How do the Russian Armed Forces express jointness?

We've seen a resurgent Russian military in Syria in the last few years, and they seem to be notably more effective than the team we saw in Georgia and Chechnya. They have new weapons for sure, but there is also performance that reflects a new training structure that leverages effective joint operations. Did they have a Goldwater-Nichols moment? Well, sorta.

General Staff

The Army's Foreign Military Service Office (FMSO) produced an e-book in 2017 called The Russian Way of War (PDF) which is one of the only documents I've found that explores Russian inter-service cooperation thoroughly. According to the authors Dr. Lester Grau and Charles Bartles, Russian command and control has jointness baked-in. They write:

Unlike the U.S. military, officers do not rotate through “joint” assignments. In the Russian system, “joint” matters, such as operational-strategic level planning and capabilities and doctrine development, are handled exclusively by General Staff personnel...Since matters of military doctrine and procurement are decided by the General Staff, it is considered essential that officers break their fixation with their branch of service (Ground Forces, Navy, Air Force, etc.) and branch of arms (infantry, armor, artillery, etc.) in order to avoid the 'trade union mentality' that hinders military doctrine and procurement matters in Western armies.

The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency's 2017 report on Russian military power confirms the FMSO report, adding that this design is intended to speed up decision-making and enable joint operations. It invites the question if jointness exists in the upper command hierarchy, why didn't the Soviet Armed Forces have joint operations commands below them?

Reform

Russian Armed Forces began to truly recognize a need for restructuring almost immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, but efforts to modernize have taken decades. Informed by painful experiences in Chechnya and Georgia, real discussion of reform doesn't really take off until 2008 when unpopular Russian Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdukov announces "New Look." The irony of this name should not be lost on this blog's readership.  Some of Serdukov's proposals came into place in 2010; such as the conversion of military districts into operational-strategic commands (OSKs). Momentum for the reform would take-off when Sergei Shoigu became Defense Minister in 2012.
Serdyukov worked closely with Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov on a wide body of reforms focused on "greater mobility, eliminating mass mobilization in exchange for higher levels of constant readiness, and improving inter-service coordination." Much like the US, Russia realized in battle situations that cooperation between services was weak and was hampering their effectiveness on the battlefield. A number of sources that have studied Russian operations in Syria say that the jointness is much improved over 2008. Russian military reform is still underway, and the fight in Syria is being observed by some as a sandbox for playing out how this "new look" is, um, looking.

OSKs

In 2010 as part of the overall reform package, they converted their six "military districts" into four OSKs based on geographical regions. These are similar in nature to U.S. Combatant Commands. The name for the western region "Zapad" ought to look familiar as well. The military exercises that US media was obsessed with last year are one of the four that happened as part of ongoing readiness training. A fifth joint strategic command was added in 2015 in recognition of the Arctic as an emerging battlespace.  The new structure means that units assigned to these regions train for joint-defense of that particular battlespace.

Russian OSKs. (Grau and Bartles, p28)

Syria

Operations in Syria provide evidence of Russian operational jointness. The SU-25 Frogfoot lost in Maasran is the Russian aircraft designed for close air support. Other attack aircraft were likely used to clear the way: bombing fixed targets, weapons caches, and command/control points of the opposition. There are numerous videos showing Russian helicopters attacking targets, likely in a close-air-support role for Iranian-backed militias. The Black Sea Fleet provided sea-lift for base-protection troops and the missile cruiser Moskva as a platform for the fearsome S-300 air defense system to back the CAS mission.
It appears that the broad reforms started 15 years ago are beginning to show fruit. While some of the more futuristic and surprising capabilities of a reformed army make the news (UAVs and cyber), it should come as no surprise that the grandchildren of "Deep Battle" understand how to modernize and institutionalize inter-service integration.

How Arabs Could Win Wars

     Arabs are not very good at winning wars. That article is rather old by this point, but it nevertheless stands that many Arab states have a major problem which kills their effectiveness: culture. Senior officers neither trust nor empower their junior officers, who neither trust nor empower the enlisted men to complete missions. For their part, the enlisted men do not trust the officers to watch out for them. Each group hates the other, and both are more concerned with preserving their own safety than the mission. The Arab states cannot simply buy their way out of this problem.

     The solution to this problem is to remake the culture of the military in the Arab states. If there is any degree of class system present in the state, the government should establish the military as an elite, selective class.

1. Improve the material conditions of the military. The enlisted men should be fed well, paid on time and not treated like incompetent cannon fodder (this will take longer to achieve than the first two.
2. Develop a culture and traditions within the military separate from the rest of society.
3. Launch an advertisement campaign to romanticize life in the military and increase volunteer rates.
4. If possible, be selective when accepting recruits. The military should be both desirable and exclusive.
5. The military should develop the belief within itself that it is an elite class in society.

     If the citizenry views the entire military as an elite class, it is possible that the officers would view the enlisted men less as peasants or cannon fodder and more as soldiers to be trusted. If the military was a better long term profession for enlisted men, we should see more soldiers stay in past the initial enlistment or conscription period, which would help to establish an NCO corps. Of course, the Arab states would need to take more steps to empower junior officers and NCO’s which might not be initially solved by such a cultural shift.

     Presently, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Eremites are attempting to build a better civil society. That is an incredible task and it could also indirectly improve military performance. However, there is a strong chance that they will not succeed; a more focused approach would be better. This suggestion would not be easy; however, it is the best solution to a problem that cannot be solved with money alone.

Humanitarian Military: An Oxymoron?

It almost seems like an oxymoron- a military that delivers humanitarian aid? What sort of world do we live in? However, one of the things many militaries do, around the world and across state types is send in the military as a response to a humanitarian disaster.

This is exactly what the US, Canada, and India are currently doing to respond to the earthquake in Nepal. A US military plane departed for Nepal with 70 people and 45 tons of cargo on board on April 26th. All of these personnel were not military members, some were from a USAID disaster assistance response team. Canada's military Disaster Assistance Response Team was sent to help.  India sent 13 planes filled with supplies and disaster management specialists. Specifically, the Inidian planes carried 3 army field hospitals. Even the Nepalese troops are involved in search and rescue, with Nepal claiming that 9 out of 10 soldiers were focusing on the earthquake. A further collection of who is sending what is available here. In fact, reading through that you are struck my the list- it is almost entirely military personnel and equipment flowing in- even most of the doctors are military doctors.

The Nepalese government's Chief Secretary, Lila Mani Poudyal, said his country was short of medical teams and relief materials, including "tents, dry goods, blankets, mattresses and 80 different medicines".(BBC)

So why is this? As The New York Times reports- Nepal had only one big helicopter in a "poor, near-roadless, mountainous land." Is it because the military is the arm of the government who is most able to respond quickly? Are they the only ones who are capable of responding to such a disaster? While some of the equipment is there to evacuate their respective countries citizens, most is meant to stay and help the Nepalese.



The answer in part is "yes" to all of the above questions. The military, in most countries, is the most able to respond quickly. They also have some of the best trained in field medicine and disaster response. Some even argue that there is an expectation that military units will assist civilian population in immediate aftermath. In some part this assistance is purely logistical. The military has the training and supplies to provide this support. And the civilian government often wants the military's experience in maintaining communication and authority in difficult situations.

Also, the governments who send military aid face an increase in political capital internationally. If a country doesn't launch a response that the world sees as related to its status in the world- it will face criticism for a lack of response. Further the UN even has a Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord) which facilitates dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors that helps to facilitate coordination and humanitarian response.

There can be negatives to large amounts of aid pouring into a country (see Haiti post earthquake), thus the military humanitarian aid has the potential to be a source of quality, quick, responsive aid to the needs of the population. Rather than an oxymoron, people should be asking why don't they do more?

Want to donate to Nepal? Look here for reputable organizations.

A European Union Military?

There have recently been calls for a more robust EU joint defense, to go so far as to have an EU military. The EU does not have a joint military- a military that is staffed and run on a supranational level.

Currently the EU member states cooperate between themselves and with outside alliances. Cooperation within the EU takes places under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) which entered into force with the Treaty of Lisbon.In addition, 22 of 28 EU member states are part of NATO.

This creates a difficult security environment, one that does not have many successes (ex: the Balkans, many African cases, almost anywhere the EU has wanted to interfere).   Many states are against the idea of an supranational EU military, but others are for it. With the problems of Germany's military to the lack of 2% of GDP to their military that many NATO states don't contribute, an EU military is an alternative.

On March 8, 2015 the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker called for an EU military to help the world take the EU seriously. Further he advocated that “A common army among the Europeans would convey to Russia that we are serious about defending the values of the European Union.” His arguments also included that it would be more efficient to have a common military than each state paying to maintain it separately.

There was immediate backlash from the UK. Both the opposition and ruling party voiced their immediate displeasure with David Cameron (British Prime Minister) going so far as to say “it isn’t right for the European Union to have capabilities, armies, air forces and all the rest of it”. The next day Finland said that an EU army is "unrealistic," however the Foreign Minister said that an army composed of joint military units would be more possible. In addition, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia insist upon utilizing NATO rather than an EU military.

This is compared to Germany, whose defense minister stated that  “our future as Europeans will one day be a European army." France has also expressed support for the idea.

Javier Solana (former NATO secretary general) and Steven Blockmans (professor at University of Amsterdam) have pointed out that the EU's treaties allow for a common military. They argue that there are political, military, and economic benefits to creating a single EU military: "Member states could achieve much more value for money than the €190 billion that they spend to keep up 28 national armies."

Where John Schindler (former National Security Agency official), argues against creating an EU army because Europe already mismanages it military forces, so pooling them is a really bad idea. Further, he argues, many defense projects are already coordinated and European-wide projects so duplicating these things is not needed.

The Bigger Picture

However, this debate is not just about having an EU military or not having one. Rather it is on the future of the EU as a Union of European States or a Union of European States. If the 28 member states of the European Union want to create a full supranational union that has political, economic, and military power they will need to move forward on creating a single European military rather than simply coordinating their military.  If they want to stay as they are, with some cooperation in all areas but no real full integration, then an EU military is not needed.

As Solana and Blockmans pointed out, the EU has always been forged in crisis and the EU is facing a crisis now (think of them essentially being surrounded by conflict).

Whatever decision the EU makes on creating a military, and it is looking increasingly less and less likely, it will be a step down a road that precludes the other option (at least until another crisis or a widespread change of national governments).

The Red Baron and EBO

The other day was the anniversary of the death of Baron Manfred Von Richthofen, better known as the Red Baron. Unlike the History Channel, I do not get wrapped up in romanticizing enemies. I thought it was worth addressing this in conjunction with how the Libya situation is hopefully de-romanticizing the mythical revolution in military affairs, specifically that our country cannot merely rely on airpower as a strategy.

The revolution of military affairs led military strategists to rely on “effects based operations” (EBO) that assumed that precision guided attacks focused on centers of gravity would allow us to force the enemy to do our bidding. This assumed that technological innovation would lift the fog of war by providing a clear picture of the enemy situation. In short, EBO is enticing to the Air Force because of an overwhelming reliance on mathematical analytics…changing warfare from a “an art to a science.” This article is the best I’ve seen that captures the issues with EBO.

The Libya situation makes clear some of the issues with EBO. Namely, strategists and campaigners cannot assume that they know how their actions will “affect” the enemy. Early in fight, when it became clear that the “No Fly Zone” was a little bit more, Qaddafi’s forces began shedding uniforms, using civilian vehicles, and hiding among the population. These actions likely forecast what future enemy forces will do in the face of an American assault, and should accentuate the concept that we must fight for intelligence and develop the situation while in contact with the enemy. The Army seems to have grasped this, as seen in their Army Capstone Concept, in the wake of works like this one by old Army Officers.

The biggest hope should be that we learn the right lessons from this conflict. Hopefully from an ending that involves a Qaddafi-less Libya. Specifically…this war will not have been won by airpower.
It will require aggressive and thrifty maneuvers on the part of the rebels, with secure lines of logistics, and an iron will in urban combat. Given Defense Secretary Gates’ recent remarks at the United States Military Academy at West Point, we should worry that our strategists will attempt (like the Kosovo example) to twist this into a victory for EBO-enthusiasts. Kind of like how historians made The Red Baron into more than just another enemy shot out of the sky. Better him than any more of ours.

What the Hell are We Doing!?

The other day, the Obama Administration decided that the pressure from the international community, namely the UN and the Arab League, was too much for him not to pursue military action in the Libya situation. With this "no fly zone," the administration has fallen into the trap of believing that detached operations from aerial platforms can effect lasting strategic change. The administration struggles to answer what the endstate in Libya looks like. I thought we should expand on this for them.

First, we should understand (as best as we can) what we are committed to.
- We want Qadaffi gone, but AFRICOM, at least on the low side, is not allowed to kill him.
- Some have admitted that a Libya with Qadaffi is still a possibility.
- We are supporting an unknown "rebel" entity that has no clear leader or political organization that is prepared to take control of the country once "regime change" happens.
- We got into this now instead of before, because........
- The Arab League originally supported a "no fly zone" but not they are wobbling
- Russia is laughing at us. But Putin is an idiot.
- We are going to "hand this over" ASAP

Someone studying strategy would consider what the end of this thing looks like. So lets...

Those thinking about this in the administration are likely praying for an Egypt-type scenario where the Libyan military, with overwhelming support by the Libyan people, turns against Qaddafi and he is run out of town. Somehow there is a smooth transition to an interim government, followed by steps toward elections. Since this same military was just shelling its people, I don't see it happening, but you never know... Though the Eqypt solution still isn't even clear in Egypt, we will call that the absolute best case scenario.

More likely to happen in this case is that if Qaddafi is killed or run out of town and retaliatory acts ignite in a lawless land. This will result in complete state failure, a la Somalia. What then? The international community will be hard-pressed to stand idly by while the country implodes, since military action contributed to this state. Someone, therefore will have to commit Stability and Support personnel into the country that will help stand up a new Libya. The uncertain security situation will likely demand some sort of military personnel and "they" will look to the US for money and/or troops. Regime change was our mission in Iraq, and that is what this outcome resembles.

Considering the process before Qaddafi falls...our "humanitarian effort" right now is designed to establish a no fly zone to prevent Qaddafi from massacring somebody. If the rebel forces restart their offensive and start getting whacked by the Libyan Army again, what will we do? An idea...lets identify a leader in the resistence that has a reasonable amount of political clout and may be able to run the country. We can embed special forces with this guy and have them call in Close Air Support until the regime falls. Oh wait....we did this....that guy's name was Karzai.

Now...if Qaddafi doesn't fall. He can rightly declare victory against basically the entire world. Does this matter? Maybe, maybe not. I believe that it will place in doubt other country's belief in America's resolve. President Obama will almost certainly not be reelected.

Reality check:
- This "got real" to many when our first casualty, an F-15 (thankfully no humans were seriously wounded) crashed into "friendly" territory because of mechanical problems. Let's imagine for a second if this plane crashed where Qaddafi's goons got a hold of him.

Our recent lesson on the mythical RMA addresses this situation very well. Despite the Army Operational Concept - the product of a lengthy project that considered the fundamental fallacy of the RMA - some among our higher brass are still convinced that the technology advances in recent decades have lifted the fog of war and allowed us to execute decisive action using PGMs (precision guided munitions) and no BOGs (boots on the ground). BG McMaster discussed in a teleconference with the COIN class this week how Iraq and Afghanistan have proven this.

To be clear - I want the US / Obama to "win" this thing. I just don't know what that means. Unfortunatly, the only good solution I see is someone (hopefully not the US) conducting Iraq-like Stability and Support Operations in Libya. Hopefully they will quell the insurgency (because there will be one) early with the lessons that we've learned over the last 11 years.

Military Effectiveness – now for pwning noobs! 1337!

Recently, much has been made of the convergence of consumer electronics and the world’s militaries. The iPod is an increasingly common part of the kit a soldier must lug around, acting as translator, weapons training, and perhaps occasionally, a form of entertainment. Xbox controllers have been modified to control UAVs. Recognizing the collusion between military and consumer industries yields benefits both in the fields and in budgetary spreadsheets, the recent 2010 QDR calls for the Department of Defense to “broaden and deepen relationships with other nations and private firms to create mutually beneficial partnerships to share capabilities, systems, technology, and personnel, while ensuring that we also protect sensitive sources and methods.”

This focus on harnessing the innovative power of the private sector is not unique to the DoD. To ease the burden of refocusing our nation’s space program, NASA is to have greater cooperation with private rocket developers. I hear our nuclear stockpile is need of modernization, perhaps we can get some private firms on that too, while we’re at it.

And yet little has been made of some basic elements of military effectiveness working their way back into consumer culture. Specifically, the current generation of war-themed video games has required players to—at least subconsciously—take into consideration the elements key to military effectiveness in order to succeed. Players, primarily males aged 12-30, are passively learning what is necessary for a successful military engagement by nights spent on games like Modern Warfare 2 or MAG.

Scenarios in war games are moving further and further away from simple “run n’ gun” deathmatch action in favor of more objective-based game types where players must work together to hold points, plant explosives, or establish a headquarters. Clans—teams that practice and play competitively against other clans together online—tend to work out specific roles for each player in order to operate more efficiently in securing objective. War games ever since Counter-Strike have required a team to balance themselves with different weapons and capabilities to improve their chances of victory. Snipers and machine gunners lay down suppressive fire so that light infantry may advance. Players with riot shields may take the place of armor, punching through enemy lines and providing cover for an advance of infantry. A well-balanced team thus replicates the technical skills and weapons handling necessary for success in the real field.

But things have become even more complex. With the advent of headsets (by no means a recent occurrence), information sharing has made the dominance of teams even greater. With the ability to identify and communicate the state of targets or the placement of enemy weapons and personnel, the cohesive team will make short work of casual gamers paired with strangers. Unit cohesion is key, as those that move systematically together on a target are the most likely to take it. In most games, players in close proximity will make recorded announcements that they are throwing a flashbang, reloading, or have taken down an enemy. Elements of the heads up display (HUD) such as radar showing target, enemy, and friendly locations, a running scoreboard, and the amount of ammunition available are a vital source of (albeit unrealistic) information for players. Anyone who has suffered an enemy EMP in Modern Warfare 2 can attest to what an impact the loss of this information can have on players.

Games have been seeking greater integration of different weapons systems, with the ability to call in airstrikes, use UAV missiles, or even call in a game-ending tactical nuke. The more arcade-style Battlefield series allows players to hop from airplane to landing craft to tank to anti-aircraft gun. The integration of these weapons systems has proven unrealistic and rather clumsy, often as a reward for success in the field. Similarly, the ranks players earn through taking checkpoints or killing opponents have had little relevance in the actual heat of battle.

But that appears to be changing. The new Playstation 3 game MAG allows battles of up to 256 players on massive online maps. There are objectives to be held, but other strong points such as pillboxes must be held or destroyed in order to make victory possible. To manage this mass of digital humanity, the game’s designers have made tactical leadership central to the game. Before each match, players interested in an officer’s position may enter their name in the running. Units of eight are each assigned an officer who decides what targets the unit should go after, and based on unit performance may earn the right to call in air strikes or other support. Though it may seem that players would quickly ignore their officer’s commands those that stay close to their leader get benefits such as faster reloading and greater accuracy, providing an incentive for greater tactical play.

As the games support ever larger fields of players, it seems that this sort of tactical leadership will have to be expanded, perhaps to the level of actual generalship where a few players get to decide the overall strategy the lower officers must pursue. Whether this will prove enticing to casual gamers such as myself remains to be seen. Nevertheless, it is interesting that both game developers and players are quickly realizing that basic rules of military effectiveness—unit cohesion, information management, tactical leadership, and perhaps even one day generalship—are just as vital to victory in the virtual world as they are on our modern battlefields. Perhaps greater cooperation between industry and the military will prove better for all involved (it is worth noting that the Navy SEALS have provided technical advice to both the Modern Warfare and SOCOM series). Let’s just hope no one in the field decides a tactical nuke after a twenty-five kill streak is actually a good idea.

Great Britain: America's Fightin' Buddy or Just a Little Brother?

This post is written in response to the article "Britain's Armed Forces: Losing Their Way?" in this week's Economist.

The article emphasizes two main points: 1) Britain's army (conventional ground forces) are undermanned and under supplied and are likely to remain that way for the foreseeable future, and 2) this has led to friction between US and English forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

As aptly started by a former Bush administration official, there is "a lot of concern on the US side about whether we are going to have an ally with the capability and willingness to be in the fight with us."

Given these developments, what should be America's policy toward our most reliable ally - an ally who might not have sufficient military capabilities to be useful in the future? This is a question that must be addressed now before America is in the heat of battle and only then realizes that its pub brawling partner has turned into a little brother who can't contribute to the fight and must instead be protected. America, the Michael Jordan of the world's military forces, doesn't want to go into battle thinking that Scottie Pippin is in the wings waiting to shoot the trey only to realize that a middle school b-ball beginner stands in his place.

The article details the 2006 counter-insurgency manual developed by American forces which eventually led to the military surge in Iraq. The theme for the manual was "clear-hold-build," and this same strategy should be deploy for strengthening military and political ties between the US and England.

First, American and British forces need to clear away any sour feelings that have arisen because of miscommunication and misunderstood strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The article seems to indicate that it is time for American commanders to speak publicly about British failures on these two fronts. But what would this accomplish? There is no need to kick an opponent while he’s down, much less turning from the fight in front of you to hit your partner behind you. The US and England need to better coordinate their military efforts in the future and have clear policy objectives that are understood by both sides, not fight about who did (or didn’t) do what in the past.

Second, I believe that America could incentivize the English to truly place an emphasis on revamping its ground forces by holding out its hand to other allies. If the British feel that America is searching for a new partner, then it will be incentivized to make sure that it doesn’t find one. Britain derives many benefits from being the US’s closest ally (mainly intelligence sharing and nuclear arsenal support) and placing those benefits on the line would make England work harder to secure them. I don’t honestly believe that America would ever cut-and-run on the British in this way, but talk of it might be enough to light a fire under the Union Jack and put it into action.

Finally, America needs to help Britain build (or rebuild) its conventional ground forces. It appears from the article that the English have plans for expanding and improving both naval and air forces, but that the army will receive “less than 10% of all spending on defense equipment between 2003 and 2018.” I’m certainly not advocating that cargo ships begin heading toward England stocked full of M1-A1 tanks marked for delivery to Buckingham Palace, but I do believe that America has a vested interest in making sure that British ground forces are adequately supplied so that they can carry out their supporting role in American offensives. Perhaps America could provide cost-savings information to the Brits or even go into partnerships on the development of new army weaponry which would allow the English to restock at a lower price. I’m open to suggestions on this front.

Some of the views above can seem contradictory, but if mustered in a balanced way, they can be used to ensure that American and Britain continue to have a long, beautiful, and prosperous relationship.