The Army -- not just your parents -- is belatedly learning about smartphones.

This week we talked about efforts to improve "jointness."  As far as I can tell, improvements in networked communications is the most important factor (aside from maybe cultural or institutional changes that might force jointness).  As Dr. Farley pointed out, when you have Marines and Army units not just unwilling but actually unable to communicate with each other as happened in Grenada, you've got problems.  So in this post I want to focus on one new piece of technology that might help improve communications -- Nett Warrior.  Here's a description of the technology.

The Nett Warrior (NW) is an integrated dismounted leader situational awareness (SA) system for use during combat operations. The system provides unparalleled SA to the dismounted leader, allowing for faster and more accurate decisions in the tactical fight. With advanced navigation, SA, and information sharing capabilities, leaders are able to avoid fratricide and are more effective and more lethal in the execution of their combat missions.

The NW program focuses on the development of the SA system, which has the ability to graphically display the location of an individual leader’s location on a digital geo-referenced map image. Additional Soldier and leader locations are also displayed on the hands-free digital display. NW is connected through a secure radio that will send and receive information from one NW to another, thus connecting the dismounted leader to the network. These radios will also connect the equipped leader to higher echelon data and information products to assist in decision making and situational understanding. Soldier position location information will be added to the network via interoperability with the Army’s Rifleman Radio capability. All of this will allow the leader to easily see, understand, and interact in the method that best suits the user and the particular mission. NW will employ a system-of-systems approach, optimizing and integrating capabilities while reducing the Soldier’s combat load and logistical footprint.

But let's back up a bit.  The Army has been trying, and failing, to develop something similar for years.  The first iteration was the Future Force Warrior (FFW).  (Note, this program has changed names numerous times; it was also called Land Warrior.  For more information about Land Warrior, check out this website.)

"The primary objective for FFW . . . was to demonstrate and confirm Soldier/SCU interoperability with the Army's Future Force communication network and the integration of the Soldier Radio Waveform into our FFW system." says Fitzgerald "We were able to accomplish this goal, while also running our system alongside the Future Force prototype and surrogate systems, fully integrated into the battle network of the exercise. This network interoperability allows soldiers to transmit voice and data, both with each other and with other units, greatly enhancing the situational awareness and combat effectiveness of our soldiers at a time when it is most needed."

The technology, however, was bulky, heavy, cumbersome -- and soldiers hated it.

But as Alpha kicks in doors, rounds up terror suspects and peals off automatic fire in deafening six-shot bursts, not one of the soldiers bothers to check his radio or look into the eyepiece to find his buddies on the electronic maps. "It's just a bunch of stuff we don't use, taking the place of useful stuff like guns," says Sgt. James Young, who leads a team of four M-240 machine-gunners perched on a balcony during this training exercise at Fort Lewis, Wash. "It makes you a slower, heavier target." 

The system weighed up to 16 pounds (a ridiculous addition given how much they already carry), had large hardware components, wires going everywhere, and, maybe more consequentially, added "stuff" onto the soldier's M-4 rifle that they never used.  A camera connected to the barrel of their gun allowed them to see around corners, which they found out was less useful in real combat scenarios.

The Army likes the potential of this technology because it integrates individual soldiers into the networked battle space.  Blue Force Tracking is a system that allows commanders and squad leaders to know where other units are, primarily by identifying certain vehicles via GPS on a map.  But the Army wanted to integrate individual soldiers into the Blue Force Tracking system via Future Force Warrior (just like in Ghost Recon!!!).  Again, the problem was soldiers hated the system.

The Army tried to kill the program (but killing things is harder than scaling them down until you can ramp them back up).  Enter . . . the smartphone revolution!  The computing power of today's smartphones is infinitely greater than anything prior to 2000.  So, after a quick name change (now the program is called Nett Warrior, named after a Medal of Honor recipient), the Army began experimenting with modified all-the-shelf technology, namely Android smartphones.  The new Nett Warrior device will use the Rifleman Radio to connect each soldier to the Blue Force Tracking system (hurray!), provide realtime GPS info for every soldier, and send pictures/video/text messages all on an encrypted system.  The technology won't be connected to a 3G/4G network because, well, we don't fight in places where those exist, and even if we did we would probably take them out to prevent the enemy from using it.  Connecting to the Rifleman Radio provides the data connection and encryption capability.

It appears the Army is beta testing the new design in live combat operations.  

If soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division happen to be on patrol in Afghanistan later this year and need support, they can probably just Google it. 

That's because they will be the first to get all kinds of high-tech gear: radios, smartphones, and wirelessly-networked vehicles, according to Watertown YNN. 

"In many places, we're so far removed," Col. Walter Platt told YNN. "We're using hand and arm signals and old FM communication much like we did in World War II." 

The centerpiece of the technology push is with Android smartphones, such as the Motorola Atrix, which will be issued to every soldier. 

This new platform is important for future combat for a variety of reasons.  First it individualizes

Blue Force Tracking.  The system we had in 2003 helped prevent fratricide and speed our advance to Baghdad.  But it only provided general locations for units (i.e. the squad vehicle).  When dismounted, soldiers can be spread out, but this new Nett Warrior system will help keep track of every dismounted soldier.  Moreover, it could provide key intelligence to commanders if a soldier happens to be kidnapped in battle.  Second, it Keeps It Simple Stupid.  Previous models were too bulky and added features that just got in the way.  Soldiers didn't need to see around walls.  They needed a simple solution that provided key benefits.  Third, most new soldiers already have experience with this technology -- who doesn't have an iPhone?!  The apps on this system are similar in kind (though not in substance) to those currently in commercial use.  Fourth, the benefits are great.  Being able to stream drone footage or pictures, send specific (clear) orders to disparate units, and provide accurate geospatial information to each soldier (and combined services) will greatly enhance our fighting capabilities.  In other words, this system dramatically improves situational awareness on the battlefield through a simple, efficient solution.

And upgrading this system will be easy.  I can imagine different versions for, say, squad leaders that might need a little bit larger screens to run different applications.  I can imagine a scenario like this:  a Stryker Brigade is raiding an urban area, the squad is dismounted and the squad leader is watching his unit move through the town on his Nett Warrior system via GPS.  So he is literally looking at a map of the town and seeing blue dots move.  He can then cycle to an app that provides real-time video from an overhead drone (or maybe a miniaturized one that lives with his Stryker, like the new Black Hornets).  Then, say he wants to send specific information to one group, he looks at his platform (zooms in if needed) circles a specific group of blue dots and a menu of options pops up ("Send Text" "Send Picture" "Stream Video" "Talk").  And he does what he wants.  Depending on the quality of the microphone piece, the system could benefit from talk-to-text software as well, freeing soldiers' hands from having to type messages.  That would allow greater flexibility for soldiers taking fire.   And as the commercial sector (I'm looking at you Google!) perfects an eyepiece component, I could see that being added to this system as well -- in essence, a mini version of the F-35 helmet display.

I jokingly (ok, maybe seriously) say that if I can't do it on my iPhone, I won't do it.  (Heck, even the University of Kentucky has an app that let's you schedule classes and pay tuition!!!)  The commercial sector has provided enormous value to consumers through mobile and tablet technology.  I'm glad to see the military is now figuring it out.  I'm sure there are kinks to work out with the Nett Warrior system, but at least it's a step in the right direction.

Deterrence and asymmetry in orbit and cyberspace

Recent North Korean provocations have swung the world's gaze towards issues of nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles that have traditionally reigned supreme over the discourse of deterrence and (hypothetical) post-WWII great-power warfare. Despite this renewed focus more plausible realms of conflict, namely in the major inter- and intra-national computer networks and in Earth orbit, deserve more attention from deterrence theorists, if only because the probability of significant cyberwar or anti-satellite operations remain substantially more probable than even the nuclear offensive of a rogue state.

The potential damage of large-scale cyber or space conflict remains difficult to determine, largely because digitization and the use of orbital satellites on a large scale represent relatively new commercial realities and the world has never had to deal with one (or all) of the advanced economies suddenly losing Internet access or GPS coverage. Nonetheless the reliance on orbital imaging and digitized networks for both commercial supply chains and military command and control imply a tremendous and difficult to unwind reliance on space and cyber assets in the 21st century. As a result a straight-forward analysis of the basic asymmetries of modern space and cyber deterrence seems in order.

Space deterrence relies on the currently prohibitive costs of space-launch technology. Deterring a non-space power remains a trivial concern because without orbital launch technologies attacking a space-based power's orbital systems is essentially impossible (barring some massive advances in lasers or other direct-energy weapons).  Similarly mature space powers have each other in a natural deterrence posture; all space powers can directly threaten the satellites of all other space-faring countries and rely intensely on their own satellite systems in times of war as well as peace, while the anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons of any one state will inevitably generate debris that harm all others. As a result hesitance to engage in first use (advantages are fleeting) and a willingness to join in cartel-like behavior to minimize ASAT use (in order to minimize externalities).

Unfortunately a major transition zone exists between non-space powers and their mature counterparts. These transitional countries, arguably including the People's Republic of China and potentially soon including North Korea and Iran, do not intensely rely on orbital systems yet possess the ability to place payloads in orbit with reasonable reliability. This allows for a first-use mentality (there's little to lose and potentially much to gain) while auguring for a "spoiler" mentality in space-weapons limitation efforts (why protect the prerogatives of relative hegemons?). This critical juncture occupied by rising space powers, particularly if they feel threatened by established space-faring states, threatens the stability of orbital access due to the destabilizing structural tendency to ASAT first strikes in the event of conflict. 

Space weapons are ferociously difficult to assess due to the fact that no two nations with major orbital operations have ever entered a formal shooting war with one another. Cyber weapons escalate these complications to an enormous degree because of vastly lower barriers to entry, increased difficulty of attribution, and a vastly wider and more complicated array of potential targets. As a result a fuller examination of cyber deterrence (and the difficulties therein) awaits future posts. 

...And Gun Running Just Became Less Fun (if only slightly)

Delegates at the United Nations applaud the passage of the UN Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty.

Yesterday the United Nations voted overwhelmingly in favor of a treaty designed to begin a system of regulating the global weapons trade business. This treaty comes after seven years of laborious negotiations, and upon its implementation, it will seek to link arms sales to the human rights records of buyers.

The General Assembly voted 154 to 3 in favor of the treaty with 23 abstentions, largely from nations like Bolivia, China, Cuba, India, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Russia, Sri Lanka, and Venezuela that are well known for their dubious human rights behavior. The three countries who voted 'no', unsurprisingly, were Iran, North Korea, and Syria. Support for the treaty was particularly strong among the African delegations, as their home countries have often had their histories defined by bloody conflicts stemming from the relatively easy access to weapons that rebel groups have traditionally had.

The Treaty will go into effect 90 days after fifty countries have signed onto it. Given it's overwhelming support, many diplomats expect this to take place within the next two to three years, which is quite fast for an international treaty of this sort. The odds of the United States being one of those countries are expected to be quite slim.

The weapons trade is a bustling $70 billion per year industry that is tied strongly to the deaths of tens of thousands of people in violent conflicts all over the world. In part, it aims to make it more difficult for situations to arise like the present one with Russian and Syria, in which Russia argues that its arms sales to the embattled Syrian government are legal under international law because there is no arms embargo in place against the country. These arms sales have contributed to the deaths of over 70,000 Syrians in their ongoing civil war.

Syrian ambassador to the United Nations Bashar al-Jaafari speaking at the UN yesterday.

Sales would have to be evaluated based on whether or not the weapons will be used by the buyer to break humanitarian law, foment genocide, commit war crimes, abet terrorism or organized crime, or slaughter women and children. If enacted, the treaty would ban sales outright to countries who would engage in any of the above activities, but in practice it is expected to cut off arms to international pariahs, namely countries such as the three that voted 'no'.

The treaty's chances of ratification in/by the United States are not good, as the exceptionally powerful gun lobby (led by the National Rifle Association) induced 50 senators to declare months ago that they would oppose the treaty, which is more than enough to defeat it. Nevertheless, in deference to American concerns, the preamble of the treaty specifies that the treaty is concerned with international sales, not domestic ones. The NRA, among other groups, will oppose the treaty's ratification anyway.

North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions

As the rhetoric ratchets up again on the Korean peninsula with talk of mobilization, attack, and counterattack, the time has come for the Obama administration to design a comprehensive plan for dealing with North Korea and its increasingly bellicose leader, Kim Jong-un.

Not so long ago a Korean crisis was a comparative rarity. These days, TV screens are filled with images of rockets and rhetoric describing potential “arcs of destruction”. Kim Jong-un is depicted surrounded by attentive military generals while he juggles phones and dusty computer equipment. Behind him is a map showing flight paths of missiles aimed at the United States. Hotlines have been cut, and the 1953 armistice has been discarded. Meanwhile, the United States flies in nuclear-capable bombers and fighter aircraft to South Korea, and the latter warns NK that provocation will be met with retaliation. None of these antics are necessarily new; however, the theater of it all has been more dramatic than usual.

Jong-un and ... Dennis Rodman?

Despite the absurdity (especially in the last two months) a substantive question remains: What can be done to break the cycle of sanctions and aggression between the United States and North Korea? Some predictable calls can be heard for the Obama administration to “engage” with the Kim regime. While logical sounding, the problem with pursuing such proposals is that they would merely convince Pyongyang that its “tried and true” strategy for winning favors still works. As previous U.S. administrations have learned the hard way, answering provocations with diplomacy will not lead to concessions by North Korea — only to another round of provocations.

What the Obama administration really needs is a new strategy for answering the provocations. Diplomacy hasn’t worked and neither has pressuring China to restrain the Kim regime. What has been effective are financial sanctions targeted at the ruling elite; the freezing of accounts in a Macau bank by the George W. Bush administration appeared to prompt paroxysms in Pyongyang. Although plenty of sanctions have been applied to North Korea, the U.S. Treasury could still do more to cut off relations between international banks and North Korea. Furthermore, the U.S. Treasury could ratchet up sanctions against North Korea’s Foreign Trade Bank and target individuals who are known to be complicit in supporting Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program.

Furthermore, the United States and South Korea ought to answer North Korea’s bellicose declarations with a public relations campaign of their own, calling the world’s attention to the horrific gulag system that enslaves an estimated 150,000 North Koreans. Mr. Kim should get the message that provocations will yield not rewards but greater pressure on his assets and international censure.

Evaluating Military Conflict with North Korea

The unbreakable alliance between China and North Korea that was "sealed with blood" during the Korean War is a relic of the Cold War during the height of communism.  What was once seen as a vital buffer zone between China and western influence on the Korean peninsula has become a buffer of questionable value given China's major shift in its trade relationship with the west and its moderating political ideologies over the past three decades.  The U.S. and South Korea each rank in China's top five trading partners with respect to both imports and exports.  The trade relationship China has with North Korea is relatively insignificant.  On the spectrum of political ideology China has also drifted away from the hardline socialist track maintained by North Korea by virtue of facilitating ever increasing economic relations with the west.  China does not support North Korea's nuclear weapons program, which places regional stability at risk, and cooperated with the other members of the UN security counsel in the most recent round of sanctions enacted in response to N. Korea's latest nuclear test.  China has recently mobilized military forces along the border with North Korea but the lack of a clear message of military support in opposition to South Korea or the U.S. may indicate preparations to regulate the flow of refugees into China in the event of military exchange on the Korean Peninsula rather than intervention on behalf of Pyongyang.

 

The North Korean regime is likely in the most fragile state that it has been in decades.  It's economy has steadily declined over the years as a result of poor management by central planners combined with increasingly painful sanctions imposed in response to its nuclear weapons program.  The costs of North Korea's nuclear program have come not only in the form of increased isolation from the global community but have also likely resulted in neglect of its conventional forces. With an estimated GDP of $40 billion North Korea's nuclear weapons program has likely forced painful budgetary sacrifices over the last decade especially if you consider the cost of the United States' development of a nuclear bomb (estimated at over $400 billion).  The death of Kim Jong Il and succession of his 28-year-old son Kim Jong Un also threatens the control of the Kim family regime which began following the Korean war with the reign of Kim Il Sung, the grandfather of Kim Jong Un.  While Kim Il Sung is deified in North Korea as the "Eternal President," adulation of his progeny has been less epic.  The recent provocations from the current regime whose cryptic propaganda videos have recently been circulating on YouTube aren't going very far in garnering external sympathy for Pyongyang, and make justifying any support China is still willing to offer to North Korea all the more difficult.

 

 

 

There are a number of wild cards that pose significant challenges to accurately predicting the direction this stand off will take.  Most notably, recent leadership changes in three of the principle states.  Kim Jong Un, the youngest son of Kim Jong Il, was selected to succeed his father as the head of state in North Korea in the spring of 2012.  Park Geun Hye, the first female president of South Korea assumed office in February 2013.  Xi Jinping assumed the office of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China in November of 2012 and is expected to continue the trend of moderating the party.  Although American President, Barack Obama, is in his second term of office defense spending and budgetary concerns in general are major factors temporing the American position with regard to North Korea, however a weak response from Washington would likely hamstring President Obama's goals of disarmament and non-proliferation in other key areas of interest, most notably Iran.

Are North Korea's threats a gift to the US industrial military complex?

The US has announced plans to increase its West Coast missile defense force by 50%, citing the possibility of a mainland nuclear missile attack by North Korea. In particular, it plans to deploy another 14 ground-based interceptor missiles to Fort Greely, Alaska, by 2017 at a cost of one billion US dollars.

The missile defense (MD) system is being criticized as a waste of taxpayer money, raising questions about its effectiveness when tests have resulting in an interception success rate of only around 50%. The country’s aim, however, is to cement its comparative superiority at a time when many other countries have long-range ballistic missiles. This is why the US has spent such astronomical sums on its MD system, and why the development accounts for such a sizable chunk of the American defense industry.

The North Korean “threat” of hitting the mainland US with a nuclear weapon has already been laughed off by Washington. Its attention is focused less on the possibility of such a strike than on finding an excuse to beef up its MD budget. The big beneficiary is the defense industry. In other words, the North Korean nuclear missile threat is essentially a big gift to the American military-industrial complex. Meanwhile, South Korea has no small part in boosting this industry, as the world’s single biggest importer of US weaponry.

Now the US faces a new challenge in its international relations, namely the rise of China.

Since the Cold War ended, the US struggle for political hegemony with China has become unavoidable, with the two sides facing off in a cool relationship where neither is friend nor foe. Washington has maintained a “pivot to Asia” focus in its diplomatic policy, an idea articulated by President Barack Obama underscoring the new importance of the Asia Pacific region. The MD expansions represent a strategy to maintain military dominance in East Asia vis-a-vis China, while also serving as a safeguard for economic expansion in the region.

International relations experts called this a “strong message” from the US to China, which it hopes will use its leverage to encourage North Korea to give up its nuclear program. But this idea is also flawed. In the first place, the expansions show that Washington has no intention of pursuing a peaceful resolution with Pyongyang, but is instead looking out for the interests of defense companies.

Second, while China does place some importance on resolving the nuclear issue in its North Korea policy, it is focused more on preventing the regime in Pyongyang from collapsing, and it is not likely to compromise its own international prestige under military pressure from the US. Indeed, the new Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping is more likely to respond to this pressure by beefing up the country’s armaments and facing off against the US in the power battle. Third, even if the US does succeed in getting China to pressure North Korea, Pyongyang is not likely to give up its nuclear program without some guarantee of its own regime security. In short, all the MD reinforcements have done is to give China an excuse to face off against the US.

Under Xi, China is voicing a new slogan: the “great revival of the Chinese nation.” Pride in being Chinese is being emphasized like never before, as is the country’s new superpower standing. This links with the ambitions toward the rest of East Asia, which were in evidence not long after the Xi administration took over. The MD reinforcements from the US are a sign that the power battle between Washington and China is going to center around the Korean Peninsula.

In the bipolar era where the US and the Soviet Union reigned, Koreans spent a half-century enduring hardship and adversity. Now, they appear poised to be sucked back into the vortex of another battle for Asian hegemony, this one between the US and China. This could mean yet another crisis for an already much-abused peninsula.

Darpa, Drones, & Dollars

Last month, Darpa (the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) launched a program that aims to  design something called a TERN, or Tactically Exploitative Reconnaissance Node, a surveillance and strike drone that can fly up to 900 miles from the deck of a destroyer. Darpa released a full, formal solicitation for the drone in a statement, noting that: "The TERN will be substantially beyond current state-of-the-art aviation capabilities from smaller ships." The solicitation placed heavy emphasis on the "node" component of TERN and highlighted the fact that Darpa encouraged its potential research teams to explore the capabilities of  the new drones to exploit cooperation between aircraft and ship to achieve enhanced performance. Such cooperation could potentially take the form of data exchange, external energy addition, and/or manipulation of the recovery environment.


The solicitation itself is interesting from a technological perspective, but there are implications stemming from the TERN program that extend beyond just enhanced drone warfare. Most significantly, the collaborative effort points to fact that the Navy and the Air Force are working on a master concept for future partnered operations called AirSea Battle. However, the parameters of such a comprehensive model are still ill-defined, even in the nascent stages. Its architects have yet to concretely announce how exactly long-range bombers and stealth jets are supposed to work alongside carrier strike groups, submarines or close-to-shore fighters. Another core problem is the lack of a common communication structure between the two branches of the military. This would likely cause serious tactical problems and lead to failed coordinated efforts. 


I personally have two primary hesitations for funneling government money into the development of the TERN program. Fundamentally, I think coordination is often a positive and constructive effort. However, TERN would require the configuration and implementation of a "bilingual" communication system that could communicate with both Navy ships and Air Force planes. This would likely be an exorbitantly costly endeavor that quite frankly seems implausible at the moment given sequestration and defense budget issues. What makes the proposal even less appealing is the fact that ultimately, it may not even work. One of TERN’s major technical obstacles is “devising a reliable launch and recovery technique,” according to Darpa itself. LCSs and destroyers don’t have the deck space for a long takeoff run which explains their reliance on the catapult-launched alternatives in the past. It's a hard sell to inject billions of dollars into a comprehensive data system overhaul when its success isn't even guaranteed. 


More importantly, we must first define the paramaters of the drone program itself before we work on expanding drone capabilities. The program continues to be shrouded in secrecy and, as some would argue, continues to lack a concrete legal basis. To expand drone capacity into naval territory would be to get ahead of ourselves at a time when the very foundations and competencies of the drone program are still up for debate. 

Shifting the Armed Drones Program from the CIA to the Pentagon

          The Obama administration has come under increasingly intense scrutiny for its targeted killings using drones over the last two years, causing the White House to consider a policy shift of the lethal targeting drone program from the CIA to the Pentagon. While there are some benefits to the U.S. in allowing the CIA to maintain its drone program, a shift of the program to the Pentagon will be more beneficial from a public, Congressional, and international credibility standpoint, due to the level of transparency and oversight provided under the Pentagon. However, in order to increase the transparency of the program, it should not be put under the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).

 

Although the U.S. has largely held a monopoly on targeted drone killings and was able to keep those operations out of public view for many years, recent developments are creating a need for more transparency in the U.S. drone program. The targeting of U.S. citizens abroad, which has also sparked fear of targeting U.S. citizens on American soil, has increased pressure from growing public and Congressional scrutiny for legal justification. Pressures are also mounting against the U.S. internationally, due to the friction created between the U.S. and other countries, particularly Pakistan, from the increase in civilian casualties caused by U.S. and NATO drone strikes. The study being conducted by the U.N. surrounding civilian casualties will likely bring further pressure from the international community for greater transparency of the U.S. drone program. Furthermore, as other countries begin to implement their own targeted killing drone programs, such as China and Russia, the U.S. can use this opportunity to set the standard for the international community and influence global guidelines on drone policy. In order for the U.S. to continue the use of drones as a part of its warfare, including the war on terrorism, the administration must take steps to institutionalize the program, by refining its standards and creating more transparency.

 

               Both the CIA and the U.S. military currently manage their own separate drone programs with the purpose of carrying out targeted drone strikes. However, only the CIA program is officially considered to be a “covert” mission, meaning that it is deniable under the law. The military’s program is clandestine, but not covert, and therefore not deniable under the law. While the Obama administration maintains that the CIA drone targeting is legally justified under the U.S. Constitution, the covert status of the operations under the CIA have shielded them from information requests made through the Freedom of Information Act.

 

Drone strikes conducted by the CIA have the advantage of targeting decisions being made within the CIA, with little or no input from other agencies. While President Obama is involved in some decisions, he does not sign off on all of them. This allows the CIA significant autonomy and flexibility on deciding when, where, and how to conduct the strikes. Intelligence on targets can be acted upon quickly without interference from outside the CIA, which could otherwise be affected or stopped by regulatory oversight. Additionally, since intelligence is the main focus of the CIA, the quality of intelligence on targets is considered to be much higher than is likely compared with the military’s capabilities.

 

Another advantage of keeping drone strikes as a covert operation is that they are not being conducted by the U.S. military, and therefore can be denied as a type of military combat or infringement on sovereignty. This is particularly important in countries where the U.S. does not have forces on the ground, such as Pakistan, and soon Afghanistan. Once U.S. forces have pulled out of Afghanistan, the use of CIA drones would still allow the U.S. to keep a light footprint there in order to target Al Qaeda operatives (and possibly other threats to the Afghan government). While the CIA is compelled to notify Congress of its intelligence activities, it is not required to seek input on targeted drone strikes. Therefore, while the covert nature of the CIA’s drone strikes has significant advantages for U.S. national security and fighting the war on terror, it does not lend to the oversight and transparency which are being sought by the American public, Congress, and the international community.

 

Shifting the targeted drone program entirely to the military has the potential to toughen the standards for drone strikes, strengthen the accountability of the program, and increase transparency. Transferring the program to the Pentagon would bring it under the oversight of the House and Senate Armed Services committees. With this oversight, the vetting of targeted strikes will be subjected to interagency input, adding an extra layer of accountability. Furthermore, the Pentagon may be subject to budget threats from Congress if the military withholds information or acts contrary to oversight committee authority. From the international community’s standpoint, drone strike operations under the military are likely to be considered more acceptable because the military considers itself to be bound by international law and the laws of war. Finally, transferring the program to the military may potentially increase transparency to the public by the fact that the Pentagon is subject to requests by the citizen Freedom of Information Act.

 

Ensuring oversight is dependent on the program within the Defense Department to which the drone program is transferred. If the program is transferred to  the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), less oversight and transparency can be expected, as the JSOC operates under different rules than the rest of the military. The JSOC is equally as secretive as, if not more so, the CIA, and is therefore less likely to share information about its drone strikes. Furthermore, the JSOC is not required to report targeted attacks to Congress, which could result in less oversight than provided under the CIA program. While the administration should aim to strengthen its imagine at home and abroad by improving the standards and transparency of the drone strike program, the best option is to incorporate the CIA’s program into current the current military drone program.

Dictators and YouTube, A Love Story II

Kim Jong-un has been quite busy of late. Between the nuclear tests, irritating the bulk of the international community, threatening everybody he lays eyes on, and the whole oppressing-his-people schtick, I find it faintly impressive that he also has the time to sit down and slap together videos about how awesome he and his country are. And yet he does:

Yesterday, the North Korean government posted another propaganda video (which I have thoughtfully included above) on both their official website, Uriminzokkiri, and on YouTube. If memory serves, this is his third video so far this year. At the rate he's going, Kim Jong-un is going to have a charming little propaganda film festival before the year is out. Hopefully, it will be possible to buy them all in some sort of DVD/Blu-ray anthology, because I can think of no better stocking stuffer to get for my family and close friends.

I was a little disappointed doing research for this, because I'd hoped that the word "Uriminzokkiri" would have some delightfully stupid translation like "America is the Devil" or "Kim Jong-un is Incredibly Verile," but it is actually quite mundane, transliterating simply to "Our Nation". I suppose it should be of some small comfort that as unhinged as he may be, Kim Jong-un seems to still be a tad more rational than Saparmurat Niyazov. But then, it could simply be he's too busy pillaging video game footage for YouTube videos to go about renaming the entire calendar. Or, he's just not as efficient as a nice, crazy Turkmen.

On the subject of names and words, the "film" itself is titled "A Short, Three-Day War," which is also somewhat underwhelming. I don't speak Korean, but The Telegraph was kind enough to translate a few snippets. Apparently, we all must beware as "crack stormtroops will occupy Seoul and other cities and take 150,000 US citizens as hostages". I don't know where Kim Jong-un's fact-finders have been looking, but I think they may be a tad off with the numbers. I know we have plenty of troops stationed in South Korea, and its delightfully high standard of living has made it a popular spot for American expats (the schnazzy music helps), but 150,000 seems like a touch of an exaggeration.

And I'm not even going to touch the sketchy karaoke music playing in the back. It had me simultaneously thinking of Cher and Dschinghis Khan. Not a good combination.

Russian Naval Expansion: Military Threat or Diplomatic Opportunity?

The high seas are instrumental in facilitating international commerce, however the combination of sheer size, limited scope of policing efforts, and less developed international governing bodies as compared to land based commercial exchange creates an environment which requires countries with global economic interests to take security into their own hands or otherwise rely upon close allies with a strong naval capacity.
A period of sustained economic growth beginning in the late 1990's has propelled Russia to a level of global economic relevance not experienced since prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union.  As Russia's international economic and political interests continue to expand, so too will its naval ambitions.  So far, the Russian Navy seems to be taking a Corbettian approach to its efforts of naval expansion, seeking to secure sea lanes of commerce rather than positioning itself to win decisive battles against other naval powers.  Russia's recently announced permanent fleet in the Mediterranean will consist of 5-6 ships (a combination of frigates, cruisers, and support ships).  These ships are equipped with a variety of armaments to include anti-ship missiles, surface to air missiles, and anti-submarine munitions, however the size and composition of this small fleet is best suited for policing vital sea lanes against malicious surface vessels threatening Russian commercial freighters rather than seeking decisive battle with competing navies.
In an era of contracting American naval presence, Russia is seeking to expand its influence around the world by reaching out to former Cold War allies to establish naval bases that will expand Russian influence in South East Asia, Africa, and North America. Currently, the only base outside of Russian sovereign territory is in Tartus, Syria, a facility with a questionable future given the ongoing civil war in the host nation. Russia has entered into talks with Cuba, Vietnam, and Seychelles (an island off the east coast of Africa) about possibly establishing naval facilities in each of these host nations that would effectively expand Russian naval influence beyond its regionally focused capacity to a limited global reach.
Given the composition and limited scope of Russian naval expansion, the American Navy has little to fear in the form of a Russian challenge to its control of the seas.  Furthermore, cooperative efforts between the Russian Navy and the American Navy in combating the common enemy of piracy and jointly responding to international crises and humanitarian assistance opportunities may create efficiencies for both navies that could relieve some of the added budgetary pressures facing the American Navy as well as establish a common interest between the two nations that could serve to repair relations that have so far deteriorated in the 21st century.     

PLA Navy to build overseas military bases?

“International Herald Leader”, a Chinese state-run newspaper publishes a commentary to advise PLA Navy to build oversea naval bases to protect its energy line in Indian Ocean area.
 

The article forecasts 18 possible overseas bases of PLA Navy, including Chongjin Port (North Korea), Moresby Port (Papua New Guinea), Sihanoukville Port (Cambodia), Koh Lanta Port (Thailand), Sittwe Port (Myanmar), DHAKA Port (Bangladesh), Gwadar Port (Pakistan), Hambantota Port (Sri Lanka), Maldives, Seychelles, Djibouti Port (Djibouti), Lagos Port (Nigeria), Mombasa Port (Kenya), Dar es Salaam Port (Tanzania), Luanda Port (Angola) and Walvis Bay Port (Namibia).

Chinese navy to build oversea bases is not a new topic. Couple years ago, news reported that Pakistan has requested China to build its first oversea naval base; Seychelles has proposed the same request as well. Recently, even a rumor has a saying about that Iran would like to provide a small island to China for building an oversea naval base. No matter if it’s true or not, all of these news are a sign of Chinese naval force’s growth, and show that China to build overseas naval bases is becoming a more serious worldwide talk.

China is the second largest economy in the world, and one of the fastest growing economies. Its development is largely relying on importing oversea energy and resources. Most of its oil and gas imports come from Middle East and East Africa (except Russia and Central Asia). And China’s most oversea mineral resources purchase is from Africa, Australia and Brazil. Among all these countries, except Australia and Brazil are on the “East Route”, the rest countries are all on the “West Route”. The “West Route” can be seen as China’s energy line, which is in Indian Ocean area, especially in Strait of Malacca. That’s why we can see 16 of the possible overseas naval bases are all on the “West Route”. Also, China’s growing global economic interests also need China to build a reliable naval force.

China has been to avoid the establishment of naval bases abroad is largely due to the legacy of its long-term foreign policy, non-interference in internal affairs of others and non-aligned foreign policy, especially the principle of no overseas military bases. However, this declaration has become less high profile in recent years. . In last year’s 18^th CCP National Congress, former leader of China, Hu urged to build strong national defense and powerful armed forces that are commensurate with China’s international standing and meet the needs of its security and development interests. This actually provides the legitimacy for China to build an overseas naval presence. Another realistic reason is that Chinese naval force is still weak. PLA still doesn’t have the ability and capability to build military bases abroad. But as China’s first aircraft carrier - Liaoning’s service in PLA Navy, the Chinese navy has already officially started its journey in blue water.

In fact, there is no reason to doubt that China intends to create a world network of military bases, so that the PLA have the ability to support China’s growing global interests. Even Japan has built its first overseas naval base already. And PLA achieves global presence is also a necessary step of China’s road to rise. PLA Navy to build overseas naval bases is just a time issue.