Striker convoy, operating as part of Operation Dragoon Run – March 2015
- Source
Last week, as a portion of Operation Atlantic Resolve
ratcheted down in the Baltic nations, Operation Dragoon Run was launched, featuring a convoy
of 120 armored vehicles and over 500 American soldiers barreling down
highways in Eastern and Central Europe back to their home base in Vilseck,
Germany. While Atlantic Resolve is
focused on improving NATO interoperability and demonstrating solidarity with US
allies, Dragoon Run tested the 2nd Cavalry’s ability to, as Stripes
puts it, “conduct a long and complex movement, with troops rambling along
small country roads and major highways.”
Additionally, it presented an opportunity for photo ops with local
townspeople, who may have never seen American soldiers and their equipment with their own eyes. Despite the widespread protests
that Russian media expected, Reuters reported that in the Czech Republic, most
locals on the streets celebrated
the Americans’ presence.
At the heart of the matter, the US is interested in
expressing her solidarity with her NATO allies, especially those new members
who experienced Russian (then Soviet) occupation in Central and Eastern
Europe. A key strategic issue is the
vulnerability of the three Baltic nations.
Since the shenanigans in Ukraine, many commentators have expressed
concern that the Baltics are next and that the Kremlin will decide to test NATO
by sending “polite green men” into Estonia or Latvia. They ignore many reasons that this would be a
poor decision by President Putin. From my
perspective, the cards are stacked against Russia if she were to eye the
Baltics as her next territorial acquisition.
Hostile Natives
Any Russian military endeavors with territorial intent would
be much more costly for the Kremlin in the case of the Baltics rather than in
the Donbass. The cultural memory of Soviet
occupation remains fresh in the Balts’ cultural consciousness. While the Russian military dwarfs all three
Baltic states’ forces conventionally, guerrilla insurgency, targeted attacks,
and allied reinforcements would be the primary method of Baltic
opposition.
Commentators have oftentimes entertained a scenario a-la the
Crimean seizure method, where “polite green men” would arrive and “protect” the
ethnic Russian populations within Baltic territory. This is inherently a false assumption, and
not only due to the NATO membership of the Baltics. Ethnic Russian residents in Narva, Estonia
can just as easily travel across the Russian border to view the nearby city of
Ivangorod to see what societal benefits are waiting for them under Kremlin
control. The city resembles a typical,
regional Russian settlement where unemployment is high, infrastructure is
crumbling, and institutions are weak. Despite
not being true Estonian citizens, grey-passport-holding ethnic Russians
enjoy Schengen zone visa benefits in addition to visa-free travel to Russia and
CIS nations. It is likely that polite
green men would not be welcomed by their ethnic compatriots in quite the same
manner they were in Sevastopol.
To borrow a phrase from Timothy Snyder, the Baltics’
location in the historic bloodlands as small, sparsely populated nations has
cultivated a historical tradition of unconventional military resistance against
larger, more conventionally powerful invaders.
The Lithuanian resistance to Soviet occupation is a prime historical
example of this. By largely not joining
the Germans in their 1941 march eastward like many Latvians and Estonians,
Lithuania retained its pool of young men.
Following the Soviet re-capture of the territory, these young men
ventured into the forests in the thousands to begin a nearly ten year
resistance to Soviet control. Despite
being untrained and loosely commanded, they ensured that Lithuania remained
designated a “zone of active conflict” by the Politburo, thus dissuading Russian
settlers and contributing to Lithuania having the smallest percentage of ethnic
Russians out of all the Baltic states today.
The Lithuanian Ministry of Defense holds insurgency as a primary aspect
of doctrine today. The challenge for the
Russians would not be in taking the region, but in holding it.
Breakdown of ethnic Russians in the Baltic states by region - Source
The NATO Factor
With the Russian economy failing due to a myriad of factors,
such as low oil prices and economic sanctions, a direct conflict with NATO is
not in the Kremlin’s interests. Per Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty, any attack on the Baltic states would be considered an
attack against all NATO members. With
NATO scrambling to remember its founding mission as an anti-Soviet and
anti-Russian alliance, now would be a poor time to test her commitment to Article
5. It’s unlikely that the world will witness
an attack on a NATO member in the short term.
However, it’s not unreasonable to speculate that a hypothetically weaker
NATO may be attacked in the future.
Trends are not complicit in this view.
If anything, NATO is growing stronger in light of this new threat to
European security.
Is it worth it, Vova?
Despite the potential challenges and costs for the Kremlin,
there are plenty of reasons for Russia to take the Baltics. As Russia remains primarily landlocked with
the exception of easily-denied ocean access, having the Baltic coast would open
up a large swath of valuable land to be exploited for naval purposes. Additionally, more buffer space from
potential adversaries is always welcomed in the Russian security realm. Kaliningrad (formerly Konigsburg) may finally
get the chance to become contiguous to the motherland. Many of these benefits would be largely
nullified by the economic costs of the military operations and international
condemnation, isolation, and potentially intervention. Many commentators also float the hypothesis
that much of the recent Russian revanchism is due to pressure on President
Putin domestically. Despite his
authoritarian control of the security services in the country, it’s unlikely
that he would survive as a political force following an outbreak of military
confrontation with NATO and the west over the Baltics. Additionally, once the returning bodybags
are in such numbers that state media cannot ignore, President Putin’s
grassroots public support will likely degrade.
As we live in a chaotic world, these factors can change both
in the short as well as the long term; however I don’t lose any sleep over the
threat to the Baltics just yet. That
isn’t to say that this opportunity to re-invigorate NATO should be squandered,
quite the opposite, it should be taken advantage of.
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