thing agreed upon in hundreds of years was they did not like foreigners!

I think it is very clear that no matter what type of counterinsurgency the US Army comes up with (short of all out genocide or a massive troop deployment) the only people who will ever be able to stop the violence in Iraq are Iraqis. I have no malice towards the Iraqi people but I think the Iraqi people have “hate” for one and other. Until that ethnic discrimination is eliminated stability and democracy is just a dream.

Currently the United States is trapped---if we leave the nation collapses, if we stay our budget deficit grows larger, and more brave American troops die. The quickest solution, I feel, is to create strong autonomous regions cut, as best they can, along ethnic lines. This Combined with strong revenue sharing across regions could create a stable Iraq; if not Iraq will eventually disintegrate like Yugoslavia or end up in another dictatorial situation with ethnic suppression.

Class Cancelled Thursday

The bloody listserv is defying me, so I hope people are reading this: Class Thursday (March 22) is cancelled in favor of preparation for the simulation. The presentation scheduled for Thursday will be rescheduled for next week.

If you read this, pass it on.

Prepping for War?

As tensions escalate between the United States and Iran an interesting article has been getting press overseas but has not really been reported in the United States. Recently, a former Iranian defense minister, Asgari, was kidnapped in Turkey. Not only did this person most likely have information about Ron Arad, missing in action since a 1986 mission over Sidon, Lebanon but also had intimate knowledge in the inner workings of ran's nuclear and military projects.

What makes this story interesting is the supposed CIA or Mossad connection. Furthermore, according to the New York Post, it is believed that Asgari took part, or has links to, the armed group that stormed a U.S.-Iraqi command center in the holy city of Karbala on Jan. 20 and killed five U.S. troops. A Middle East intelligence source said the United States could not let the outrage stand and had been hunting the general ever since. Any information that is gained from this kidnapped general if he was in fact kidnapped by Mossad or the CIA could go a long way in creating a “strong argument” for a war against Iran.

"Lack of Effective Air Power in The Gulf War"

Cyrus, I can somewhat see where you are going but I think you may still be hedging a bet that in the next conflict, the air power will “get them bad guys”. I agree that, yes air power did a good bit. They hit a lot of deep targets within Iraq, they quite possibly demoralized forces and they knocked out 40%, (according to Press) of Iraq’s armored forces.

But Cyrus, your giving air power too much credit. Let’s take a closer look on air power’s effectiveness.

First, there were clear indications that air power’s strategy of decapitation for six weeks prior to major ground operations did not accomplish its goal. This goal, the death of Iraqi leadership and/or the complete breakdown of Iraqi military communications, command and control. We know that key leadership made it out unscathed. Press clearly shows that the Iraqi’s were able to mount a retreat and additionally reposition defensive forces to meet the Coalition left hook. Even over a six week period we must begin to question the value spent in launching sorties, both in time spent and dollar cost, as compared to launching ground forces forward. It could be argued that the air campaign had reached its likely full potential over that six weeks and more time would not necessarily lead to much more progress.

Second, Press explains that many of the forward positioned stocks of supplies (XVIII Corps finds) and the defensively positioned armor of Iraqi forces were largely undisturbed by air power (Amazingly even in open desert!). Majority of the Iraqi armored forces eliminated were on the move, in retreat, on open road. Kind of reminds us of the similar experience we recently had in Afghanistan. Stephen Biddle provides us the vivid examples of a small, small area where concentrated air power still rendered not nearly the destructive effectiveness they sold us on. Imaging taking that air power and diluting it over a much larger theater of Iraq and Kuwait!

Third, if air power failed in any of its missions overall it was the mission to protect the land forces’ penetrating advance through the enemy lines. Robert Pape is clear that this is where air power can earn its money in Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War. Pape predicts just what Press shows, air power is less effective against defensive forces. Pape goes further and says that air power should be used to protect the flanks of an attacking force by concentrating its firepower against the repositioning defensive forces maneuvering to meet the attacker. Air power missed this completely in the first engagement in the Gulf. The attacking forces ended up eliminating this counterattacking force itself. What if the Iraqi’s were armed with better armor? What if they had longer ranged fire power? I bet we may not be gloating over the small number of soldiers killed in that conflict now if the Iraqi’s were better equipped. It is clear that air power failed miserably in neutralizing that counterattack and covering the attacking force’s flank.

Cyrus, I’m baffled too. Maybe it was intelligence that failed to point the airpower in the right direction. Maybe it was that they were occupied on other targets. I don’t know. But I know that, had our ground forces not been better equipped, I think they would have had a tough and bloody slog through that attack and that air power, or lack thereof, would be shouldering a large blame for it.


Try this on Cyrus, for an interesting read:


http://stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=15295&archive=true

Airpower in the Gulf War

In The Myth of Air Power in the Persian Gulf War and the Future of Warfare Daryl Press says that the role of airpower was insignificant in defeating the Iraqis. He challenges conventional interpretations of the Gulf War by contending that the six week pre-invasion air campaign did not seriously weaken Iraq’s warfighting capabilities. His evidence, however, is inconclusive.

Press writes that the air campaign failed to impair Iraqi forces in five key aspects: it did not critically damage or restrict maneuver, C3I, supply lines, or Iraqi morale, nor did it critically attrite Iraqi forces. If the Iraq military retained all these capabilities up to the beginning of ground operations, Press argues, the Coalition victory cannot be attributed to the air campaign. This conclusion leads Press to downplay the importance of airpower. However, the evidence he cites is questionable and can support contrary interpretations.

First, consider the attrition of Iraqi forces. About forty percent of Iraqi armored vehicles were damaged during the air war. Press asserts this says little about air effectiveness: Iraqi defensive forces still had favorable force ratios when they were routed by Coalition forces. This is true, but losing forty percent of ones armor (well over one out of every three vehicles), especially when ones military is already outclassed, is still a crucial diminution in warfighting and logistical abilities. Furthermore, Press notes that Coalition commanders missed key air strike opportunities, such as against redeploying Republican Guard divisions during the “left hook” invasion. A well executed air assault on these divisions could have yielded results on par with al-Khafji and the Highway of Death. Thus, rather than demonstrating the inherent limits of airpower, the Gulf War shows both its utility (forty percent attrition is big) and even a greater potential for lethality through improved battlefield awareness.

In addition to forty percent attrition, the six week air strike discombobulated Iraqi forces. Press argues that the Republican Guard and the regular army gave no indication of low morale but fought bravely. However, what appears to be feats of bravery—individual surprise attacks, hopeless forays, etc.—can also be the actions of a befuddled, desperate enemy. The Republican Guard and the regular army may have been quite fazed by the air campaign and simply kept fighting because it was the best alternative option to surrender.

The Front Line Iraqi forces at least were clearly demoralized. They likely caught the worst of the air campaign in terms of supply disruption and attrition, and it was they who in mass either turned tail or surrendered to the (decoy) Marine invasion. At the close of the second day of ground operations, before any major battles had been fought in the “left hook” invasion, Baghdad announced its withdrawal from Kuwait. Thus the Coalition in a sense achieved its primary goal through the complete disintegration of the Iraqi Front Line--the place where the prewar air campaign had been most intense.

In sum, Press is correct to eschew overconfidence in airpower and assert the enduring importance of ground force deployment. However, his argument that the prewar air campaign contributed only slightly to the Coalition’s stunning success rests on inconclusive evidence and may, in fact, be wrong.

The Gettysburg Powerpoint

Not to bite the hand that feeds us; the class does feature an awful lot of ppt. But DOD does a lot of planning via powerpoint; and it's important to keep in mind the limitations of the medium.

Would we be better off if they were communicating plans in actual sentences, rather than this sort of thing?

"Here may be the clearest manifestation of OSD’s contempt for the accumulated wisdom of the military profession and of the assumption among forward thinkers that technology—above all information technology—has rendered obsolete the conventions traditionally governing the preparation and conduct of war," commented retired Army Col. Andrew Bacevich

I get the graphic from some old blog posts, and I haven't read the book quoted; so take it for what it's worth.

We've read the Army's counterinsurgency manual; and though we noted a lot of material that looked like a sociology 101 text, it's a thorough document, with actual ideas contained therein.

But decisionmaking at the political levels learned its lessons from the ppt-rich, communication-poor corporate world.

For all the misgivings sociology profs might have at their work being used in an army manual, isn't it miles better than military decisions made and communicated in incomprehensible gibberish?

Cheney’s Analysis of China’s Rise

Vice President Cheney said in a speech in Sydney Austrailia February 23rd that, “Last month's anti-satellite test, China's continued fast-paced military buildup are less constructive and are not consistent with China's stated goal of a peaceful rise.'' The location of this speech is not trivial either, as the Chinese have begun demonstrable efforts to strengthen their leadership in bilateral and multilateral ties with their Asian neighbors and in ASEAN.

Pardon me Mr. Vice President, with all due respect, its called deterrence. Deterrence is a key element to maintaining peace, and thereby to a peaceful rise. A state’s capacity to remove an object from within the airspace over its sovereign territory is simply a vertical extension of its national security. A state demonstrating this capacity for the flock of spy satellites perched to keep an eye on that state is simply manifested deterrence.

If the Chinese had dropped 5 JDAM’s into a US Embassy in Europe, or had been conducting spy operations all over the US airspace and coast line, perhaps I could be convinced the Chinese had aggressive rather than defensive motivations. However I can’t help but notice that it is the United States and our dwindling allies that are conducting the warcapades around the world.

Mr. Vice President, I don’t mean to imply that you’re not a reliable source of intelligence data or analysis, but I think I’ll wait until China begins to develop some power projection capabilities that could reach beyond greater China before concluding that China’s rise is anything but peaceful.

Troop Commander Wales

The United Kingdom is withdrawing 1,600 of their now 7,100 troops in Iraq. Even while Prince Harry is being voluntarily deployed to Southern Iraq, Parliament is discussing a complete withdraw of British troops by the end of this year. Troop Commander Wales must be quite the soldier. I can’t help but assume that the White House was aware of this and other allied withdrawals when planning the recent troop surge. I'm wondering, what is the implication for the United States when cornerstone of the “coalition of the willing” is no-longer willing?

New Plan for Iraq

With the new plan of increasing troops in the Iraq, yesterday, Gen. Fil claimed a new strategy----“clear, control and retain”. He explained,

“The first objective within each of the security districts in the Iraqi capital is to clear out extremist elements neighborhood by neighborhood in an effort to protect the population. And after an area is cleared, we're moving to what we call the control operation. Together with our Iraqi counterparts, we'll maintain a full-time presence on the streets, and we'll do this by building and maintaining joint security stations throughout the city. This effort to re-establish the joint security stations is well under way. The number of stations in each district will be determined by the commanders on the ground who control that area. An area moves into the retain phase when the Iraqi security forces are fully responsible for the day-to-day security mission. At this point, coalition forces begin to move out of the neighborhood and into locations where they can respond to requests for assistance as needed. " [1]

Let’s see the former strategy, “clear, hold and build”. Condoleezza Rice explained,
“Clear the toughest places, no sanctuaries to the enemy, and to disrupt foreign support for the insurgents. We are working to hold and steadily enlarge the secure areas, integrating political and economic outreach with our military operations. We are working to build truly national institutions by working with more capable provincial and local authorities. We are challenging them to embody a national compact, not tools of a particular sect or ethnic group. These Iraqi institutions must sustain security forces, bring rule of law, visibly deliver essential services, and offer the Iraqi people hope for a better economic future. " [2]

Compared with the former strategy, the new plan requires more role of the Iraqi government. The new plan focuses not only on “we” but also on the allies. Having been trained for years, the Iraqi military and police have the capability to share some burden of the US troops. Second, the “clear” task is accomplished in the form of small warfare, which is defined as “neighborhood by neighborhood”. The new tactic may be more suitable for the current Iraqi situation. Third, the Iraqi military is needed in the second phase and security forces are needed in the third phase. They can improve the relationships between Iraqi populace and Coalition Force. Iraqi forces understand the culture, and know how to get along with the populace. More importantly, when they secure and help the area develop, the populace regards them as representative of government, and will respect and support them. If the securing and building job is done by the US army, the Iraqi government cannot establish its own foundation from its people. On the other hand, with the new plan the US can deploy the skilled troops whose positions are handed to Iraqi security forces to achieve the first phase in the new front.

Another interesting stuff is that the new plan gives up the “build” task. Isn’t the status quo situation ready for rebuilding, or does the US want to let Iraqi people develop with their own hands? If the US doesn’t want to help Iraqi economic development, then I think the Iraq War will be a failure, because with the economy deteriorating, Iraqi people can be easily influenced by the extremists and terrorists. If it is not ready, then when is the appropriate time? The moment when all the extremists are cleared out or when the certain area is controlled, or when the area is retained?

Response to Several Responses

In response to the third and fourth comments of the "We Need More Time, Not Major Shift" post, I see and understand the points both arguments are making. If you look through history, there are many conflicts, both conventional state-on-state, and unconventional; but I believe the fututre holds something different.

Gen. Zinni made the point that conventional battles is the exception, I believe in the future that is true. Iraq and Afghanistan are obviously insurgent battles. If a conflict with Iran irrupts, then that too will be an insurgent battle. They have already threatened the use of tens of thousands of terror style attacks on US interests throughout the world. Terror style attacks in my opinion is not a conventional form of fighting. You may thinik of cases where US, or other state militaries had used this form of attack, but I would argue that they were not fighting conventional battles.

Insurgency is the way of the future I believe, it will certainly be the type of fighting in Iran, and using Iraq and Afghanistan as examples, any leader of a rogue or otherwise enemy state would be folish to do otherwise. It is the only way that does not gaurantee downright defeat. Maybe eventual defeat, but not without taking many lives of their enemy.

North Korea may be the exception, with its vast armies and years worth of targetting and placement of forces. But I would not doubt that Kim has plans at the ready for insurgent tactics. It would be irrational for him not to learn from history. America cannot quickly and successfully fight unconventional wars. It takes much more time and bloodshed to win. This would seem right up Kims ally, he knows he could never win against the US, what else would he have to fall back on. The only other thought would be that he uses his remaining nukes incase of invasion. He could use them tacticly on the battle field. But, do not think for a second he has not thought about, or planned to fight using insurgency tactics.

The fourth comment points out that insurgency is the exception. That might have been true in the past, but not for the future. There a few formidable state militaries could stand against the US, though not successfully. The rest will rely on the only proven tactic they have left; insurgency. Counterinsurgency is a tactic our forces must learn and learn quickly, because it is the battlefield of the future.

A New Threat

With the introduction of China’s new weapon system that can successfully destroy an orbiting satellite, the United States is going to have to reevaluate its intelligence, communications, and military systems. There has been a long running controversy over the use of weapons in space, though the technology is available, it is not known with certainty that there are active weapons systems in space at this time. However, if the reports are true of China’s test, this could bring a new era of a space arms race; one aimed at combating the new technological threats.

Through out the past decade, the United States has increasingly relied on satellite systems for the nation’s national security. They are not only used to protect the home front, but used extensively for military engagements through out the world. The Department of Defenses (DoD) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program relies on GPS and satellite systems to conduct their missions. Smart bombs to pinpoint and strike targets, as well as troops on the ground to know exactly where other forces are located in real time rely on GPS and satellite communications. Additionally, these systems are used for intelligence gathering. The National Security Agency (NSA) uses satellites for surveillance, and most all other radio detection and interception. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) uses them for surveillance on foreign locations and intelligence collection. Most all communications systems for intelligence and military units on the ground are made through the use of satellite systems.

If this new technology is exploited further, there are many concerns that would need to be addressed. The path our national security agencies have been traveling could have leaded us in the wrong direction. We have come to rely on satellites, that if they can be destroyed when we need them most, we do not have a reliable system in place. If America got in a conflict with China regarding any number of issues particularly Taiwan, our satellites would be in grave risk and so would our strategic capability. America needs to be researching and developing new technologies for its communications and intelligence gathering needs. Satellites that are undetectable or that create ghosts to conceal its true location are a few of the defenses our satellites currently have. But new, more secure ways must be developed.

Finally, this new Chinese system may be the start of the new space arms race. Undoubtedly, our intelligence agencies are working to acquire information regarding this Chinese technology. Though America has been the leader in developing new defense technology, it is still necessary to know your opponents full capabilities. A whole new type of weaponry and communications is in the future. Even if this technology is not pursued further, the fact the capabilities are present is something the United States cannot ignore. The Chinese are in the lead when compared to the United States since they have developed this technology first and they likely are already developing ways to combat it. America must make every effort to be at the forefront of this race, if not, our national security policy could be much different than it was just a month back.

New Approach

The blog posting is now going bare-knuckles. This could get interesting.

Security Needed, Inquire Within.

While we are contemplating an insurgency operation against the U.S. in Iraq, let’s look at the counter-insurgency Iraq itself faces…aka: civil war. What teeth does the young government have to effectively conduct a counter-insurgency of its own?

Pivotal is the establishment of a legitimate government that can effectively provide for the people…and here is the catch…it must be viewed as legitimate by all the people. So what is job one? SECURITY

Much to Thursday’s speaker’s chagrin, Iraq needs some effective force loyal to the government that is capable of maintaining a stable environment which all Iraqi’s feel secure. Anything short of this provides fodder for those groups or individuals that can provide security to its base.

So what folks be might an Iraqi enlist support?

a) Shiite Militias come to mind. Wow…they are already organized, trained and tacitly supported by a big country full of resources. I wonder if those Shiites would try to use their influence to take control of the government…by means other than popular election.

b) Sunni. Small, effective at guarding turf through terror tactics. Hardly the guys I would want to protect the resource-rich land that I have and they don’t.

c) Kurds. They’re nice guys. They have somewhat of an organized security force (when it’s not busy in Turkey). They could cover down on the rest of Iraq and provide security. But what is the incentive…besides that… they have to work on getting ready to defend Kurdistan.

d) The Americans!!! That’s it. They started this thing. Why don’t they hang around indefinitely and do it. Nnaaa. Their public will never support it…especially with media trolling the streets. Besides…they have other world wide operations and elections to worry about.

e) Hey…how about some of the neighbors. They would love to help out in Iraq. Eyeeee…it could just be a repeat of a, b, and c.

Well, I guess we are just going to have to go with the Iraqi Security Force. Yep..definitely. The trick will be to build a strong enough loyal force and eliminate, or render them ineffective, the partisan forces that could pose future threats and derail the government. But how do we do that?

I would imagine that we have to increase the effectiveness of our bureaucracy. That could be real tough and time consuming considering we have not had an effective government bureaucracy that tended to all the populace’s needs in nearly 40 years. That of course will require an organizational culture change at a minimum. Secondly, perhaps some mentorship would help. Are there any effective governments out there that could really help us with our lower echelon bureaucratic workings and issues at the local (not provincial) level? Sounds like the U.S. is running short.
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2007&m=February&x=20070208145128sjhtrop0.3155481

Train Iraqis?

One of the more controversial points in Thursday’s presentation was the recommendation for the US to abandon, temporarily at least, the training of Iraqi security forces. The argument is that training Iraqis at this time has a higher opportunity cost than does focusing solely on a US led counterinsurgency. This viewpoint has a few flaws.

It is argued that the US should exercise caution in training and equipping Iraqi forces since such accoutering may be turned against the US down the road. But unless the US plans to provide security in Iraq indefinitely, it must eventually outfit and train an effective Iraqi security force. The longer this is delayed, the more turbulent will be the transition from a predominantly US military administration to an Iraqi one.

A well trained Iraqi security force would also provide a strong boost to the counterinsurgency. An Iraqi force would come naturally equipped with local knowledge—language ability, cultural and geographical awareness, understanding of community norms—and would also enhance domestic support for the war, two advantages that are highly valuable (perhaps vital) to waging counterinsurgency.[1] Indeed, Krepinevich argues that a key error in General Westmorland’s approach to the Vietnam war was his reluctance to improve coordination between the US and the ARVN. While there are salient differences between Vietnam and the current situation in Iraq, the principle of cooperating with indigenous anti-insurgency forces still applies.

Finally, training Iraqi forces is consistent with the nature of the ongoing conflict. The US is fighting a counterinsurgency, not against itself, but on behalf of another government. Accordingly, making full use of that government’s forces, cooperating with them and training them, is not only judicious but more or less demanded by the conventions of interstate relations. By relegating the role of Iraqi forces in the defense of their own nation, the US will only give credence to the criticisms of those who have described Iraq as a pawn on the US chessboard of international statecraft.

It may be that training Iraqis decreases the resources available for a purely US counterinsurgency. But the advantages that would be realized through an effective Iraqi force, not to mention the satisfaction it would give to international opinion, more than compensate for the loss.
[1] Joes, Anthony, Resisting Rebellion, The University Press of Kentucky, 122-155.

Public Perception of the War on Terror

The hunt for Al Qaeda to the general public has been focused mainly in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, it must be realized that this hunt does not solely reside in this region, but expands across all regions of the world. The reason for this lack of knowledge could be traced back to the operational tactics used by US and other ally forces. Additionally, this could also be a cause for the lowered support for the war on terror.

Under a White House directive, the Pentagon after September 11th was given the “authority to hunt and kill suspected terrorists around the globe”. [1] Though the hunt continues to this day yielding very few “high value targets”, these operations are conducted by highly trained special operations units, many of which have been redeployed from Iraq and Afghanistan. Aside from these units’ roles as forward military operators, they also conduct operations very similar to those of intelligence officers. This dual role has called into question their use as spies, rather than as a military fighting force.

These special operations units have come increasingly in the public eye since Islamic forces have fought against the Ethiopian military in Somalia. The United States has been giving the Ethiopian forces updated intelligence reports to almost assure the Ethiopians success in their operations. Recently, an American gunship was used to strike a position believed to be that of several senior level Al Qaeda members in Somalia. Later, American special operations units were used to secure the air strike sight and collect evidence.

The tactics used for fighting the various al qaeda groups vary greatly when comparing Iraq and Afghanistan to those in Somalia. The first two consist of a large military force, the troops are overt in military dress, gear, and they are transported in large convoys obvious to al qaeda fighters. In Somalia, the tactics are much more discreet. These unites are trained in covert counterterrorism forms of combat. They execute their duties covertly whether it is a military operation or an intelligence operation. The styles and tactics used is a major cause for the lack of information the general public has about counterterrorism operations in other parts of the world.

Support for the war on terror has been dwindling and in order to gain it back, the public must have a clear picture of what the tasks at hand are. There is much attention from the news and political leaders about what’s going on in Afghanistan and Iraq, that it is forgotten where else the fight is also taking place. Due to the nature of the warfare taking place in Africa and in order for the public to understand the magnitude of the fight against terror, there must be special attention made to inform the public about other areas of the world where the war on terror is also taking place. Perhaps with an increase in knowledge and understanding, public support may raise to levels seen in years past.

[1] Pentagon Sees Move in Somalia as Blueprint, MARK MAZZETTI, January 13, 2007 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/13/world/africa/13proxy.html?_r=1

In Just and Unjust Wars Michael Walzer gives some moral guidelines concerning war. But neither Walzer nor just war theory provides clean cut rules for military behavior. There is always a degree of uncertainty in warfare, and this uncertainty is centrally important to just war analysis, particularly the principle of proportionality.

Just war theory usually has two “in war” guidelines: discrimination and proportionality. Discrimination argues that military force ought only to be applied against combatants, and civilians should be exempt. There does not seem to be much uncertainty here. It is generally incorrect to kill people, and even in war, the logic goes, civilians should be spared since they pose no direct threat to combatants. Fair enough. But the waters become murkier when we make the jump to proportionality.

Proportionality argues that the use of force should be limited such that the achieved goal justifies the injury inflicted. This injury, Walzer tells us, may sometimes include civilians. Now at first this sounds utilitarian: if the object seems useful enough, proceed with your destruction. But in fact “proportionality” is a blend of principle and uncertainty and is not utilitarian. There are actually two principles at work: the first is to avoid destruction. However, since we are currently engaged in war it is assumed we believe there is some higher principle at stake—perhaps our territorial integrity or the protection of our population.

Thus there is a collision of principles: the principle to avoid human destruction versus, say, the right to territorial integrity. This is where uncertainty comes alive. Just war theory will say that the right of national territory is in fact the higher principle. But how “higher” is it? And what level of retaliation does it justify? Are we allowed, morally speaking, to lie to the enemy? Can we kill the enemy soldiers? Bomb his cities? Invade his country? And after we win, can we devastate his country to remove a future threat? The answer, to all of these questions, is: we’re not sure. There is no rule. So, we introduce proportionality, which in a reworded definition could read: “keep your application of violence at the lowest level possible that will still allow you to achieve your goal in fighting.” We are uncertain how much violence we can morally employ in response to their aggression, so let’s limit it all we can.

To borrow from Clausewitz, the “fog of war” encompasses more than strategic and tactical moves; it also includes the realm of moral decision-making. Since we are never certain what exigencies justify violence against human life, nor the level of that violence, we are well advised at all times to proceed cautiously. This is the principle of proportionality.

Joseph Nye and the Domestic Front

Nye’s ideas of soft and hard power represent an excellent view of how the US should progress in the current international system. However, his ideas are only truly effective when all of the assumptions he makes, of which there are quite a few (e.g. the economy will be sustained, society will not decay, that Americans do not become isolationists, and that America’s interests will be shaped in a broad and farsighted way that incorporates global interests (171)), work in harmony with each other. While Nye acknowledges all of these and even more that I have omitted, he glosses over them and seems content that the reality of the situation is that the United States is poised to continue with the blessing of both hard and soft power.

But is this the case? When reviewing the domestic sphere in the US, Nye notes that the power of the American domestic sphere is found in numerous aspects, but the one I take issue with in this entry is in the continuing power of the “melting pot” ideal (118). Nye notes that this idea of the melting pot continues to shape American culture as it both integrates different cultures into the American domestic sphere and broadens America’s interests abroad (118, 119). However, many political theorists, including but certainly not limited to Kimberly Curtis in Our Sense of the Real, Michael Warner in Publics and Counter Publics, Jurgen Habermas in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere and John Dewey in The Public and Its Problems bring forth arguments that oppose Nye’s mystical melting pot. I will only expand on Curtis here.

Kimberly Curtis notes a strong increase in enclaving within America’s domestic sphere. In enclaving similar and likeminded individuals are choosing to group together in communities out of fear of what is different. This idea is represented best in gated communities within the US. In these communities people segregate themselves from outsiders or those who might be different out of a since of necessity or even fear. By removing themselves from the general population and grouping with other likeminded individuals, society as a whole begins to lose its plurality and rely upon a false sense of what reality truly is. Instead of living in a reality sustained by a diverse public, a homogeneous reality takes over in which change and debate become a scarce event.

More importantly, however, is the role of shaping reality to each individual person. Curtis states that “our ability to experience and constitute a world shared in common is utterly dependent on that world appearing to us through the eyes of others” (16). It then logically follows that if we are to understand and comprehend a true sense of reality the eyes that we look through must be the eyes of those different from us. Otherwise, if we are to live in a homogenous society, we are basically seeing ourselves through our own eyes at all times and thus never experiencing a true reality.

The breakdown of the plurality of our society deeply undermines not only our soft power but also our hard power. In Nye’s words “If these divisions were as deep as portrayed, they could undercut our hard power by inhibiting our capacity to act collectively, and diminish our soft power by reducing the attractiveness of our society and culture” (113).

If the fears of these theorists are true and the undermining of America’s domestic sphere is indeed in progress, Nye’s hopes are in jeopardy. In this reality America’s goals and tasks should no longer be focused on how they act within the international sphere, but instead how they bring about the melting pot so sought after by Nye on the domestic front. Otherwise, America’s place in the international system is neither secure nor progressive, as Nye had hoped.

Starring: The USA

Since the end of the Cold War, American power has surged to unprecedented heights and currently dominates the international stage. The absence of counterbalancing on the part of other major powers has lead several scholars to conclude that the international system has evolved from a balance-of-power framework to a more complex international network. Moreover, according to several theorists like Joseph Nye, power itself has developed into something “less tangible and less coercive,” and currently exists in two forms: coercive “hard power” and co-opting “soft power.” With the transformative influence of globalization, power has evolved into something more than brute strength; and with the fall of the Iron Curtain, the United States has taken the international stage as the main actor in this current power play.

Now the main question is: for how long will it last? America plays an unprecedented role, and it appears that as long as the international audience is satisfied, the performance will most likely continue. Indeed, it seems that in the twenty-first century, the biggest threat to American power is not the emergence of another strong actor or troupe of actors; instead, the biggest threat to American power is America itself. If the United States acts as a prima donna and irritates her captive audience, she may be ushered off the international stage. Conversely, America may choose to exit the world stage prematurely, thus ushering in a new wave of international actors in a new power play.

If the United States is to continue as the world’s superpower, it must learn how to effectively use both hard and soft power resources. The danger is that the United States will bow out of the international power play, financially burdened by military costs; or, the United States may become arrogant, and fail to temper hard power with attractive, soft power. Both situations may be avoided if America recognizes and respects her fellow actors. As Nye relates in the Paradox of American Power: “The multiplicity of new actors means that there is very little the United States can achieve alone” (169). Thus, it appears that on the international stage, there truly are no small parts, only small actors. The United States, as the ‘biggest’ player on world stage, should recognize that its powerful size is largely contingent upon the support of fellow actors.

Imp Awards '06 - Year In Review

Soul of Hitler: Good evening.

Soul of Pinochet: Adolph, before we present tonight's final award, I must say I loved your work in Poland in the 1940's. Just magnificent.

Hell's audience: (Standing ovation)

Soul of Hitler: (Touching heart) Thank you all so much. Please, please sit down. I only wish that the Bundeswehr had had as much enthusaism.

Hell's audience: (Laughter)

Soul of Pinochet: Haha. Good one. Well, without further ado, the nominees for The Best Armed Conflict of 2006 are:
The continued insurgencies by Marxists in India and Nepal (video clip of dead people along roadside); the seperatist insurgencies in Sri Lanka and Thailand (video clip of beheaded Buddhist monks).

Soul of Hitler: The usual ethnic bloodshed in the resource-rich nations of Africa (video clip of child soldiers and refugees); the genocide in Darfur (video clip of a rape of one woman by 5 janjaweed).

Soul of Pinochet: The U.S. led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (video clip of blindfolded and cuffed Sunnis and Shiites with bullet holes in the back of their heads); the Israeli-Hezbollah War (video clip of a burning Beirut and hysteria in Haifa); and finally, the suprise late entry, the war between Ethiopia and Somalia (video clip of the professional Ethiopian army mowing down waves of teenage Somali Islamists).

Soul of Hitler: And the winner is (Opens envelop. Dramatic pause.). Unglaublich! The genocide in Darfur. Accepting this award is Mohammed Yusef Jihad, the latest janjaweed militia member killed by Sudanese rebels 11 minutes ago.

Soul of Jihad: Wow! Words can't explain how I feel. I definitely wasn't expecting this...I mean, all of the other nominees were so deserving. Um...well...I guess first I have to thank Allah and his prophet Mohammed. I also need to thank President Bashir and all the leadership in Khartoum for providing us aircover as we laid waste to women and children...I also want to thank the leadership in Moscow and Beijing for their support on the UN Security Council. Thanks, fellas!

Hellspawn Orchestra: (begins to play music)

Soul of Jihad: I guess that's my cue. Real quickly, thanks to my dad and 4 wives. Also, sons, it's late and I hope you're in bed by now and not watching this. Thanks again!

Soul of Judas: (enters stage right) Thanks to everyone tonight. I had an incredible time hosting the Imp Awards for the 2006th straight time. We've had an amazing year. Ares' thirst for bloodshed was certainly sated, and Lucifer added plenty of new souls to his coffers. Hopefully I'll see you all at the Vanity Fair afterparty! Good night!

WJC

Anybody see this?

I never really experienced the Clinton years. I was too young in the first term and too apathetic towards politics at the end of his second term to have ever really "known" him. Last summer I read The Survivor (which is both very informative and very fair) and learned a lot of things that I never knew. By the time I started to follow poltics, Clinton was out of office; so most of the things that I know him for are the things he's done out of office.

This interview with Chris Wallace is interesting. It is nice to see a President who is articulate and smart. Even if he cites Richard Clarke a little too much, I feel like he dissects Wallace's points several times down to their core. I would have loved to see him in a Presidential debate. His analytical abilities are inspiring, and should threaten any right-wing pundit trying to pull "a fast one" on him.

Cuba As A Case Study

After the actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Lebanon it seems to be clearly evident that at the end of the end of the day, military action may end a regime but it doesn't change attitudes. One could dethrone the Taliban, Saddam, and kill Hezbollah senior leadership, but if the local public still agree with what they stood for, the fighting will not end.

Change has to come from inward if local attitudes are to change. Imposing a new political system doesn't seem to work. What about this approach: Long term sanctions and patience are the key to fighting corrupt regimes.

Fidel Castro won't live much longer, and his "revolution" could very well end with his death. Even the most ardent supporters of his regime support Castro more so than his political system. Would they trust a one man government if that one man at the top wasn't Castro? I doubt it. Of course I don't even have to mention how the pro-democratic parties in the country feel about having a democracy.

Patience, however, is not a strong point when it comes to American foreign policy. Generally speaking, Presidents want and need results, for reasons ranging from politics to legacy. It would take real leadership for a President to say in his 8 years in office, he plans to do nothing about Cuba. For his time in office, he's just going to keep the status quo and wait them out. For his policy to work, the man/woman who follows him would be expected to do the impossible: the same thing.

If after Castro dies and Cuba begins a democratic process, then we might be able to start looking at Cuba as a case study.

Exercise in Futility

Three thoughts:

-I'm of the mind that Israel is partly responsible for what has happened to it this week. Firstly,Israel should have never set the precedent for trading prisoners in 2004 by trading hundreds of terrorists for a single Israeli businessman, an Israeli colonel, and the remains of Israeli soldiers. That action could only have helped Hamas and Hezbollah think that kidnapping Israeli infantrymen could gain further benefits.

-Does Israel have an exit strategy? For now Israel is content to launch missiles and mortars at Hezbollah positions (whether it is hitting them is another story. Reuters is reporting that of the 204 so deaths in Lebanon about 190 of them were civilians.) Does Israel want to go so far as to invade Lebanon with tanks and infantry and then threaten the fragile democracy in Lebanon? I doubt this, because they're smart enough to know that this will pave the way for Syria to regain influence in the country. Israel has to decide if it wants to go so far as to occupy Lebanon, or just shell southern Lebanon from Israel. The latter will have no effect on stopping Hezbollah though, the stated purpose of the military operations. If Israel really wanted to stop Hezbollah, the only way it could really cripple it would be by regime change in Syria and Iran. Something Israel is not capable of doing.

Israel's only real option (that will achieve the operation's goal) will probably have to be inserting special ops, and use them to take out Hezbollah leadership and/or weaken the terrorist group. Thus allowing the Lebanese military to fight Hezbollah on more equal grounds. However, that would take real leadership from Lebanon, which seems highly unlikely given the Lebanese public's view of Hezbollah.

However, in the end, one has to wonder if the IDF has ever heard of the Iraq War before. Conventional warfare in the name of fighting Islamic extremism hasn't worked out too well there...

Fantasy Dictatorship Draft

If you're tired of alot of those "normal" fantasy drafts like I am (exception being the ones where you draft upcoming movies and win by how much they gross in theatres) have I got a new fantasy draft for you.

Here's how it works:

1. Draft some dictatorships.
2. You can only have two dictatorships "starting" at a time.
3. Drink some beer, and pray for global instability...your league standings depend on it.
4. Tally your points.
5. Drink more beer, and savor your genius.

The Point System
Reprimand from NGO--- .5 points.
Reprimand from U.S. gov't agency---1 pt.
Reprimand from UN Security Council or UN Human Rights Council---2 pts.
Sanctions (Trade, Political, or Travel)---3 pts. every six months.
Revealed clandestine wetworks by U.S. gov't against said dictatorship---4 pts.
Missile Strike by U.S.---4 pts.
Missile Strike by ally(NATO, Japan, or Australia)---4.5 pts.
Land invasion by U.S.---7 pts.
Land invasion by ally---8 pts.

The Dictatorships (and how many points it costs to draft them)

Iran 10 pts., North Korea 11 pts., China 7 pts., Zimbabwe 3 pts., Myanmar 6 pts., Cuba 5 pts., Pakistan 5 pts., Saudia Arabia 5 pts., Syria 8 pts., Sudan 8 pts., Vietnam 3 pts., Egypt 4 pts., Tunisia 3 pts., Somalia 6 pts., Libya 4 pts., Belarus 4 pts., Uzbekistan 4 pts., Tajikstan 3 pts., and Kazakstan 3 pts.

The drafter only gets 7 pts. with which to draft his dictatorships. The points that are earned not only count in the standings, but can also be saved to draft new dictatorships. So if you want one of the big dogs, like Iran or the DPRK, you better save up. A drafter can also trade in a dictatorship for half the value he drafted it for, and those points can be put towards drafting a new dictatorship.

Enjoy!

Cloud

Who Cares When You Can Throw It All Away?

Kentuckians aren’t the only people who dump trash; the military does as well and now they are cleaning up the public mess. Recent discussion of innovations in military weapons systems, strategies, and technology prompted a reciprocal question: what happens to the old toys? Beyond selling them (secondhand goods by now) to other countries, a recent article on the AP reported that some 64 million pounds of chemical weapons were dumped between WWI and 1970 off U.S. coastlines (dump). In my previous presentation, you may recall that the measly 532 tons of chemical weapons stored at the Bluegrass Army Depot is currently a big deal. In fact, not only do dumping sites currently circle the U.S. mainland, but U.S. sites also exist in 16 other counties-most dumped after WWII.

However, other dimensions add interest to this issue-secrecy and destroyed evidence. Apparently the dumping practice-which seems so routine was kept secret until earlier this year when the Army released classified materials revealing the enormity of the weapons dumped. Furthermore, much of the paperwork detailing where the dumping had occurred has been destroyed. The Army only knows where half of the dumps are. Now, the military is seeking information from fishermen and victims of poisoning on where the missing locations may be. Some 200 serious injuries have occurred due to the leakage of chemicals from canisters worn apart after decades of the ocean’s salty abrasion (Daily Press).

These actions make one wonder what exactly was going on where classified materials had to be destroyed. Sure, sensitive materials are for selected eyes only, but why would the military want to purposely forget where it laid weapons? The Russians may have this trouble, but it is not the conduct of the U.S. Secondly, what should be done now? The U.S. is not liable for cleaning up the hazardous materials because a 1975 treaty banning the dumping of chemical weapons does not apply to pre-1975 dumping. Furthermore, those dumps in international waters carry increased complexity. Yet, fishermen and environmentalist believe it should be done for obvious reasons. Leaking mustard and nerve gas kills everything it touches in the water, and experts believe that even the WWI canisters pose serious threats for hundreds of years. In an era of billion dollar bombers and high tech revolutions, one should expect environmental cleanup to be an affordable higher priority of today’s mediocre EPA standards.

Heeeres.....Peter Gabriel?!?

This guy won a contest for: taking a movie and making a new trailer for it which gives the movie a totally different meaning. It's worth checking out... I can't stop watching it.

http://www.ps260.com/molly/SHINING%20FINAL.mov

Blog, blog, blog, all day long

blog, blog, blog, the blogging song.


Second Verse?

Some Poor Bastard v. Tenet

Can't...stop...blogging.

It had to happen sooner or later: the CIA kidnapped and "interrogated" the wrong guy. This poor bastard's name is Khaled al-Masri. According to the lawsuit he filed against the CIA, al-Masri, a German of Lebanese descent, was leaving Germany for a New Year holiday in Macedonia when he was stopped at the border and arrested. He claims he was held for 23 days and then flown to Afghanistan (quite the vacation hotspot, I hear) where he was subjected to "torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" at the hands of the CIA for five months. Eventually, the CIA confirmed his identity and decided they had the wrong guy ("Sorry about that, our bad") and then flew him to Albania of all places. Clearly, we don't know what happened in Afghanistan or what he considers "torture", but I'm pretty sure he wasn't given nightly back-rubs and gentle words of encouragement.

Obviously, this is one case, and I don't think policy should be decided on what may or may not have happened to one person. But this incident must surely give one pause. Even if you don't consider the morality of this policy to be a problem, there could be pragmatic implications: Are these renditions providing enough actionable intelligence to justify such terrible publicity? Could this policy cause our European allies to rethink their commitment to assist us in other intelligence gathering operations in their own countries? It's not outside the realm of possibility: The Europeans certainly aren't required to assist us, and in general, they feel far less threatened by Islamic terrorism than we do. Just food for thought.

Maybe RMA won't guarantee us victory this time

President Bush spoke to the Council on Foreign Relations yesterday regarding the administration’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. During his speech his discussed several examples of successful use of our military forces in establishing stability in Iraq with the assistance of Iraqi forces. Much of what he discusses are basic approaches by utilizing manpower and boots on the ground, not technology and precision weapons. President Bush’s description of successful initiatives in Iraq support what Dr. Kier argued in her paper that RMA is not providing any support to the stability or counter-insurgency operations in Iraq. While important in war, they have been relatively ineffective in establishing peace. Bush likewise discusses the success of embedding US military personnel with Iraqis to ensure that they can effectively maintain areas that have been secured. He has again support Dr. Kier’s point that working personal interaction with the Iraqis, as practiced by the British, is most effective in maintaining security, stability, and cooperation. Bush’s speech seems to indicate a change from the rather Rumsfeldian notion that our military superiority and advanced technology, much of which is provided through RMA, are enough to win the conflict in Iraq. Perhaps this acknowledgement of past mistakes, which the Bush administration has been more willing to make of late, will likewise provide for a slight change in RMA or at least the faith put in its ability to guarantee absolute victory. RMA or not there was never any doubt we could defeat the Iraqi army, but clearly RMA is no longer playing a role in whether we can help the Iraqis bring stability to their war torn country. RMA is important and should continue to be pursued, but we cannot allow belief in a RMA-guaranteed victory to blind us to the fact that some operations, such as the invasion and occupation of Iraq, will still need extremely large troop deployments to guarantee success no matter how many cool new toys we get.

Evan is the coolest, but not parmeaneidies+

In the article “Change and Transformation in Military Affairs”, Elliot Cohen argues that transformation from the bottom-up has been the most evident throughout military history.

Cohen believes that the greatest changes in war are brought about by spontaneous innovation in reaction to tactical problems. Obviously, this spontaneous innovation is a result of the soldiers on the ground fighting the war, rather than the political thinkers in Washington. We discussed at the beginning of the semester how the failure of junior officers to think on their feet have plagued militaries such as Egypt, but the flexibility of junior officers has typically been a strength in the US military.

Cohen goes on to state that the ability for soldiers to be innovative is linked to their culture, and is therefore the root of American soldiers success. “…Societies that do not see occasional failure as calamitous, that allows juniors to overcome or contradict seniors, and that do not value ‘face’ or reputation excessively are likely to transform themselves.”

However, it seems as though in some aspects American culture is not supporting these "cultural necessities" for innovation or transformation as it has in the past. First, the occasional failure that US troops have met with in Iraq have been seen as calamitous and has been met with demands of withdraw. On Cohen's second point, ( and someone please correct me if I am wrong ) I thought that American officers do stick strictly to their rank and that there is a strong emphasis placed on obeying orders from the officers above you. And finally, in terms of the importance of not relying on reputation excessively, it seems as though with the war in Iraq that there are many people who would have rather not gone at all if it meant a suffering of the US reputation.

Is American culture changing, so that in the future, it will not be as conducive to innovative thinking from its ground soldiers, those who are arguably the most important link in US military transformation?

Isn't that a Nietzsche niche?

Krepinevich argues that even in countries that cannot overcome the cost barriers to threaten the United States, they could become "formidable niche competitors."” Countries could concentrate their abilities in a particular area in order to prevent U.S. power projection. His assertion has considerable merit. Mountain tactics in Afghanistan and Pakistan have not been easy for the U.S. to combat. Asymmetric urban combat in Baghdad has shown to be a difficult tactic to deal with. The navy has realized that littoral combat in the Taiwan Strait may present a serious problem to the U.S. accomplishing its goals. Are we ready for a cyber attack?

As AmericaÂ’s relative military power increases versus other countries, their incentive to specialize will increase as well. To deal with specialization, the U.S. could use a threats based approach. If the number of countries that specialize is small, the U.S. can create plans to deal with each one without too much effort. But what happens if there are many small, specialized threats? The threats based approach will be very expensive and difficult to pursue. And a capabilities approach would certainly be less effective against a specialized enemy.

Is the revolution in military affairs, an impotent military?

American Conservative on China

With all the talk of warring against China from the hawks in the class, one might wonder how that would turn out. The answer comes to us from the American Conservative. No, I don't mean that one guy in class who is always blathering about this or that from the right-wing of the class. I mean the magazine.

Here are a few excerpts to entice you to go read this dozen-page treatise:

The history of the United States is the history of confrontation, even conflict, with the other great powers of the earth. At the dawn of the 19th century, the young Republic found itself confronted with the two great powers of that world, Britain and France... [In] the 20th century... the U.S. soon found itself in wars hot and cold, against Germany, then Japan, then Russia. Now, in the 21st century, the looming great powers are China and India.

If that wasn't inspiringly bold enough for you, try this one on for size:

In the years since, the neocons have gotten themselves right where they want to be: tangled up in the Middle East. Yet some seem eager to open up a “second front”; the ever-belligerent Max Boot, for example, agitated in the pages of—where else?—The Weekly Standard for a policy of “internal subversion” against China. The goal, he crowed, waving the reddest possible flag, was to “Taiwanize” the People’s Republic. Some might be tempted to minimize the political weight of a mere scribbler, but after Operation Iraqi Freedom, is there any doubt that noisy neocons have the capacity to translate their warlike op-eds into war itself?

By the way, ignore the Toms--Friedman and Barnett--telling us that a war with China won't happen because of doux commerce (sweet commerce), the article explains the fallacies of their argument.

I better hurry, if I'm posting on the inevitabilty of great power conflict, I'd better get it posted before December 7 is over.

Two armies are better than one.

So we've got the Army developing RMA. That will give us the ability to bombard anything we see back into the Stone Age. That's fine and dandy, as long as our opponents stay out in the open. However, as Iraq and Afghanistan are proving, our enemies are rarely this courteous. They hide among innocent civilians, which means we can't really blow them to kingdom come without making the situation even worse. The solution proposed by the readings obviously encourages more infantry-based doctrine. Dismounted infantry are better at peacekeeping, counterinsurgency, and urban warfare. That would enable us to better fight the battles we seem to be facing now.

However, if we moved to a primarily infantry-based army, we would likely lose our advantage in high-intensity warfare. If we did that, China, North Korea, Iran, and others might take the opportunity to challenge American dominance in their region.

So what's a superpower to do? My solution is to split the Army in half. Light units could remain light units, specializing in counterinsurgency, urban warfare, and peacekeeping. Heavy units could continue to develop RMA. After all, heavy units are the most effective at delivering overwhelming firepower anyway; why not allow them to improve at this? I can't speak for medium units. I simply don't know enough about their primary functions to speculate on where they fit in.

The military will, of course, resist having half of its units reconfigured for low-intensity warfare. The Army doesn't like those kinds of fights. That's why it may be necessary to split the Army in half. By forming a new branch of the army, it might be possible to form a service that prefers those types of conflicts.

As a superpower, the US has to develop an array of capabilities. If it focuses narrowly on one area (high intensity warfare), its opponents will focus on other areas. Therefore, the US has to be at least competent in all areas. To do otherwise leaves the US open to attacks on its weakest areas.

Crisis Iran

There is a discussion of military options in Iran (or lack thereof) over at The Officers Club--a blog run by three graduates of the finest military school this country has ever seen. All three are now serving as junior officers (hence the name). Go give it a look.

Recruiting on Federally Funded Campuses

Returning to military recruiting tactics, the US Government is trying to establish its recruiting tactics onto college campuses that disagree with some of the ideals behind the functioning of the military. Many cite the Pentagon’s policy toward homosexuals as their point of contention. The article can be found at msnbc.com

The schools that are trying to continue denying recruiting on their campuses may face the withdrawal of federal funding for their school. In the same way that many private companies donate to schools and receive certain privileges for their donations, the government would like to have the benefit of using the campus to recruit.

As we talked about in class, recruitment efforts for the military need more outlets. With the need for more military personnel to continue the War on Terror, it would be beneficial to have recruiters in as many locations as possible, and able to reach as many students as they can.

Right now, the debate is whether or not the funding should require the schools to allow recruitment. I can understand the feelings of the government. It is paying to provide education for the students of the school, but is not necessarily able to reap any of the benefits of its investment. Without being allowed to recruit on the campus, they do not have access to as many individuals as they do by sitting in their recruiting offices in town.

As far as the schools are concerned, their problem is that they don’t allow organizations with discriminatory policies on campus, which would include the “don’t’ ask, don’t tell” policy of the military. They believe that the integrity of the school would be damaged if they were to being to allow recruiting. I think that if they are able to overlook this policy to accept federal money, they should be able to overlook it to allow recruiting on campus.

Have a coke and a chinook

How do you think decisions about billions of taxpayers dollars are being made? Would you believe major companies like Lockheed-Martin are relying not only on pricy bid proposals to the government, but also more economical radio adds complete with celebrities and sports references? Not exactly the intellectual argument that I had pictured.

This Washington Post article describes how Lockheed-Martin in an attempt to sway important defense officials to buy into their 10 billion federal law enforecment communications system, is buying up radio advertising not to reach the mass public, but about 50 employees in the Treasury, Justice, and Homeland Security departments. Lockheed Martin is not alone in this endeavor, as government contractors have surpassed the auto industry as the top revenue category for one popular Washington news-based radio station.

"And while there may be only a few dozen officials involved in the final decision on a contract, Calkins added, those people can be influenced by others -- like co-workers and bosses -- who might encounter an ad."

What? I realize that decisions about defense procurement are based on a variety of things including the much more fact based bid proposals. The idea that decisions could even be slightly affected by "peer-pressure" from co-workers who heard their favorite football player on the radio is fine for tennis shoes, but ridiculous for defense procurement. What is next- television adds with blondes in bikinis posting up against the Millennium Falcon?

Does anyone else find this as crazy as I do?

Am I having deja vu all over again?

Britain and the US are trying to get the rest of the permanent members of the UN Security Council to agree that Iran is in fact actively attempting to develop a nuclear weapons program. The hopes of this latest diplomatic initiative is to get Iran brought to the Security Council and to ensure that action will be taken against Iran by the UNSC. Convincing China and Russia of Iran's intentions are key as they would be the most likely to veto action by the Security Council against Iran.

My thoughts on this are that we're simply seeing history repeat itself as it did prior to the US invasion of Iraq. I'm not saying that the US is preparing to lead the charge into Iran, I would hope that logical reasoning and look at Iraq and domestic pressures would show that's not a viable option. What I am saying is that even if this does get taken to the Security Council, I wonder if some type of action be taken. No one argued that Iraq needed to comply with the UN and weapons inspectors, the trouble came in determining what to do and when to do it. When the UN didn't agree, the US, UK, and its "coalition of the willing" (don't forget about Poland) went their own way with it and invaded. There are greatly diverging views on how to deal with perceived threats to international security, and it doesn't seem clear that the UNSC will be able to be anymore decisive than it was leading up to the Iraq invasion. Can the UNSC tackle another major crisis over WMD and again run the risk of appearing irrelevant? Will squabbling be the end result of what to do with Iran? Once again the US is attempting to convince other states of the intelligence it and the UK possesses indicating a weapons program. Questionable intelligence will likely result in a divided response as it did with Iraq. Clearly the divide over Iraq still exists, and it seems unlikely that it will be bridged in the immediate future to the liking of all parties involved. Ultimately I believe that Iran will eventually be brought to the Security Council, but I question how effective a response will be enacted once the time comes.

Justify My Gov

This week we're reading about transformation within the military. Since 9/11, it is sad how little we have transformed. Just this week the 9/11 Commission gave the grade of a "D" on reform, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10314699/site/newsweek/.

But let's focus on the military's problems: Washington still has multiple layers of rank heavy bureaucracy, there is the insertion of large cumbersome task forces in to every place; an over-emphasis on technology; and a lack of appreciation for the urgency of providing security, food, water, and electricity IMMEDIATELY so as to start the cycle of counter-insurgency information collection from locals.

Our bureaucracy has failed to provide the crucial linguistic skills, four years after 9/11, that are far more important to transformation than any weapons system. For example, the road to the Bagdad Airport, AKA Route Irish, suffers fewer attacks today, because Iraqis man the checkpoints. Reportedly, in Afghanistan even our translators don't have a firm hold on Pashtun, several years in. There are still too many delays in approving operations in the field that are associated with layered bureaucracies that come with joint task forces. The result is detrimental to fast moving tactical success at ground level.

If we really want to have a RMA, we need to work more on "people skills" then new technology. We need to learn difficult languages, allow the men on the ground to have more leeway in making decisions, rid ourselves of bureaucracy. One need only look at how the Special Forces and C.I.A. were allowed to operate in Afghanistan before and at the beginning of that war. Sure, the brass at the Pentagon didn't like seeing pictures of SFs with mangy beards riding horses, but they got the job done superbly; and their beards and horses were part of the reasons why.

Burritos are Better Protected than Military Secrets

Technological innovation due to military wants and the fat contracts that support otherwise uneconomical research may receive well deserved criticism, but there are numerous, often unrealized benefits that the public enjoys due to declassification and spin-off technologies-even right here in Kentucky. Innovations such as the internet (I thought Al Gore invented this?) and the global positioning system (GPS) were once closely guarded military secrets that were later integrated into the tech markets. WD-40 became and still is a wildly successful lubricant after it was invented for NASA applications. Modern conveniences related to the internet are taken for granted today, and companies such as OnStar and the slew of GPS receiving devices such as electronic driving maps are products of declassification. Although there usually is a considerable time lag between military/contractor invention and potential public use, these technologies would probably have taken longer to achieve if the research was done outside of government/DOD initiatives. Who else could have supported the 30+ satellites used for GPS today back in the mid-1980’s during its creation?

The effects of defense supported innovations via contractors being released for public use also raises internal security concerns. If the same technology that the military uses is available on the market, then just about anybody could obtain the otherwise disclosed materials with the intention of sabotage. Sure, sharing WD-40 with the world may not be a direct security risk today, but what about more sophisticated innovations?

One instance that illustrates this concern and spurred publicity occurred right here in Kentucky. In the late 1990’s, Lexington based contractor Mas-Hamilton produced locks for defense purposes (Locks). These same locks, used for doors and safes, were sold to the Pentagon, other defense contractors, and to Taco Bells (based in Louisville) across the nation. When a study revealed that a majority of the locks in the Pentagon were vulnerable to high-tech thieves using computer-based devices, the DOD requested updating their locks with a newer, electronic lock produced by Mas-Hamilton…the same locks that Taco Bell uses to protect its burritos. Along with this request came the demand that other defense contractors update their locks. However, many refused citing that if the locks could be available to fast-food workers, then the security tech is just as vulnerable as the old locks. In response, Kentucky Senators McConnell and Bunning sought to increase defense funding to retrofit all locks used to secure military information, including contractors (Bunning). As discussed in class, this move may have been more about the protection of local, defense-related jobs than security interests as Mas-Hamilton publicly expressed the intention of lay-offs if sales didn’t increase.

Nevertheless, the cycle of political protection of local defense contractors to force military spending is a reality-even here in Lexington. However, with the average U.S. defense contractor CEO salary rising 79% in just one year (2002), there is a clear concern that fat contracts for military procurement and innovation be revisited (CEO). Is there something wrong if defense CEO’s make 45% more than other U.S. company CEO’s? Yet when it comes to the public benefits produced with spin off applications after declassification, perhaps these fat contracts are well worth the money spent and the burritos’ saved.

Putting Politics Back Into Warfare

“All warfare is political.” In regards to Iraq, the British, according to Elizabeth Kier, have this right. The Americans do not. To use a line from Black Hawk Down—sorry, Dittosfan—“The moment the bullets start flying politics goes out the window.” This illuminates the American military’s attitude towards war. Completely decimate your enemy.

But, as Ms. Kier aptly shows, this attitude is antithetical to securing the peace. (Kryptos and Watson both comment on this in earlier posts.) In fact, not only is the Army’s approach antithetical, it is adversely affecting the outcome by creating greater sympathies for the insurgents (or whatever they are called now—‘displeased persons’ or ‘persons with complaints’).

“It’s a war the Army can’t win,” state the claimants. Why can’t it be won? Because it’s not the type of war the Army is used to fighting successfully. Congressman Murtha—the widely respected ex-Marine and Democratic Congressman from Pennsylvania -- recently created an uproar with his calls for the establishment of a timetable for the removal of troops. Our presence is, he states, making matters worse. And this is true—sort of. It’s erroneous to confuse our presence as what is causing the dismal peace dividends with the methods we are using to secure peace. And while I don’t agree that we should have invaded Iraq in the first place, I think pulling our troops out has drastic consequences, especially for our credibility. A state’s power comes not just from military and economic capabilities, but from the strength of its national will. As much for future conflicts (military and otherwise) as for the sake of the Middle East, we need to remain in Iraq until we have ensured the creation of a stable and viable state.

So what’s a SecDef to do? If the Army is making matters worse but withdrawal is damaging to the vital and strategic interests of the United States, how do we accomplish our goals? I think our potential to create a new service, as Kier advocates as one possible future option, is unrealistic in the immediate future. However, I do agree that we could train particular branches within the Army or Marines (perhaps with British assistance). I also agree that reliance on high technology could further serve to undermine our interests. There is something inherently distasteful to people about a big brother approach to security (such as the use of drones or pgms, which may actually minimize civilian casualties) that may spur even further collusion with/support for the enemy.

The answer therefore lies in a military force whose primary responsibility is to protect and interact with civilians. (Much as cops are now returning to street walk in the most degraded neighborhoods, building bonds with residents.) It is not simply the security that is provided, but the relationships that are built with the civilian population that will undercut support for the insurgents. This will undoubtedly result in a temporarily (I use that term with uncertainty) higher body count. However, it’s the only way we will ever achieve success, secure our interests, and enhance our credibility.

The case for the status quo

So I went into class thinking that we should close down the excess production capacity in the US arms industry. After all, it seemed like the major reason those plants were still open was because of political patronage. After listening to the arguments in favor of keeping the situation unchanged, I went home and thought about it some more. I reread my notes. And you know what?

I don't see any real alternative to keeping the plants open. Yeah, it's wasteful, but given the alternatives, I don't really see another option. It's painful. I don't like it. I hate spending money (ANYBODY's money), but like I said, what other options do we have?

A case for Guantanamo Bay

The New York Times published an article today detailing an escape by four detainees from the Bagram Theater Internment Facility in Afghanistan in July of this year. Two of the men, Omar al-Faruq and Muhammad Jafar Jamal al-Kahtani, are considered former high level al-Qaeda operatives. Apparently:

According to military officials familiar with the episode, the suspects are believed to have picked the lock on their cell, changed out of their bright orange uniforms and made their way through a heavily guarded military base under the cover of night. They then crawled over a faulty wall where a getaway vehicle was apparently waiting for them, the officials said.

More disturbingly:

One American intelligence official said the prisoners also took advantage of "a perfect storm" of mistakes by the military guards.

A theory also exists "that American intelligence officers had once proposed staging an escape to release a detainee whom they wanted to act a double agent against Al Qaeda." But, this theory has been denied by American officials.

The question remains about how this could happen. I realize that this detention facility is not Alcatraz, but how does the military allow high level al-Qaeda members escape from one of its prisons? Shouldn't keeping terrorists detained be something our military takes seriously in this War on Terror/Global Struggle Against Extremism?

Although I am not in the military and would never claim I could do better, I hope we would all expect better security than this. Maybe putting them on an island isn't such a bad idea.

Update: I didn't see Dr. Farley's post on this at LGM until after I posted this one.

It's time to get drunk!

We are done!

Let's do the damn thing!

Here we go...t-minus 25 minutes and counting. Who am I kidding? I'm gonna fail.

I'm Turning Japanese (I really think so)

Koizumi is looking to call a spade a spade. Japan will finally be able to call its military a military and use it. (for peacekeeping that is) If they can change the constitution, no easy task. Koizumi's more proactive stance on the Japanese military has consistently increased over time. He sent troops to Iraq and even though a Japanese hostage was recently executed, he is leaving them there. Although Japan continues to be a staunch ally of the U.S., will this constitutional change affect other areas of Japanese foreign policy? Todd believes a resurgent Japan will join with Europe and Russia to balance the U.S. Is that the real reason for a change in Japan's military identity or is it the fear of China injecting large amounts of money into its military? I think I know the answer.

Flaming Stamos

I read Doris Goodwin's new tome, "Team of Rivals" over the Thanksgiving holiday (I have a strong dislike for my immediate family) and it was really good. It is basically the story of how Abe Lincoln appointed to his cabinet men he had run against to become the President. I had no idea that Abe rolled like that.

These men (William Seward, Salmon Chase, and Edward Bates) were all nationally known and presidential. These accomplished men were extremely angry at being beaten by a relatively unknown. Yet Lincoln not only convinced them to join his administration--Seward as secretary of state, Chase as secretary of the treasury, and Bates as attorney general--he ultimately gained their respect as well.

It's an incredible story because Abe was able to forge alliances with these men to win the most important war this country has ever fought. Abe could have picked campaign contributors or partisans, but instead he picked the men who deserved the job the most. Abe transcended personal bitterness in order to run a country.

As we all know, this isn't the case anymore. I'm not going to use my penultimate post to bash the Bush adminstration-because we all know about former heads of Arabian Horseman Federation becoming FEMA Directors- instead our entire society needs to be examined. When did we start to sacrifice the best route of managing a country for helping out the few? There seems to be little honor in political appointees anymore. Would the U.S. have been able to wage war in Iraq or the Balkans with a more diversified cabinet? I definitely don't believe that groupthink would have been as prevalent in the run up to the Iraq war.

I'm not advocating a constitutional amendment addressing the issue of political appointees, but government would benefit so much more if the right men/women were picked for the job over the most convenient.

Rumsfeld Thinks He's Clever

As the Washington Post article states, “He declared that the insurgents would, henceforth, no longer be called insurgents.”

So, with what he called an epiphany, Rumsfeld has decided that these groups do not deserve the legitimacy that calling them insurgents granted them. However, the organizations are there. Simply changing what we call them will not change the way they operate, nor the way we need to react to them. I’m glad he feels proud of this accomplishment, but really, what does it prove? Nothing, if you’re looking for a change in our operations (or theirs). These groups are not going to think “We’re no longer ‘insurgents’, so we can’t do certain things anymore. They don’t play by any rules but their own, and certainly aren’t going to notice a little thing like an alteration of what we call them.

Rumsfeld also seems to have forgotten that if there’s going to be an actual name change, people should be informed:

“Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Peter Pace, standing at Rumsfeld's side, evidently didn't get the memo about the wording change. Describing combat in Iraq, he paused and said, "I have to use the word 'insurgent' because I can't think of a better word right now."”

" 'Enemies of the legitimate Iraqi government' -- how's that?" Rumsfeld proposed”

Even with this new name given to the former insurgents, the General forgot and called them by their old name again during his speech.

The article goes on to discuss Rumsfeld’s shortcomings as defense secretary. There are other ways in which he has attempted to change rules to suit his views, and they were not followed, either. If his strategy involves changing names and not really understanding what is going on in Iraq,

( “When Aldinger protested that the question was not hypothetical, Rumsfeld replied that Iraq is "a sovereign country" and suggested the death-squad allegations could be politically motivated. "I just don't know," he said. "I can only talk about what I know." With an exaggerated shrug, he added: "That's life."”)

perhaps it is time we get someone in the position who will pay attention to the important aspects of what is actually occurring on the ground, rather than agonizing over what we should call the enemy.